A PHENOMENOLOGY OF FITNESS FROM CONSUMPTION TO VIRTUOUS PRODUCTION by Neville, Ross, (Thesis)
Technological University Dublin 
ARROW@TU Dublin 
Theses, Doctoral School of Culinary Arts and Food Technology 
2012-9 
A PHENOMENOLOGY OF FITNESS FROM CONSUMPTION TO 
VIRTUOUS PRODUCTION 
Ross Neville (Thesis) 
Technological University Dublin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/tfschcafdoc 
 Part of the Recreation Business Commons, and the Sports Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Neville, R., : A PHENOMENOLOGY OF FITNESS FROM CONSUMPTION TO VIRTUOUS PRODUCTION, 
Doctoral Thesis, Dublin Institute of Technology, 2012. 
This Theses, Ph.D is brought to you for free and open 
access by the School of Culinary Arts and Food 
Technology at ARROW@TU Dublin. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Theses, Doctoral by an authorized 
administrator of ARROW@TU Dublin. For more 
information, please contact 
yvonne.desmond@tudublin.ie, arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, 
brian.widdis@tudublin.ie. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License 
 A PHENOMENOLOGY OF FITNESS 
FROM CONSUMPTION TO VIRTUOUS 
PRODUCTION 
 
Ross D. Neville 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Presented to the School of Hospitality Management and Tourism, 





Supervisor: Dr Catherine Gorman  
Associate Supervisor: Dr Sheila Flanagan 
Advisory Supervisor: Prof. Frédéric Dimanche 
Abstract 
Although our imagination as policy-makers, legislators, academics, and 
members of the general public has been captured by the promise of fitness, what is 
meant by it and whether or not its individualising emphasis is a good thing is much 
less clear. In response to this question of cultural significance, this thesis provides a 
phenomenology of fitness. It does so in two important senses and in the context of 
two distinct parts. 
The first half of this thesis (Chapters One and Two) is given to the task of 
bracketing the natural attitude with respect to fitness; that is, contextualising the 
question of its cultural embeddedness within processes of reflexive embodiment that 
are at play in modern society. “Being fit,” it is argued in this context, implies “being 
fit for something” (something other than health) or “being fit for someone” (someone 
other than oneself). And, having lost some (if not all) of its modernist illusions and 
its progressivist convictions to social regeneration, the task of “being fit” is framed 
as an ambivalent one, akin to the modern-day Sisyphus, and gestural of the self-
reflexivity inherent in late-modern consumer society. 
By shifting the organisation of attention from ambivalence, the second half of 
this thesis (Chapters Three and Four) examines the possibilities for a positive 
appropriation of fitness beyond mere consumption activity. By focusing on fitness at 
the level of action and interaction (where meaning relates to use and practice) the 
second half of this thesis opens up the possibilities for a re-description of fitness (of 
Sisyphus) on the basis of the following proposition: fitness is something we 
negotiate, despite it being something we never really achieve. Findings from twelve 
elaborative phenomenological interviews emanating from an ethnographic orientation 
over a two and a half year period are given towards this end. They indicate that 
i 
consigning fitness to mere consumption activity overlooks the importance of 
participants’ meaning-making activities, their motivations, and the pleasures that accrue 
on the basis of ongoing activity and increased experience. They indicate that, if “doing 
fitness” enables individuals to become acquainted with these internal goods, then “being 
someone through fitness” can operate as an indexical marker of virtue. 
The possibilities for a Complemental Model of Health and fitness and for a 
novel approach to talking about the fit body are discussed in conclusion (Chapter 
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‘Fitness: something everyone understands but no one can define precisely.’ 
Stephen C. Stearns, Quarterly Review of Biology 
 
One of the most commonly visited sites for recreational consumption is the 
modern day fitness club. What was traditionally niche and merely the preserve of the 
barbells and beefcakes has spawned an infrastructure so vast that the fitness industry 
is now considered one of the true powerhouses in international commercial leisure. 
In fact, such is the extent of this proliferation that the practice of “going to the gym” 
and “working out” has sparked a cultural phenomenon offering opportunities for 
leisure from a variety of traditionally institutionalised disciplines. The industry 
boasts steady growth over the past four decades and, over the last number of years 
(since 2004) in particular, has come to the fore as the leisure facilities sector’s 
leading segment (Datamonitor, 2011). In 2010, for example, the fitness clubs 
segment of the global leisure facilities sector generated total revenues of $62.9 
billion – over 45 per cent of the sector’s overall value – representing a compound 
annual growth rate for the period 2006 to 2010 of almost 3.5 per cent (Datamonitor, 
2011). This, however, appears to be a modest analysis of the industry’s vibrancy. A 
more encompassing analysis of the fitness industries conducted on behalf of the 
International Health, Racquet and Sportsclub Association (IHRSA, 2010) reported 
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 that, in 2009, the sector was worth $70 billion. It is difficult to think of another 
industry, given such mitigating economic conditions, with such a strong growth 
trend. As Hans Muench, IHRSA Director (Europe) noted in 2008, not many people 
are aware of the fact that ‘for the last 20+years, our industry has grown 
consistently...proving itself to be recession resilient’ (Amend, 2008, p. 16; see also 
IHRSA, 2009). According to IHRSA (2010), over 128, 000 clubs served 
approximately 119 million members in 2009, many of whom, despite the economic 
adversity, were new members (see also Club Industry, 2009; Kufahl, 2010). But 
perhaps most striking among industry trends is the fact that growth in the fitness 
industries has been strong worldwide, as opposed to being confined to the 
traditionally high-performing North American and European markets; a testament to 
the global appeal of keep-fit culture (IHRSA, 2009, 2010). 
In spite of the extent of this growth, it would be a perverse misunderstanding of 
the magnitude of fitness to consider its significance in mere quantitative terms. 
Rather, the modern experience of fitness is the product of the coming together of a 
great many social, political, economic, and material factors. Its significance, for 
example, is clearly evidenced by the fact that it is both shaped by and has shaped the 
major trends of contemporary leisure – e.g. privatisation, commercialisation, 
rationalisation, hybridisation, simulation. In particular, relentless processes of 
individualisation (and a general decline in the membership of traditional social, 
sporting and community organisations) have shaped the emergence and increasing 
prevalence of gym-going and working out as physically active leisure forms 
(Bauman, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2007; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Putnam, 2000; 
Rojek, 1985, 2010a). In a more general sense, the prolonged success of fitness is 
related to the fact that our imagination as policy-makers, legislators, academics, and 
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 members of the general public has been captured by the promise of fitness. It is a 
promise of actualising new standards of wellbeing in the public domain and of 
physical capital in the private domain; a promise that is driven by capitalism’s much 
maligned relation with the body and self-identity. Whether fitness is analysed at the 
public or private level, however, one theme seems to resonate today: fitness has 
largely replaced health as the desired, normative status for individuals in advanced 
modern societies. It might be argued that these representations and the moralisation 
of body-work typically associated with fitness is not entirely peculiar to modern 
culture (especially given the prevalence of dietetics and physical regimen dating as 
far back as antiquity see e.g. Foucault, 1992; Giddens, 1993; Sassatelli, 2006a). The 
development of an elaborate and sophisticated discourse on body maintenance and 
modification practices, and an industry to serve the needs of an increasingly 
sedentary, consumer lifestyle-oriented, and body-conscious society, however, 
certainly is a modern phenomenon. 
Of critical importance to this modern emphasis on fitness include such things as 
advances in modern medicine by means of the biomedical health model,1 the near 
wholesale eradication of acute and infectious diseases, and the increasing prevalence 
of chronic and degenerative conditions in their place (Beaglehole & Bonita, 2004; 
Diez-Roux, 1998; Pearce, 1996; Petersen, 1997; Petersen & Lupton, 1996). 
Understanding the magnitude of keep-fit culture implies an understanding of the 
general shift in emphasis in the model of healthcare that has occurred from reactive 
to proactive approaches to life-politics (e.g. towards practising preventative as 
opposed to only curative medicine). With Type 2 diabetes, heart disease, obesity, 
hypertension, high cholesterol, stroke, and high blood pressure among the major 
                                                            
1 In using the term “biomedical” to discuss the modern health context, I mean to imply the dual aspects 
of both clinical practice (which focuses more narrowly on individual health) and epidemiological research 
(which focuses more broadly on public health). 
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 social health problems of the 21st century, chronic conditions are now increasingly 
being framed as individual responsibilities to be obviated through an array of body 
modification and maintenance practices. The fact that autonomous, responsibly-
informed individuals are now encouraged to make cost-benefit analyses of life 
options and trajectories is a testament to the conceptual importance of fitness in the 
modern health context. Public projects of wellbeing are now almost inseparable from 
private projects of self-creation. They have been aligned to the extent that, where 
health designates a public recognition of wellbeing, fitness acts as its private 
corollary. Although this model has roots that are over four decades old – having been 
reinforced on the basis of the naturalisation of self-work into the sphere of leisure 
time (see Rojek, 2010a, 2010b; Smith Maguire, 2008a, 2008b; Smith Maguire & 
Stanway, 2008) – it is most clearly evidenced in contemporary calls for healthcare 
reform, and in collaborative efforts of both the medical community and the fitness 
industry of which the recently established “Exercise is Medicine” programme is a 
product (Jonas & Phillips, 2009; Sallis, 2009; see also Bryant & Peterson, 2006; 
Burnham, 1998; Elrick, 1996). The logic is quite clear: if exercise is medicine, then 
fitness is the new health. But what is meant by fitness is much less clear. 
1.1 Fit for What? Fit for Whom? 
It seems reasonable at the outset of a thesis entitled A Phenomenology of Fitness 
to demarcate some distinct ground from which one can proceed. This means 
asserting what is meant by phenomenology in the first instance and by fitness in the 
second. The more daunting word perhaps, phenomenology, is one that, for present 
purposes, will be delimited to a description. To undertake a phenomenology is to 
undertake a description of some phenomenon (phenomenology, Husserl wrote, is a 
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 descriptive science). So, what is fitness such that it might be submitted to a 
phenomenological description? 
While our imagination has certainly been captured by the possibility of fitness, 
and we have been impressed by its apparent universality as a normative imperative, 
it would be remiss to attribute to it an assumed, stable and shared meaning. It is quite 
clear, for example, that there has been a shift in the ways in which people talk about 
and relate to their bodies. Expert knowledge about such things as exercise, fitness, 
health, wellbeing, obesity, Body Mass Index, calories, diets, nutrition, 
supplementation, vitamins, minerals, fats, proteins and carbohydrates, now play a 
large part in everyday language, the modern identity narrative, and the reflexive 
project of the self. In his The Transformation of Intimacy, for example, Giddens 
(1993; see also Giddens, 1991) makes the broad sweeping claim that everyone today 
in the developed world is on a diet. There is much truth to this. But it seems to only 
tell one part of the story. People today are not only concerned with what they put 
into their body (though this is significant enough in itself), but what they can get out 
of it. Concerns with respect to the normal functioning of the body are now coupled 
with – and have perhaps even been effaced in large part by – considerations with 
respect to the body’s potential. That is to say, modern selves no longer merely bear 
witness to the body-in-itself, but to the body-for-itself, the body-for-others, and what 
the body can do (see Baudrillard, 1998; Bourdieu, 1984; Buchanan, 1997; Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1983, 1987; Fox, 2002; Fox & Ward, 2008a, 2008b; Markula, 2006; 
Pronger, 2002).  
In spite of this performative shift and the widespread adoption of something like 
a fitness vernacular, what is meant exactly by fitness is much less clear. As the 
evolutionary biologist Stearns (1976, p. 4; see opening quote to this chapter) wrote, 
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 fitness is ‘something everyone understands but no one can define precisely.’ 
Bourdieu (1998) made a similar point when trying to elucidate the role of sport in 
society. According to Bourdieu, talking about sport is difficult because it is too easy: 
‘everyone has their own ideas on the subject, and feels able to say something 
intelligent about it’ (ibid, p. 15). This very fact, it seems, is exacerbated when it 
comes to talking about fitness. Having a body and being concerned with its status (its 
health, fitness, wellbeing, etc.) appears to be the most self-evident of things. ‘[O]ur 
body,’ Simmel (1997, p. 210) wrote, ‘is our first and most unconditional possession.’ 
‘We have only one body and it has to be saved,’ wrote Baudrillard (1998, p. 129) in 
a similar vein. However, as Smith Maguire (2008a) has observed, asking people 
what they mean when they say “I think I’m fit,” or “S/he doesn’t look fit,” rarely 
leads to a straightforward definition. Making sense of fitness is a difficult task 
because it is within everyone’s purview; because it defines us as we try to define it as 
our object of attention. However, that fitness is a slippery concept is a fact cloaked 
by seemingly incontrovertible evidence in existing medico-scientific literatures, the 
media, and popular press to the contrary. 
The elusive nature of fitness is surely related to general changes in the way 
people have viewed the body over time. And while this is likely associated with 
exercise’s shift in emphasis from the margins of conventional leisure practice, 
changes in our understandings of fitness are perhaps more closely associated with the 
intensification and sophistication of epidemiological research and the biomedical 
model. On the one hand, this has led to a more refined conceptualisation of fitness. 
For example, fitness was traditionally defined by the U.S. President’s Council on 
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 Physical Fitness and Sports2 (1971, cited in Casperson, Powell & Christenson, 1985) 
as the capacity to carry out one’s daily activities without undue fatigue and with 
sufficient energy left in reserve to engage in leisurely activities or to attend to 
emergency situations (see also Bouchard, Shephard & Stephens, 1994; Greenberg, 
Dintiman & Meyers Oakes, 2004; Keong, 1981; McCormack Brown, Thomas & 
Kotecki, 2002; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1998). However, 
changes in societal conditions – i.e. changes in the nature of our social-material 
activity environments, work-leisure relations, and the growth of the consumer and 
service industry sectors – have now led to a re-evaluation of what is meant by the 
term. This has certainly been the case in the U.S. with The President’s Council on 
Physical Fitness and Sports (2000) declining to offer a simple definition, 
demarcating instead a number of identifiable physiological, health, skill, and sports 
related components. 
Of particular note is the significant increase in attention being paid to matters of 
public fitness (though this is something of a logical misnomer), including the 
development of complex causal models of disease prevention and the subsequent 
development of interventionist approaches to public welfare. This “refinement,” 
however, has led to an increasingly reductive position, prefigured in large part by the 
growth and development of the new epidemiological research. As Casperson et al. 
(1985, p. 126) remarked, ‘[t]he epidemiological study of any concept or event 
                                                            
2 The President’s Council has undergone a number of name changes/extensions since its inauguration in 
1956 as “The President’s Council on Youth Fitness” under the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
In 1963, John F. Kennedy expanded on the mandate of these original formulations to include all 
Americans with “The President’s Council on Physical Fitness.” In 1966 Lyndon B. Johnson broadened 
the council’s remit to include sports (“The President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports”). And 
finally, in 2010 under the Obama administration, given the rising pressures at the level of public policy for 
the food industries to contribute in the efforts to combat the plague of adult and childhood obesity, the 
council has expanded to “The President’s Council on Physical Fitness, Sports and Nutrition” (for an 
overview see Department of Health and Human Services, 1998; The President’s Council on Physical 
Fitness and Sports, 2006; The President’s Council of Physical Fitness, Sports and Nutrition, 2011). Where 
the council is referred in the text, its name at the time of the publication of the source will be used. This 
will help to avoid attributing outdated views to the council as it presently exists. 
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 requires that the item under investigation be defined and measured.’ Under the 
commitment to this symbolic generalisation then, fitness has to be reduced from the 
very beginning in order that it might be observationally testable. Just as a whole host 
of diseases, disorders, perversions, and afflictions came to be defined in terms of 
identifiable and observable symptoms to be isolated and treated with the onset of the 
modernising world (see e.g. Foucault, 1998, 2001, 2003), so too the epidemiological 
emphasis on fitness has settled on a definition that underscores composites of 
individual physical abilities relative to established benchmarks. Operating from this 
individual base then, fitness is marked only by its proximity to statistically typical 
(and verifiable) functional abilities. Although there is much merit to be attributed to 
the relational basis upon which the terms of fitness are spelled out, something rather 
peculiar is happening – the more we talk about fitness the narrower its scope 
becomes. 
It is important to note from the outset that this thesis will resist this latter 
position such is its timeless, asocial, and ahistorical approach to the study of fitness. 
This thesis will resist the temptation to constrain fitness in this manner. It will resist 
the temptation to locate fitness at the expense of the mystery that inspired it in the 
first place; namely, that fitness presupposes a culture and material environment in 
which certain functional abilities are valued. Fitness is nothing if not a cultural 
phenomenon (see Featherstone, 1982; Freund & Martin, 2004; Glassner, 1989, 1990; 
Sassatelli, 2005; Smith Maguire, 2002, 2008a; Volkwein, 1998; White, Young & 
Gillett, 1995). That fitness is a cultural phenomenon implies grounding it in 
biological needs and physiological capacities only in so far as these are mediated by 
a dynamic set of complex, socio-historical and materially contingent, practices, 
values, and behaviours. It is to acknowledge that “being fit” implies, from the very 
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 beginning, being “fit for...” (fit for something or, perhaps more insidiously, fit for 
someone). It is to acknowledge that fitness is a relational term and that 
comprehensive account must also express the way the body is related to a social, 
historical, and material order of causality. 
1.2 Aims of the Thesis and Chapter Descriptions 
Since, the general aim of this thesis is to provide a phenomenology of fitness, it 
will help to make a number of preliminary points as prolegomena. Firstly, while 
there are many reasons why certain phenomenological themes have fallen out of 
favour over the past half century, the notion that our descriptions of phenomena 
should proceed by way of bracketing commonsense (or “natural”) attitudes is not one 
of them. With phenomenology, Husserl famously stated, we are to put out of action 
that general positing of the natural attitude. Failure to do so, Husserl and others 
warned, merely leaves us blinded in a haze of biases, pre-notions, and pre-
constructed discourses that do violence to our investigations (Husserl, 1983, 2001 cf. 
Bourdieu, 1998; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994; Foucault, 
1991, 1995, 1998). Secondly, and on this basis, this bracketing of the natural attitude 
implies an acknowledgement that these biases exist. It also implies breaking with 
them as common representations so as to facilitate an attunement to those factors that 
remain implicit in our practices, discourses, and institutions. As the later Heidegger 
(1971, p. 178) argued, to undertake a phenomenology is to come to an understanding 
of the ‘thinging of the thing.’ It is to come to an understanding of how objects come 
to matter for us as things and how a great many objects, artefacts, ideas, practices, 
techniques, technologies, discourses, institutions, infrastructures, events, and 
associations have had to participate in the formation of a relational field of meaning 
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 (i.e. in order to form a “world”). So, if for the phenomenologist the being of an entity 
is its being-in-the-world, then it is only by coming to terms with the assembly of 
these worldly relations that fitness can be understood and rendered amenable to 
conceptualisation. 
This thesis undertakes a phenomenology of fitness in two important senses: (i) 
by bracketing the natural attitude with respect to fitness, and (ii) by providing a 
description of fitness from the perspective of this renewed contextualisation. It 
should be immediately clear that this chapter has begun this process, insofar as it has 
criticised tendencies towards reductionism, and insofar as there has been an 
acknowledgement of fitness’ cultural embeddedness. It is only through the chapters 
that follow that this phenomenology will take its full effect. 
Chapter Two of this thesis, “Making Sense of Fitness,” contextualises the 
question of fitness within the processes of reflexive embodiment at play in modern 
society (i.e. modernity). In order to bracket the natural attitude with respect to fitness 
and to answer the question of fitness’ cultural embeddedness, Chapter Two examines 
the reasons why (in modern society) individuals reflect back on their bodies and 
upon themselves as bodies. That is to say, by contextualising fitness, its cultural 
imagery, practices, discourses, and institutions within a quite specific social-
historical, material and political context, Chapter Two undertakes to make sense of 
fitness as a relational phenomenon. It takes as its primary objective the following 
question: in what sort of a society has fitness come to the fore as a legitimate matter 
of concern? In order to answer this question, the chapter makes a number of 
important moves. Firstly, it highlights what would appear to be the consensus 
position with respect to fitness prior to any unsettling of the natural attitude. It moves 
away from this view in order to frame this consensus in relation to the onset of 
10 
 modernity, the neo-liberal (as opposed to merely biomedical) model of health 
politics, and the risk-centred, individualised orientation to the body and self-identity 
that they presuppose. Fitness’ association with progressivist convictions (to health, 
wellbeing, social regeneration, etc.) is problematised and its association to the 
modern logic of consumption is underscored. The chapter concludes by outlining in 
more detail this problem of fitness: that is, the problem of fitness’ intimate relation 
with idealised images of consumer culture and having become a matter of concern 
quite apart from health. It outlines how, despite the normative status of the fit body 
in modern society, the task of achieving fitness is akin to the task of Sisyphus.  
Fitness is framed as an ambivalent practice, something to be toiled at indefinitely 
without ever actually being achieved. In its concluding paragraphs, Chapter Two 
opens up the possibility for a re-description of fitness on new terms (or, a re-
description of Sisyphus as will be seen). 
Chapter Three, “Towards a Phenomenology of Fitness: Methodological 
Consideration,” takes up the problem of fitness and this task of re-description in 
more detail. It summarises the thesis to that point, takes stock of existing critical 
accounts of fitness and, in particular, outlines the justification for a shift in emphasis 
from critique to matters of concern. In order to do this, a shift in the organisation of 
attention is made away from ambivalence in order to examine the possibilities for 
fitness beyond mere consumption activity. Chapter Three opens up the possibilities 
for a re-description of fitness on the basis of the following proposition: fitness is 
something we negotiate, despite it being something we never really achieve. Therein, 
the thesis is directed towards the generation of a phenomenological description based 
on the following question: What is the structure of this process of negotiation? In 
order to answer this question, Chapter Three directs the thesis towards: 
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 1. An exploration of meaning-making in the context of fitness participant’s 
lived descriptions. 
 
2. An examination the motivational impulses that encourage and nurture 
development in fitness activities. 
 
3. An examination the types of pleasures that accrue to participants through the 
engagement in fitness activities. 
 
Further to this description, considerations (with respect to the research approach) 
including the methods of description, sampling, and pertinent revisions are also 
underscored. A summary of the data-generation situation, considerations pertaining 
to sensitive issues, the process of data interpretation, and the reliability and validity 
of the methodological approach are also presented.  
Chapter Four, “Negotiating the Fit Body: From Consumption to Virtuous 
Production,” presents a re-description of fitness by focusing on the pragmatic level 
of action and interaction where meaning relates to use and practice. Findings from 
twelve elaborative phenomenological interviews emanating from an ethnographic 
orientation over a two and a half year period are given toward this end. In this 
chapter, participants’ own descriptions are deployed in order to follow through on 
the positive proposition that fitness is something individuals negotiate. Chapter Five 
offers a tripartite analysis of fitness’ negotiated dimensions. It (i) reconsiders the 
possibilities for health as a broader narrative frame within which the ambivalent 
character of fitness tends towards coherence, (ii) underscores the dual importance of 
both “doing fitness” and “being someone through fitness” in the context of how 
agency is established with respect to fitness practices, and (iii) explores the 
possibilities for pleasure on the basis of a complex interplay of tension and release. 
The re-description presented in Chapter Four highlights the possibilities for fitness 
beyond mere consumption activity and, in line with the title of this thesis, offers a 
renewed and negotiated conception of virtuous production. 
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 Finally, Chapter Five (“Conclusion: Towards A Complemental Model of Health 
and fitness”) provides a number of concluding remarks and assesses this thesis’ 
significant contributions. It underscores a number of possible limitations and 
examines some opportunities for future research on these bases. In particular, 
Chapter Five outlines the possibilities for a Complemental model of Health and 
fitness as a means of bringing together the findings of this research, consolidating 
some of its potential limitations, and providing an analytic frame under which health 


















MAKING SENSE OF FITNESS 
 
 
‘That which was fit among the animals is not fit among human beings, not merely 
because the animals were non-moral and man is moral; but because the conditions of 
life have changed, and because there is no way to define the term “fit” excepting 
through these conditions.’ 
John Dewey, Evolution and Ethics 
 
 
Making sense of fitness is a difficult task. In Chapter One, this point was 
pressed in relation to fitness’ status as a cultural phenomenon. It was established that 
fitness and its role in society could not be understood by recourse only to its 
significance on mere quantitative terms and that, in order to account for fitness in a 
manner that avoids reductionism, it was necessary to analyse its social-historical, 
material, and political relations (i.e. its conditions of meaning). Given this cultural 
embeddedness, this chapter treats fitness as akin to what Bourdieu (1998, p. 15) 
referred to as a ‘social object.’ That is, it treats fitness as something that is both 
‘hidden behind a screen of pre-constructed discourses’ and in need of a ‘break with 
common representations’ (ibid). To reiterate a point that was made in Chapter One: 
making sense of fitness implies an understanding of how fitness has come to matter 
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 for us and for how a great many participants3 have had to gather in order to form a 
relational field of meaning. If, as the opening quote from this chapter suggests, there 
is no way to define fitness without acknowledging how the conditions of life have 
changed, then the purpose of this chapter is to examine the mechanisms through 
which fitness has been harnessed as a means of salvaging the self and of reorienting 
the body in the face of the consequences of modernity. That is to say, the primary 
objective of this chapter is to address the following question: in what sort of a 
society has fitness come to the fore as a legitimate matter of concern?  
The first section of this chapter, “2.1 The Consensus Statement with Respect to 
Fitness,” follows on from the Introduction in highlighting what would appear to be 
the consensus position with respect to fitness and its axes of intelligibility –
hierarchical and multidimensional structuring. It gives an overview of pertinent 
distinctions between physical activity, exercise, fitness, and health, and of their 
relations as illustrated in various models. The section concludes by illustrating a 
comprehensive hierarchical model of physical activity, fitness, and health.  The 
following two sections of this chapter (“2.2 Fit for Modernity” and “2.3 Fit for 
Consumption”) examine more closely the relational character of fitness, highlighting 
the fact that, as an ontological category, being fit implies being “fit for...” The 
section “Fit for Modernity” underscores the sociological importance of our present 
stage in the history of modernity for understanding the prevalence of fitness in 
modern society. Here, fitness is linked in a very specific way to the privatisation of 
risk typical of neo-liberal economies and a new configuration of power relations that 
treats individuals as the autonomous and creative centres of their own embodied 
                                                            
3 I use the term “participants” in a broad sense here following Hacking (1999) and Latour (2005) in order 
to refer to all of those acts, actors, objects, ideas, practices, techniques, technologies, discourses, 
institutions, infrastructures, events, associations, or actants (Latour’s phrase) that congeal over time in 
order to produce a specific social matrix (Hacking’s phrase). I also advocate the use of “relational field of 
meaning” here insofar as it maintains an emphasis on fitness’ relational character. 
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 destinies. The importance of the organisation of the fitness field as an official 
discourse is also underscored. Section three, “Fit for Consumption,” discusses the 
importance of the role played by consumption in the production, legitimation, and 
reproduction of fitness as a field of practice. It illustrates how, in the society of 
consumers, investments in the body are not only directed towards the autonomous 
ends of subjects and the optimal performance of the body-for-itself, but on the basis 
of an instrumental rationality that requires bodies to be fit for consumption. Section 
four, “Fitness and Ambivalence,” highlights the incompatibility of the neo-liberal 
aspirations for fitness at both the public and private levels and problematises the 
common sense hierarchical associations of fitness, health, and wellbeing. On this 
basis, and in order to (re)configure the role of fitness in the modern experience, the 
grounds for its dislocation from health are discussed in the context of a number of 
important distinctions. This final section is given to the analysis of what might be 
disaffectionately referred to as the problem of fitness; that is, the problem of fitness 
at a normative, perspectival and interpersonal level. In the concluding section, a 
positive appropriation of “the problem of fitness” is established in order to point 







 2.1 The Consensus Statement with Respect to Fitness 
It was outlined in Chapter One that the main theme running through the various 
accounts of fitness over the past number of decades is its relational character. 
Traditionally speaking, this was thought to be a relation of a more general kind in 
which an individual’s fitness was equated with daily, task-related, energy 
expenditure requirements (President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports, 1971, 
cited in Casperson et al., 1985; see also Greenberg, Dintiman & Meyers Oakes, 
2004; Keong, 1981; Malina & Little, 2008; McCormack Brown, Thomas & Kotecki, 
2002; see also WHO, 2011). Although this view seems to resonate quite well with 
the notion of promoting relations of fit between individuals and their activity 
environments – a view that is increasing in appeal, though will not be of primary 
focus in this thesis save for a number of remarks in conclusion – such a view has 
largely been rejected as inadequate and has been replaced by a definition that is more 
“conceptually concise.” While there are a number of specific operational difficulties 
that the traditional definition poses for the epidemiological study of health statuses 
within modern populations, the two most prominent bases for a shift in emphasis are 
fitness’ seemingly multidimensional and hierarchical structuring. Two formulations 
of fitness’ multidimensional character appear to have been particularly formative in 
the literature.4 In the following subsections, the work of Casperson et al. (1985) and 
Bouchard and Shephard (1994; Bouchard, Shephard & Stephens, 1994) will be 
brought together in order to illustrate the general consensus hierarchical model of 
their structuring (in “Figure 2.3 The Hierarchical Model of Health and Fitness” on 
page 24). 
                                                            
4 For a historical overview of fitness’ conceptual development, see U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (1998) Physical Activity and Health: A Report of the Surgeon General (see also Sharma, 1994). 
For a contrasting historical account of the cultural production of fitness see Smith Maguire (2008a). 
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 2.1.1 The Components of Fitness and the Hierarchical Model 
Building on the President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports initial 
formulations (circa 1963/1966 under the Kennedy/Johnson administration; see U.S 
Department of Health and Human Services, 1998), Casperson et al. (1985) drafted a 
position paper in which a number of definitions and distinctions for health-related 
research were underscored. For Casperson et al., the need for a clarification of 
commonly used terms such as “physical activity,” “exercise,” and “fitness” followed 
from the epidemiological imperative to establish standardised terminologies and to 
promote a greater understanding of the relation between each of these terms and their 
subsequent relation to health statuses. They begin by distinguishing between 
physical activity and exercise. ‘Physical activity,’ Casperson et al. (ibid, p. 126; see 
also Dishman, Washburn & Heath, 2004; World Health Organization, 2011) explain, 
is defined as ‘any bodily movement produced by skeletal muscles that results in 
energy expenditure.’ As such, everyone performs physical activity in order to sustain 
life. Although it is often used interchangeably and shares common elements with 
physical activity, the term exercise is largely distinguished from it on the basis of its 
scope.  ‘Exercise,’ Casperson et al. (ibid, p. 128) explain, is best understood as a 
‘planned,’ ‘structured,’ and ‘repetitive...subcategory of physical activity’ that has a 
specific ‘regard [for] physical fitness.’ On the basis that there are a number of 
exercise-related components that contribute to it, fitness is defined as that ‘set of 
attributes that people have or achieve’ (ibid). As the illustration overleaf reveals, 
fitness is a property of individuals, and these properties are deemed to fall into two 



























For Casperson et al., it is clear that fitness is better understood on more specific 
terms than originally conceived, and on the basis of components that can be 
measured in relation to health and skills/athletic abilities. In fact, it might even be 
said for Casperson et al. that the move away from the traditional definition of fitness 
(as general energy expenditure in relation to some specified activity environment) 
towards a definition that accounts for measurable individual components is, in large 
part, attributable to increasing levels of engagement in exercise programmes as 
structured forms of physical activity and the need to account for the effects of this in 
a manner that is amenable to observational testing (a need that is neither 
epistemological nor ontological, but pragmatic). 
Like Casperson et al., and in the consensus statement from the Second 
International Conference on Physical Activity, Fitness, and Health (Bouchard, 
Shephard & Stephens, 1994), Bouchard and Shephard (1994) also emphasised the 
importance of a relation of fit between individuals and their social-material 
environment. ‘In general terms,’ Bouchard and Shephard (ibid, pp. 80-1) explained, 
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 ‘fitness can be conceived as the matching of the individual to his or her physical and 
social environment.’ In spite of this broad encompassing definition, they went on to 
define fitness in terms of ‘those characteristics that permit a good performance of a 
given physical task in a specified physical, social, and psychological environment’ 
(ibid). Like Casperson et al., for Bouchard and Shephard the components of fitness 
are reduced to individual characteristics that can be operationalised within the 
context of two specific goals – performance-related fitness and health-related fitness. 
Their proposed multidimensional model is illustrated in “Figure 2.1 Bouchard and 
Shephard’s Components of Physical Fitness” overleaf. 
In comparison to the work of Casperson et al., Bouchard and Shephard’s 
multidimensional model of fitness is rather more extensive. For them, fitness is best 
measured in line with a broader framework of physiological indicators that include 
(as illustrated above) the workings of the body’s morphologic, muscular, cardio-
respiratory, motor, and metabolic components. This, however, is very much a 
difference in extent and not a difference in kind. In spite of this difference, however, 
what is important for both Casperson et al. (1985) and Bouchard and Shephard 
(1994) is that, where fitness is conceived of as a relation (matching or performance) 
between individual characteristics (or attributes) and activity environment, this 
relation is deemed to be observational in terms of typical statistical efficiency. Taken 
together then, the consensus position entails treating fitness as a multidimensional 
phenomenon at the level of the individual and as a measure of individual bodily 
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At a more general level, the consensus position entails treating physical activity 
and exercise, fitness, and health in a discrete manner and as related to one another on 
the basis of a shared plane of causality. It is on this basis that the consensus position 
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 is referred to as being hierarchical and, thus, as exhibiting the following logical 
relations: physical activity and exercise contribute to fitness which contributes to a 
state of positive health, which is indicative of overall wellbeing. It is also notable 
that, for both Casperson et al. (1985) and Bouchard and Shephard (1994), health-
related components (as opposed to performance-related ones) are deemed most 
important in the hierarchical configuration. That is to say, within the hierarchical 
model, it is health that functions as the most important goal or, more accurately, as 
the higher order construct. Although the consensus position evidences a clear 
commitment to public health research, it also clearly reflects an epistemological 
commitment to the methodological principles of epidemiological research and a 
political commitment to the alignment of the biomedical model’s two principle 
referents (individual and public health). An updated hierarchical model which 
usefully conceptualises the consensus position and which outlines the 
aforementioned relations is presented overleaf on page 24.5 
In order that this multidimensional-hierarchical model might be accepted as the 
consensus statement within the exercise science community, it will be useful to make 
three final observations. Firstly, the model continues to form the basis for the 
President’s Council on Fitness, Sports and Nutrition account of their key terms and 
definitions in the field (President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports, 2000). In 
fact, it forms the basis for the U.S Department of Health and Human Services (1998) 
most extensive report of the Surgeon General on physical activity and health which 
bring together, with the President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports, a 
consensus statement from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention and the 
National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion. Secondly, 
                                                            
5 The relevance of this model might be further underscored by highlighting the fact that it was formulated 
on the back of a large-scale review of exercise-, fitness-, and health-related research between the period 
1990 and 2000 (Blair, Cheng & Holder, 2001). 
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even a brief online search indicates that both Casperson et al. (1985) and Bouchard 
and Shephard (1994) serve as foundational source material for operational 
definitions of key terms within exercise science research across a number of sub-
disciplines (and in an international context). Related to this, and the final reason for 
accepting this multidimensional-hierarchical model as the consensus position, is the 
fact that, where existing research is concerned, the nature and relations of physical 
activity, exercise, fitness, and health are deemed to be suitably amenable to empirical 
research and scarcely pose any significant conceptual issues. On these bases, it 
seems hardly an over-estimation of its internal validity to refer to this model as the 
consensus position within the international exercise science community. 
  


























Adapted from Blair et al. (2001, p. 380) 
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 2.1.2 Towards an Account of Fitness and its Cultural Embeddedness 
In spite of this internal validity, a number of problems with the hierarchical 
model have been highlighted within other (seemingly non-related) literatures. From 
the perspective of the sociology of the body and the sociology of health and illness, 
for example, the relation between health and fitness has been deemed especially 
problematic (see e.g. Bauman, 1998a, 2000, 2001, 2005; Bauman & May, 2001; 
Glassner, 1989, 1990; Smith Maguire, 2007, 2008a). And this is not merely for the 
well known fact that what makes one fit does not necessarily make one healthy, but 
also, because aligning health and fitness is deeply political (see e.g. Foucault, 1980; 
Frew & McGillivray, 2005; Holmes, Murray, Perron & Rail, 2006; Markula, 1997, 
1998, 2001, 2006; Pronger, 2002; Smith Maguire, 2008a; White et al., 1995).6 
Although this chapter will explore these political considerations in more detail, it 
will suffice to say for now that a general disillusionment with the consensus position 
has resulted from its neglect of contextual factors and its latent value neutrality.  
There is clearly a broad emphasis within the consensus position on the social 
and material configuration of activity environments individuals inhabit. However, 
the more specific emphasis on the descriptive characteristics of individual bodies is a 
testament to this neutralist position. This construction of the individual on value-
neutral terms is problematic. For one, it emphasises only what an individual can do 
(through diet, physical activity, consumption, and stress management, for example) 
to effect a change in their body’s physiological systems (that is to say, morphologic, 
muscular, cardio-respiratory, motor, and metabolic systems) such that they can 
increase the chances of experiencing higher-order outcomes (notably, health). As 
such, accounts of fitness constructed in this manner merely become accounts of the 
                                                            
6 Whether this alignment is “political” or “pragmatic” is an issue that I take up in the following chapter 
(Chapter Three) and again in conclusion (Chapter Five). 
25 
 individual that implicate them within already existing environments (rather than vice 
versa).7 Accounts of “individual fitness,”8 therefore, have proceeded at the expense 
of a broader range of relations that impact on the body. As Freund and Martin (2004) 
have explained, fitness is more than a mere property of individuals (or ‘mind-
bodies,’ to use their term, ibid, p. 274). Fitness, they continue, is constructed within 
cultural contexts in which uses of the body occur. And, since the consensus position 
largely brackets this conditioning environmental factor, it has become largely 
disembedded from the context of habitual social practice. The result of this 
disembedding, Freund and Martin explain, is that fitness has been reduced to an 
individual commodity that is sequestered from the daily life-worlds in which it is a 
matter of concern. So, although consensus perspectives highlight social, cultural and 
environmental conditions in a general sense – and, thus, that fitness might be deemed 
to be a valued capacity in relation to such conditions – it is clear that this important 
value component is largely ignored. The often silent hand of culture, it seems, 
presents a broad suite of variables that extend too far beyond the remit of the 
controlled epidemiological research environment.  
To use a phrase from Chapter One, the consensus position seems to proceed at 
the expense of the mystery that inspired it in the first place – namely, that fitness 
presupposes a culture in which certain capacities attributed to individuals are valued 
and that it is, therefore, a cultural phenomenon. This has at least two implications. 
At best, this value-neutrality proceeds at the expense of a whole host of relations that 
have sedimented in ideality over time. At worst, it proceeds at the expense of a more 
                                                            
7 One might even go as far as to say that the broken line traversing the illustration in “Figure 2.2 The 
Hierarchical Model of Health and Fitness” plays an important role in demarcating those variables which 
are related to the individual and, hence, amenable to close observation from those which are outside of 
the individual and are not. 
8 As opposed to the earlier conceptions of fitness discussed previously. Or, for example, as opposed to 
Eisenhower’s (1956, cited in United States Government Printing Office, 1999a, p. 579) emphasis on ‘total 
fitness’ in the early days of The President’s Council. 
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 deep-seated political agenda which shows how the notion of “being fit” can imply 
“being fit for something” (something other than health) and, perhaps more 
insidiously, “being fit for someone” (someone other than oneself). 
In order to account for fitness’ cultural embeddedness, it is important to 
acknowledge that, as a widely used predicate, it does more than describe the 
characteristic features of individual bodies. Rather, our modern notion of fitness has 
served to create, shape, and utilise bodies in ways that align with the interests of our 
dynamic modern social configuration. It is in this sense that fitness has to be 
understood in terms of a social organisation of activity that implicates the body and 
the self in ways not prominent in previous modes of sociality. In order to outline the 
contours of this value-ladenness, it is necessary to understand how the dynamic and 
disembedding features of our present stage in the history of modernity (the shifting 
nature of time-space relations, risk, power, and capital) have imposed new meanings 
upon the body and self-identity (thus making them thoroughly reflexive). The 
following sections are given specifically to this task.  
2.2 Fit for Modernity 
My emphasis hitherto on “modern” society or “modernity” is noteworthy and, in 
general, I mean to invoke an image of social organisation that has proliferated from 
the seventeenth century onwards and which has become largely worldwide in 
influence (see Berman, 1983; Giddens, 1990). More specifically, with the term 
modernity, I mean to align this study with what Giddens (1990, 1991) referred to as 
“high,” “late,” or “radicalised” modernity, what Beck (1992) referred to as the 
“second” modernity, what Beck, Lash, and Giddens (1994) referred to as “reflexive 
modernity,” and what Bauman (2000) has referred to as “liquid” modernity. In fact, 
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 in many respects, my use of the term modernity will align closely with many features 
associated with the mode of social formation that has be designated as “post-” 
modern (Lyotard, 1984; see also Baudrillard, 1983, 1994; Harvey, 1989). A number 
of points will suffice to make explicit what is meant by modernity before proceeding. 
For Giddens (1990, 1991), who is arguably the most prominent sociologist of 
modernity, the modern world is not merely different in configuration and in relation 
to previous modes of sociality. Rather, it is more dynamic in both scope and 
profoundness. Although it has established a greater global interconnectedness which 
has been lauded, the distancing of time-space relations – a characteristic feature of 
modernity (see Berman, 1983; Harvey, 1989) – has also altered some of the most 
intimate and personal features of everyday life. Notably, and given this distancing of 
time and space, the private sphere has become increasingly influenced by areas quite 
distant from it. In fact, the configuration of modern institutions and political 
structures now connect the private and public spheres in ways not prominent in 
previous modes of sociality. Abstract and expert systems of knowledge now 
penetrate and organise people’s lives in ways previously accomplished by local 
systems of interaction. And since these systems have to organise and deploy 
technical and specialised knowledge in a manner that is amenable to action, trust acts 
as our primary re-embedding mechanism. ‘In respect of expert systems,’ Giddens 
(1991, p. 19) explains, ‘trust brackets the limited technical knowledge which most 
people possess about coded information which routinely affects their lives.’ Trust 
acts as a means of binding time and space. And since “moderns” are reliant on this as 
their primary means of reintegration and control in the face of ontological insecurity, 
the experience of modern life is tempered by risk. This notion that modernity is 
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 unique in terms of how individuals relate to risk is an important factor in accounting 
for fitness and other culturally elaborated ways of attending to the body. 
2.2.1 Fitness and the Privatisation of Risk 
That modernity has become synonymous with risk culture is prominent in the 
work of a great many social theorists (e.g. Bauman, 1991; Beck, 1992; Beck, 
Giddens & Lash, 1994; Castels, 1991; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Giddens, 1990, 
1991). Since the distanciation of time and space has led to an undermining of locally 
based meaning systems (systems that had procedural rituals for legitimising shared 
identities) the onset of modernity has inflicted in individuals a heightened reflexivity 
and susceptibility to risk. In the modern world, for example, one can no longer rely 
on custom, tradition, or norms to frame an ascribed identity. Rather, by eroding 
traditions, secured identities, and templates for biographical trajectories, the 
advancement of modernity has implicated in individuals the requirement to construct 
their own identities. This declaration of the need to achieve self-affirmation (over 
self-determination) is nowhere more evident than in Nietzsche’s opening of the 
modern self to the possibility of an infinite number of interpretations. As Nietzsche 
(1996, p. 30) explained, ‘there is no ‘being’ behind doing, acting, becoming.’ Rather, 
moderns ‘become who [they] are – human beings who are new, unique, 
incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves’ (Nietzsche, 2001, 
p. 189). Modernity is inherently risky because individuals are implicated in the 
creation of their own identities amidst a diversity of options and within a plurality of 
social worlds. Self-making is an inherently risky business because, as Nietzsche 
(1996, p. 42) warned, ‘[t]he ability to guarantee one’s self with all due pride...is...a 
ripe fruit, but also a late fruit’ (original emphases).  
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 The modern world is inherently risky because it is characterised by a shift in the 
burden of risk associated with life options and choices. Self-making is no longer the 
remit of the social body in total. Rather it is the remit of the individual and 
characterised by what Foucault (2000) has referred to as individualising power. That 
is to say, if, as Foucault explained, each historical epoch has specific ways of 
producing the kinds of bodies that conform to its needs as an economic system, then 
the privatisation of risk is the means by which modern power has reached into the 
attitudes and actions of individuals. It is also the ultimate context under which fitness 
has come to the fore because it is under this intensifying risk context that individuals 
have on taken a more reflexive relation to their embodied self. It will suffice to make 
three important points concerning this connection. 
2.2.1.1 From Dangerousness to Risk  
Firstly, a necessary entry point for considering the relation between fitness and 
the risk society is the shift that has occurred from dangerousness to risk. While, for 
Giddens (1990) danger and risk are closely related – since ‘[w]hat risk presumes is 
precisely danger’ – it will be useful to propose a distinction. Castels (1991), for 
example, argues that risk has become autonomous from that of danger. ‘A risk,’ 
Castels (ibid, p. 287) writes, ‘does not arise from the presence of particular precise 
danger embodied in a concrete individual or group.’ Rather, ‘[i]t is the effect of a 
combination of abstract factors which render more or less probable the occurrence of 
undesirable modes of behaviour [or outcomes]’ (ibid). For Castels, the shift from 
dangerousness to risk is based on the Foucauldian premise that power is not to be 
sought in the existence of a central point, but refers to a complex and strategic 
relational configuration in a particular society (see Foucault, 1998, pp. 92-102). 
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 Dangerousness presupposes a typically substantialist logic and can be localised to 
some specific referent whereas risk has no such centre because it is thoroughly 
relational. 
In relation to the present study, it can be said that modernisation (which has 
brought with it advances in biomedical science and technology) has facilitated a shift 
away from the dangers of, say, acute and infectious diseases to a heightened 
awareness of, and anxiety with respect to, the risks of non-communicable conditions 
that are more chronic and degenerative in character. Modern epidemics are risky in 
character because they exist in an awkward relation to health and problematise the 
traditional paradigm of cause and effect. With modern epidemics, Boero (2007, 
2010) explains, there is a lack of a clear pathological base. They are neither the 
effect of a single source, nor do they present the threat of widespread contagion. 
Rather, the moral panic that frames contemporary analyses of Type 2 diabetes, heart 
disease, hypertension, high cholesterol, stroke, and obesity, for example, is explained 
by the fact that modern bodies are always potentially at risk, not necessarily to some 
pathogen external to them, but to their very composition. Modern epidemics neither 
exhibit the need for concrete symptoms or diagnosis for their subjection nor do they 
exhibit the appearance of an internal or inherent truth to be brought to the fore. In 
fact, given their lack of a clear pathological base and the fact that they have become 
increasingly resistant to passive prevention, modern epidemics are, for the most part, 
outside of the purview of traditional conceptions of health. That they are being 
framed as the major health problems of our time is almost something of a misnomer. 
One might even go as far as to say that the major health problems of our time are not 
necessarily health problems at all. Quite the contrary, modern epidemics 
problematise health. 
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 The type of risk to which modern individuals are now exposed produces its 
effects from the inside out (not the other way round as was traditionally the case). It 
is “subject-centred” as opposed to “object-centred.” And, borrowing from Foucault, 
it is everywhere in modern society, not because it embraces everything, but because 
it potentially comes from everywhere. As Petersen (1997, p. 195) has explained of 
the modern health context, ‘everything potentially is a source of ‘risk’ and everyone 
can be seen to be ‘at risk’.’ Modern individuals are not merely subjected to risk. 
Rather, they have become subjects of risk in and through their bodies. 
2.2.1.2 Neo-liberalism  
Secondly, given that the shift from dangerousness to risk implies a shift from 
object-centred risk to subject-centred risk, the question as to how it is to be obviated 
takes centre stage. How could the State foot the bill if health profiling is to take 
everyone into account, since everything is potentially a risk, and since everyone is 
potentially at risk? The short answer to this question – it can’t. The state cannot 
afford increases in healthcare costs associated with changing demographics, new 
technologies, and increasing demands (Foucault, 1980; Giddens, 1990, 1991; 
Giddens & Pierson, 1998; Petersen, 1997; Smith Maguire, 2008a; Turner, 1991). 
The longer answer to this question (which will be pursued here in order to engender 
a confluence between risk and fitness) is that it doesn’t have to. The current 
paradigm of health promotion9 means it doesn’t have to because the State has sought 
to absolve from its traditional interventionist role and establish the market as the 
primary means of fulfilling welfare goals (Crompton, 2010; Glassner, 1989, 1990; 
Petersen, 1997). This is because the risk society of late modernity and its political 
                                                            
9 Since the early 1970s, at least. Though, as Foucault (1980; see also Leder, 1992a, 1992b) has explained, 
our current model of health politics was inaugurated at least as far back as the eighteenth century. 
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 corollary, “neo-liberalism,” provides an environment under which the burden of risk 
is shifted from the formal mechanisms of democratic politics onto individuals.  
Take, as a particularly revelatory example, the increased emphasis on physical 
fitness and individual behaviours in the context of the U.S. healthcare system. 
According to Patel and Rushefsky (2006) there has been an increased emphasis in 
the U.S. on containing rising healthcare costs over the past four decades. It is a 
legacy, the implications of which remain today, that can be attributed to the Nixon 
administration based on the policies implemented and bills enacted during his term 
of office. Take the following excerpts from former U.S. President Nixon’s address to 
Congress (on February 18 1971) and his remarks at the Reception for the President’s 
Council and Conference on Physical Fitness and Sports (on February 19 1971). With 
respect to the general healthcare context, at that time, Nixon explained how: 
...today we devote almost 7% of our GDP to health expenditures…But what are 
we getting for all this money?...Because we pay so little attention to preventing 
disease and treating it early, too many people get sick and need intensive treatment. 
Our record, then, is not as good as it should be. Costs have skyrocketed but values 
have not kept pace. We are investing more of our nation’s resources in the health 
of our people, but we are not getting a full return on our investment…Because 
demand goes where the dollars are, the result is an unnecessary – and expensive – 
over-utilization of acute care facilities (Nixon, 1971, cited in United States 
Government Printing Office, 1999b, p. 171). 
 
And with respect for the role of the individual, fitness, and the competitive spirit in 
the process of alleviating this strain on the state, Nixon explained that: 
As a result of that program [The President’s Council of Physical Fitness and 
Sports], people around the country have been made aware of the importance of 
physical activity and what an individual can do about his health that will possibly 
not make it necessary for him to go to a doctor. And so much can be done if we do 
take care of ourselves properly...Let’s face it. This is a sports-minded country. That 
isn’t bad. It has a lot to do with the spirit of a country...[W]hat I am suggesting is 
this: that we need to alert the people of this country...that they can do something 
about their future to make them develop the health patterns which will avoid 
physical illness and very serious physical illness in the years ahead...[T]he point is 
that I feel that the emphasis on exercise, the fact that some exercise–call it what 
you will, jogging, walking, participation in competitive sports–some of this is so 
essential for the physical wellbeing of the people of this country...I believe in 
competitive sports...I believe in the spirit that an individual develops, either as he 
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 watches or as he participated in competition...And if the individual is thinking in an 
optimistic and, in the best sense, competitive way, he will be a more healthy 
individual in every way. I believe in that (Nixon, 1971, cited in United States 
Government Printing Office, 1999b, pp. 194-5). 
 
These passages are paradigmatic of the neo-liberal re-orientation to health politics 
that occurred around the middle of last century and has flourished ever since. Two 
points are especially noteworthy. Firstly, the neo-liberal orientation is underpinned 
by the privatisation of risk. And, as was mentioned previously, this privatisation of 
risk is essentially the leitmotif of the neo-liberal political project and late-modernity 
in general. Neo-liberalism, by encouraging market freedom and minimum 
intervention by the state, fosters an environment under which individuals are 
encouraged to exercise a regulated autonomy. It represents an ideological shift away 
from what Giddens (Giddens & Pierson, 1998, p. 103) referred to as ‘external risk’ 
(the presumption that the state will intervene and protect its citizens when things go 
wrong) to a more active ‘reflexive risk environment’ (ibid, p. 163) under which 
people are encouraged to establish a different relationship to their social and material 
conditions (under which individuals are encouraged to act as autonomous and 
responsibly-informed). Secondly, in order that such a relation might be effected, the 
neo-liberal orientation has clearly emphasised the need to apply market principles in 
order to satisfy basic welfare conditions of modern existence. This has included such 
things as (i) increased competition and, therefore, choice, (ii) a greater emphasis on 
economic freedom and autonomy, as well as rationality and personal accountability, 
and (iii) the identification of all of these elements with the maximisation of self-
interest. More broadly, the metaphor of the market has led to the treatment of bodies, 
health, and wellbeing as objects with utility functions and commodity status. As will 
be seen later in this chapter, the body (as fetish) is something that can be bought or 
sold or, indeed, traded within the positional economy  
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 2.2.1.3 Individualisation  
Finally, the lesson of this risk society is that the modern state is not developed 
above and independent of individuals. Rather the neo-liberal model refers to the 
organisation of risk according to a specific kind of individualising power. Foucault 
explains: 
I don’t think we should consider the “modern state” as an entity which was 
developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, 
but on the contrary as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be 
integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new 
form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns (Foucault, 2000, p. 14). 
 
The concluding sentiments of Nixon’s address to Congress express something of a 
clarion call for this “specific pattern” by which individuals have been integrated into 
the modern state: 
“It is health which is real worth,” said Gandhi, “and not pieces of gold and silver.” 
That statement applies not only to the lives of men but also to the life of nations. 
Not only is health more important than economic wealth, it is also its foundation. 
Nineteen months ago I said that America’s medical crisis has deepened. All of us 
must now join together in a common effort to meet this crisis–each doing his own 
part to mobilize more effectively the enormous potential of our healthcare system 
(Nixon, 1971, cited in Mayes, 2004, p. 89). 
 
Lest this be taken as an outdated philosophy in the context of current healthcare 
paradigms, consider the following presentation by former U.S. President George W 
Bush to a local YMCA in 2003: 
One of the things I talk about is the need to really work on cultural change in 
America to encourage a culture of personal responsibility, to encourage people to 
be responsible for the decisions they make in life...The initiative, the Healthier U.S. 
initiative, really speaks to personal responsibility, doesn’t it? It says that we are 
responsible for our own health. By making the right choices, we can make the right 
choice for our future. By making health choices we can do the right things for our 
future. Moms and dads, by working on healthy choices, not only for themselves, 
but their kids, are doing their job as a parent. By exercising every day, by finding 
time, by carving out time, no matter how busy you may seem or how boring 
exercise may seem initially, it’s part of a responsibility culture...[T]he truth of the 
matter is, one of the best reforms in America for health care is a strong, 




 It is noteworthy to mention that, in these speeches, both Nixon and Bush are careful 
to address their subjects on nominative terms. Rhetorical strategies allow the listener 
to think that it is always someone else who is putting a strain on the system. We 
might not be the cause of our crippled healthcare system. But the strain on the 
system is one we all have to bear. It is our healthcare system and we are not getting 
the return on our investment. Where economic burden exists it is not only to be 
resisted through the promotion of individual market rationalities. Rather, it is 
compounded by the burden of moral responsibility. That the fitness of individuals is 
implicated in this process is quite clear. How this takes on a moral character will be 
discussed in the next section “2.3 Fitness and the Hegemony of Vision.” Bush’s 
address is considerably more sanguine that Nixon’s approximately three decades 
previously.  However, the same message is clouded in this political rhetoric: an 
inversion in the burden of responsibility in health politics onto the individual.10 
The lesson to be learned here is that, against this backdrop of increased demand, 
individual behaviours have become the linchpin in modern health economics. This is 
a process that has been increasingly refined over the past four decades in order to 
minimise socially borne risk and insert political and economic priorities into 
individual lifestyles.  The transition from dangerousness to risk provided the impetus 
to rethink healthcare as disease prevention as opposed to only treatment-based. Since 
the increasingly prominent subject-centred risks of chronic and degenerative 
conditions had proven themselves to be without object (and thus resistant to passive 
prevention) support for the role of proactive measures in tackling modern epidemics 
                                                            
10 It is worth mentioning as an aside that, according to the work of Diez-Roux (1998) and Jacobs (1998), 
this has been shown to be the case in both a U.S. and European context. It is also notable to mention 
that this prioritisation of individual responsibility and individual lifestyle change forms the World Health 
Organization’s position with respect to the prevention of noncommunicable diseases. It also forms the 
backbone of their global strategy on diet, physical activity, and health (WHO, 2002a, 2002b, 2004). 
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 has been deemed an economically prudent policy (cf. Smith Maguire, 2008a, pp. 46-
61).  
On this basis, it can be said that the prevalence of fitness in modern society is 
linked in a very specific way to this new configuration of power relations. Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim (2002) have argued that neo-liberal risk economies do not merely 
permit active contribution such that individuals can merely join together in a 
common effort. Rather, ‘individualization processes...demand an active contribution 
by individuals’ (ibid, p. 4). Although it has been deemed to be their greatest 
achievement in the name of championing the liberal agenda, this individualising 
trend can also be seen as a means of serving the needs of modern neo-liberal risk 
economies. For Beck and Beck-Gernsheim and others (e.g. Jean Paul Sartre, Michel 
Foucault, Charles Taylor), individualisation is not a social condition arrived at by the 
free decision of individuals. Rather, in modern society, people are condemned to 
individualisation. The cogency of this process resides in the operation of power 
within it. It resides in the fact that, as Foucault (1980, 1998) has described, 
individualising power produces its effects at the level of desire. As Rose (1998, p. 
151) would go on to suggest, power works through (and not against) subjectivity. It 
does not negate the vital capacities of individuals. Rather, it creates, shapes, and 
utilises them. The neo-liberal risk economy does not merely represent an ideological 
shift towards individualisation. Rather, it represents a shift away from ideology and 






 2.2.2 Fitness, Official Discourses, and the Hegemony of Vision 
It was established in the previous section that the organisation of power in 
modern risk economies resides in the fact that it produces its effects at the level of 
individual desire. It is not only the case that there is an increasing emphasis upon 
privatised risk through self-regulation in late-modernity, but this burden of 
responsibility is reintegrated as an ultimately desirable process. 
While the foregoing sought to explain how the transfer of risk has come about, it 
will also be instructive to reflect on why this depoliticising process has been so 
successful in continuously reproducing itself. One important way of coping with this 
question is to suggest that the desire for self-regulation presents itself, not 
necessarily as a conscious want or need, but is a force driven at the level of what 
Bourdieu (1984, 1985a, 1990, 2004; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) referred to as the 
habitus. That is to say, the desire for self-regulation is the result of a long process of 
inculcation through which class taste is inscribed into the body as an individual 
motivation structure or habit of action. This is a picture of modern body politics that 
Crossley (2006a, 2006b, 2006c) has closely considered. He explains that, even if 
gym-going itself is not rooted in, or a reflection of, class histories (most accounts 
date the growth in emphasis on fitness from the early 1970s onwards), self-
cultivation, of which gym-going is a recent manifestation, is. It is plausible, Crossley 
concluded, that gym-going is the latest expression of a long-standing petit-bourgeois 
preoccupation with self-cultivation and self-improvement, alongside such things as 
dietetics, meditation, psychoanalysis, etc. 
 It is clear that the organisation of late-modern risk economies requires a 
normalising gaze be dispersed throughout society. And the function of self-
regulation at the level of habitus goes some ways towards explaining its prevalence. 
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 In terms of its effectiveness, however, it also seems perverse to speak of “power 
producing effects at the level of desire” without recourse to the presence of a willing 
body; one willing to bear witness to this normalising/rationalising process. It is not 
enough to be “under surveillance” or to merely act in a manner that is a reflection of 
“class taste.” Rather, the adoption of the role of modern risk manager is based on the 
premise that, where bodies are found to be lacking, they must come forward and 
plead their case before a witness. The legitimation and reproduction of this 
normalising/rationalising process requires that it be sedimented into what Bourdieu 
(1989, p. 22) referred to as an ‘official discourse.’ Or, to use Foucault’s (1980, p. 
131) terminology, it must establish itself as a ‘regime of truth.’ In order for fitness to 
take on a central role in the economy of self-regulation, it must implicate the 
individual within the process and, therefore, come to the fore in terms of what 
Foucault (1998, p. 64) referred to as a ‘confessional science.’ It can only do this on 
the basis that it fulfils (at least) three quite specific interrelated criteria. 
2.2.2.1 Systems of Classification  
Firstly, establishing an official discourse requires the production of a system of 
classification that asserts what a person is, universally and objectively. And, with the 
development of multiple narrative fields related to physical education and sports 
over the past half century (i.e. biomechanics, kinesiology, sociology of sport, sport 
history, sports management and marketing, sports psychology, sport science, sport 
studies, etc.) fitness, like health, has been increasingly utilised as a central theme for 
legitimate areas of scientific inquiry. Over the past half century, fitness has 
functioned as an axial principle for its own ‘medical speciality’ (British Medical 
Association, 2002, p. 522), the objectives of which include ‘the welfare of 
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 athletes...the prevention, protection and correction of injuries, and the preparation of 
an individual for physical activity in its full range of intensity’ (Kent, 1994, p. 29). 
And with an increase in the use of the term sports and exercise science to designate 
this medical speciality in its broadest sense, we can also see how the importance of 
fitness has been extended in scope beyond the confines of formal sporting activities.  
Thus, under the modern programmatic, it is not only the status and normal 
functioning of the body that is brought into the realm of evidence-based inquiry and 
practice. Rather, even the performance of the body and its potential (for both 
sporting and everyday) fitness have their own metaphysics – what Glassner (1990, p. 
215) referred to a ‘biosocial realis[m].’ Today, knowledge of fitness – knowledge of 
an ‘ethnophysiological’ kind (Monaghan, 2001a, pp. 45-72, 2001b, p. 337) – is both 
highly technical and highly specialised. It is for this reason that the welfare and 
preparation of individuals for physical activity and fitness is reliant upon the 
mediating effects of an equally specialised system in which knowledge about the 
active body can be translated into workable forms (that can be aligned to action). It is 
on the basis of this realist system of classification, Glassner explains, that individuals 
today accept and take up the well-confirmed medico-scientific evidence for the 
adaptive and aesthetic superiority of the mobile, strong, fat-free fit body (cf. Holmes 
et al., 2006). 
One can clearly see the evidence for this by reflecting back on the consensus 
position with respect to fitness. For example, it would hardly be remiss to say that 
the model outlined in “Figure 2.2. The Hierarchical Model of Health and Fitness” 
has become conceptually embedded within our system of both formal and informal 
inferences with respect to the body. One could generally accept that individuals now 
understand the extent to which their behaviour in various consumption roles can be 
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 monitored (and moderated) in order to effect a positive response in health- and skill-
related statuses. The increased provision of sport- and exercise-related degree 
programmes, the professionalisation of sports psychologists, fitness instructors and 
personal trainers, the prevalence of nutrition and (the re-emergence of) dietetics, the 
mass dissemination and consumption of lifestyle media and fitness texts such as 
exercise manuals, magazines, DVDs, and mobile applications, etc., are all surely 
testament to this claim, and a point of inquiry that has been developing in the extant 
literature (Dworkin & Wachs, 2009; Glassner, 1989, 1990; MacNeill, 1998; 
Mansfield, 2011; Pronger, 2002; Smith Maguire, 2001, 2002, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). 
To borrow a phrase from Smith Maguire (2002), it is through this process that we 
have acquired knowledge as body lessons and, through, gradual courses of 
instruction and inculcation, have come to self-consciously monitor our fitness as a 
socially-visible activity of consumption (more on this later in this chapter, section 
“2.3 Fit for Consumption”). 
The consumption of scientific knowledge pertaining to fitness and its 
internalisation as a conceptual scheme has also been met with some resistance in the 
literature for treating individuals in a manner that has been described by Crossley 
(2001, p. 110, 2006b, p. 24) as ‘culturally dopey’ (see also Davis, 1995; Crossley, 
2006a, 2006c; Fishwick, 2008; Gimlin, 2002). However, I think that a distinction 
made by Foucault (1980) provides a helpful middle-ground and will allow us to get 
at what is at stake here. As Foucault (ibid, p. 132) explains, rather than taking up and 
merely accepting an ‘ensemble of facts’ individuals will more likely reliably infer 
from medico-scientific evidence an ‘ensemble of rules.’ “You are what you eat”; 
“Watch what you eat”; “Eat this, not that”; “Count your calories; 2000 a day for 
women, 2500 a day for men”; “Don’t count calories”; “Focus on portion-control”; 
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 “Eat plenty of fruit and veg”; “Eat your five-a-day”; “Eat low-fat;” Eat good fats”; 
“Watch out for the sugar content in low fat products”; “Make sure its low GI”; 
“Check for wholegrain”; “Smoking and drinking are bad for you”; “A glass of red 
wine every now and again is good for you”; “Exercise regularly”; “30 minutes 
exercise every day”; “Take the stairs instead of the lift”; “No pain, no gain”; “Don’t 
overdo it!” “Everything in moderation!” When it comes to the uptake and acceptance 
of scientific knowledge, one could easily make the argument for the aforementioned 
as examples of rules that most people understand as conducive to healthy living. But 
this is entirely different than saying that they merely accept facts and that their 
reasons for doing so are epistemic. It is perhaps more helpful to think of individuals 
as having made investments in the game of fitness (Wittgenstein, 1963; see also 
Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Foucault, 1980; Lyotard, 1984).11 As Wittgenstein 
famously, remarked, to follow a rule is merely to know how to go on. And the 
emphasis here is pragmatic, a rendering of scientific knowledge formal so as to 
produce effects. 
2.2.2.2 Diagnosing Bodies  
Secondly, since official discourses function to assign an identity, their 
legitimation is further premised on the extent to which they facilitate the 
performance of diagnostic acts (Bourdieu, 1989; Foucault, 1980). In order to exist as 
an institution of knowledge, fitness-as-confessional-science has had to codify its 
                                                            
11 The notion of a game should not be taken as reflection of the level of seriousness individuals attach to 
their bodies and embodiment. Rather, it is just to say that it is more plausible to think of individuals as 
following rules on a day-to-day basis than it is to think of them as accepting truths. For example, it is 
unlikely that most individuals would be aware of the state of play in research that examines the 
differences between proteins, carbohydrates, and fats and how these macronutrient sources affect insulin 
responses in different ways. It is similarly unlikely that individuals (though perhaps not diabetics) are 
concerned with their insulin sensitivity when they look for low GI/wholegrain products in the 
supermarket. It is even more unlikely that individuals who drink a glass of red for health do so in order to 
specifically increase their intake of phytochemicals. But this does not negate the importance of these as 
habits of practice. 
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 subject so that systems of classification can be produced. In fact, although Edwards 
and McNamee (2006) have problematised the relation of sports science (and, by 
extension, exercise science) to broader institutionalised medical practice, it is with 
this notion of diagnostics that we can see an extensive overlap. 
It was made clear at the outset of this chapter that the consensus position 
emphasises fitness’ multidimensional character and the importance of monitoring 
individual bodily indices relation to acceptable and pre-established parameters. It is 
also the case today that, since fitness is a relational term, there has been much 
emphasis on defining its other – unfitness. Today, for example, this mark of 
unfitness is principally defined in relation to the obese body-in-itself which varies in 
degrees of intensity in relation to a Body Mass Index (BMI = 
Weight[kg]/Height[m2]). While there is clearly an interesting study in examining the 
reasons why our mark of fitness has changed over time, it is also quite true that this 
is of secondary importance. What matters here is what the measurement can do and 
an acknowledgement of the fact that diagnostic procedures more generally are 
central to the legitimation of an official discourse. As Jutel (2009) explained, 
diagnosis is so central to the legitimation of an official discourse because it “does the 
work.” It segments, orders corporeal states, and gives them material force. In 
creating order, it aids in the identification of options by predicting outcomes relative 
to pre-established explanatory frameworks. It allows for the social incorporation of 
an individual and provides a cultural elaboration of what is acceptable behaviour and 
what is expected of them. As Foucault (1998) explained, through diagnosis the 
individual can be fixed by a gaze. They can be isolated and animated by this 
attention they receive and can be designated a status, one that deviates in differing 
degrees from this locus of control. As Bauman (1991) explained, this sort of 
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 classificatory clarity is our closest intellectual equivalent to behavioural certainty. It 
allows for the establishment of norms association, identification, and for the 
regulation of behaviour.  
It is quite clear that the organisation of the fitness field has relied heavily on the 
development of systems of classification and diagnostic procedures that it has 
adapted from the broader medical field. It too combines examination and observation 
in order to codify its subject and, in conjunction with confessional practices (see next 
section), procedural examinations and interventions, seeks to reduce the frequency 
with which deviation from the norms occurs. One might even go as far as to say that 
the fitness field hangs on to the ‘epistemological coat-tails’ (Morall, 2009, p. 96) of 
the broader field of health and medical discourse. Just as a whole host of diseases, 
disorders, perversions, and afflictions came to be defined in terms of observable 
symptoms to be isolated and treated (see esp. Foucault, 1980, 1998, 2001, 2003), so 
too has fitness become a part of this normalising process. Conceptually, increased 
emphases on fitness have been a fitting response to the general tension that has 
existed (and continues to exist) in philosophies of health between neutralist (or 
value-neutral) (e.g. Boorse, 1975, 1977, 1987, 1997) and normativist (or value-
laden) perspectives (e.g. Nordenfelt, 1986, 1987, 2007; Emson, 1987; Englehardt, 
1975; Goosens, 1980; Guerrero, 2011; Scadding, 1988; Täljedal, 2004). Theories of 
health now encompass a broad spectrum which traverse the World Health 
Organization’s (1946, p. 1315) original formulation of health as, not merely the 
‘absence of disease or infirmity,’ but the state of ‘complete physical, mental, and 
social wellbeing.’ Since nobody could qualify as being healthy on latter vitalist terms 
(see e.g. Engelhardt, 1975; Guerrero, 2011), fitness has been apt to fulfil health’s 
original descriptive role. The classificatory potential of a concept like fitness has 
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 been a fitting and timely mediating variable in the context of trying to account for 
health on both materialistic and idealistic terms. It has played a critical role in the 
calls for increasing methodological refinement and for improvements in the cost 
efficiency of public health research. It has also been critical in the foundational 
welfarist basis of nineteenth century epidemiology having given way to an 
instrumental emphasis on the individual as the subject of moral conscience 
(Beaglehole & Bonita, 2004; Glasgow, 2005; Pearce, 1996; Petersen & Lupton, 
1996). It has allowed for the alignment of public health concerns with individual 
behaviours, and is itself a reflection of the types of bodies that are now subject to 
diagnosis – “individual bodies of risk” as opposed to “the social body at risk.” 
2.2.2.3 The Confessional Programmatic  
Thirdly, and finally, the success and reproducibility of official discourses is 
related to its success in implicating individuals in this confessional process. If, as 
Foucault (1998) reminded us, the perfection of power should tend to render its actual 
exercise invisible, this is because individuals are invited to see for themselves.12 The 
following excerpt from the American College of Sports Medicine’s (ACSM) Fitness 
Book under the heading “Why Fitness Testing is a Good Idea” provides a good 
example of this:  
You discovered in chapter 1 that regular exercise produces a variety of important 
physical changes. But, changes are often difficult to recognize because most occur 
gradually. To identify your rate of progress, take the ACSM Fitness Test at regular 
intervals throughout the year. It will allow you to understand the effort required for 
you to see positive results from your exercise program. As your scores in the ACSM 
Fitness Test improve, you will enjoy a greater feeling of accomplishment and 
satisfaction...Plan to repeat the test again on the one-year anniversary of your first 
day of the program, and see the wonderful changes that have happened to you 
(ACSM, 2003, p. 60, emphases added). 
 
                                                            
12 Though, as Bourdieu would likely observe, they are (ironically) blind to the processes of their 
construction in the first place. 
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 Adopting the role of chief risk manager under ACSM guidelines then, is a process of 
discovery. To be sure, progress requires effort. However, by using the “ACSM 
Fitness Test” as a prescriptive guide, individuals can “identify” their “rate of 
progress,” “understand the effort required” and, most importantly, to “see the 
positive results from your exercise program.” Moreover, since “changes are difficult 
to recognise,” this process privileges sight as its most basic asset. Sight functions as 
the confessional programmatic’s most fundamental tool for distancing the subject (or 
individual) from its object (or bodily fitness).  
Another prevalent example of this ‘hegemony of vision’ (to use Levin’s 1993, 
pp. 1-29 phrase) which infiltrates the fitness experience is also outlined in Phillips 
and D’Orso’s (2002) New York Times Best Seller, Body-for-Life. At the outset of 
the book, Phillips, himself a renowned fitness guru, laments the fact that ‘there are 
still millions of people who have yet to discover their true potential’ (ibid, p. 21, 
emphasis added). ‘What these people are missing,’ he explains, ‘is the ability to 
apply knowledge,’ the ability to ‘cross the abyss’ (ibid). But how does one cross the 
abyss? How does this relate to the modern confessional programmatic? According to 
Phillips, the following will help you find ‘your reasons’ (ibid, p. 23, original 
emphasis): 
When you look at yourself, do you honestly like what you see? It’s important to really look. 
Since we all “see” ourselves every day, we often don’t notice if we’re slipping. If 
we’re not careful, before long, the image we have of ourselves in our minds will not 
be in sync with reality. I suggest that you...have someone take a photo of you 
standing relatively relaxed with your arms at your sides, in a pair of shorts or a 
swimsuit. Get that photo developed and look at it (Phillips & D’Orso, 2002, p. 23, 
original emphases). 
 
For Phillips and D’Orso, the problem of fitness is a product of the inability to see 
clearly. “When you look at yourself,” they emphasise, “it’s important to really look.” 
Appearances, “if we’re not careful,” start to cloud reality. For Phillips and D’Orso, 
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 the first step in the process of self-regulation (or “crossing the abyss”) requires only 
that the truth comes to the surface. Truth and visibility work together because, as 
Butler (1999) has explained, this truth is inscribed on the body. If, as Foucault (2000, 
p. 14) explained, the form of power associated with official discourses (or regimes of 
truth) is linked with a production of a specific kind of truth, it is a truth of the 
individual and one of visibility and observation. This is clearly reflected in Phillips 
and D’Orso’s (2002, p. 22) claim that, in order to cross the abyss, one has to ‘look 
inside – deep inside – for honest answers’ (original emphasis). The confessional 
programmatic reproduces, in the context of an interplay between repudiation and 
contrition (Boero, 2007, 2010; Monaghan, 2008; Smith Maguire, 2008a; White et 
al., 1995). The confessional provides what Monaghan (2008, p. 48) referred to as 
‘discursive space’ in which individuals can be absolved from past sins while, at the 
same time, leaving the path open for personal salvation through acts of contrition.13 
It opens up a space for the realisation of a need for change. And this realisation, to 
quote Foucault (1998), exonerates, redeems, and purifies the subject. ‘[I]t unburdens 
him of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises him salvation’ (ibid, p. 62). It is only 
from here that the process of reparation can take effect. 
The lesson to be learned here is that the social organisation of fitness is not only 
individualising. Rather, as Foucault (2000; see also Baudrillard, 1998, pp. 129-50) 
explained, it is salvation oriented and oblative. In fact, it provides a useful 
contemporary example of what Rorty (1979, p. 12) referred to as ‘the mirror of 
nature.’ In order to bear witness to this normalising/rationalising process, individuals 
                                                            
13 It is noteworthy to mention as an aside that the problematisations of the body in late modernity have, 
in some cases, been reconstructed in the context of victim blaming and stigmatization. For example 
Boero’s (2007, 2010) analyses of the promotion and implementation of bariatric procedures is a 
particularly useful example of the problems arising from this ethic of self regulation. According to her 
research, the promotion of these weight-loss surgeries is often positively framed: i.e. the blame associated 
with fatness and slothfulness is misplaced and obesity needs to be reframed as a chronic disease. Where 
bariatric surgeries fail, however, Boero argues that such positive framing is quickly dispensed with. 
Treatment becomes atavistically charged, and traditional notions of individual culpability are re-invoked. 
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 are invited to look in this mirror. They are invited to look upon themselves from a 
third person perspective and to use, as their primary motivation, this visual 
demonstration of lack. The process begins by getting clear on what is reflected in the 
mirror, for truth is an object to be realised therein. The lesson of this confessional 
programmatic – and what distinguishes it from traditional conceptions of health and 
medical practice – is twofold. Firstly, when it comes to the lacking body, it is not 
enough to be told the truth. Rather, it has to be seen for itself. Secondly, it is not 
enough to wait idly by for this lack to be addressed. No one can do it for you. You 
have to want to do it, and want to do it for yourself.14 
The social organisation of fitness by means of the confessional programmatic is 
an attempt at the sedimentation of an official discourse at the level of the individual 
body, a systematic effort to promote investments in the body so as to reduce the 
frequency with which deviation from the norm occurs. That fitness is now presented 
as a legitimate official discourse is, thus, both a reflection of the existing problems 
with the objective body and health within risk economies and a powerful vehicle in 
their perpetuation and reproduction as individual concerns. The importance of the 







14 While this emphasis on the visual in bringing to the fore the truths about the body is clearly evidenced 
in the work of Descartes’ and in the production of medical knowledge and technologies since at least the 
eighteenth century (Foucault, 1980a, 1995, 1998, 2001; Leder, 1992a, 1992b; Levin, 1993), this process 
has become increasingly radicalised since the middle of the twentieth century. 
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 2.3 Fit for Consumption 
At almost one and the same time, neo-liberalism both politicised and 
depoliticised the body. It lead to a decreased emphasis on state intervention as a 
means of fulfilling welfare goals, bringing to light the importance of the individual 
body (in the context of the social body) and defending the efficiency and suitability 
of the market to fulfil this body’s needs. Given this emphasis on the individual body 
and individual market activity, scarcely any work in the current realms of exercise, 
sports, and health sciences these days seem to (explicitly) identify fitness with what 
it was once commonly accepted to mean – environmental adaptation.15 What is even 
more scarcely acknowledged is the fact that, since this environment has become 
increasingly consumerist, there is also a need to understand fitness in terms of its 
association with the consumer leisure industries, products and services, advertising, 
and the construction of ideal body images to fit commercial logics. As Smith 
Maguire (2008a; see also Smith Maguire & Stanway, 2008) explained, compulsory 
self-production – that leitmotif of late-modern risk economies – has been harnessed 
as the engine of consumer industries and as the framework of everyday lives to the 
extent that these two have almost become one and the same thing. The problem of 
fitness – of re-orienting one’s body in the face of risk – is not merely an individual 
problem. It’s a consumer’s problem. Neither is it merely a problem of individual 
activity, as many of the health industry’s initiatives would have you believe. Rather, 
it is a problem of consumption activity. As such, it is not enough to merely discuss 
                                                            
15 This is a view that the philosopher John Dewey (2008) very much held. He thought that there was no 
way to define the term fit without recourse to the manner in which the conditions of life had changed. 
Although this is scarcely the case in the sport and exercise sciences today, the work of Malina and Little 
(2008), in their article ‘Physical Activity: The Present in the Context of the Past,’ is a useful exception to 
this. 
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 fitness in the context of health (or even sport). Rather, it also must be framed in 
terms of its role in the logic of modern consumption. 
2.3.1 Fitness and Consumer Society 
To say that fitness is a consumer’s problem is to say that the shift in emphasis 
from social engineering to performativity (established in section “2.1.1 Fitness and 
the Privatisation of Risk”) – ‘from building a better society...to better adapting to 
society’ (Smith Maguire, 2008a, p. 40) – follows a more general shift in ours from a 
society that engages its members in their capacity as consumers rather than as mere 
producers (Baudrillard, 1998; Bauman, 2000, 2007; Campbell, 1987; Sassatelli, 
1997). Moreover, if, under the conditions of modernity, there has been a shift in 
individual concerns about, and relation to, their bodies, then this is exacerbated 
within the consumer society. Baudrillard explains: 
For centuries, there was a relentless effort to convince people they had no 
bodies...today, there is a relentless effort to convince them of their bodies...In capitalist 
society, the general status of private property applies also to the body, to the way 
we operate socially with it and the mental representation we have of it. In the 
traditional order...there was no narcissistic investment or spectacular perception of 
[the] body, but an instrumental/magical vision, induced by the labour process and 
the relation to nature. What we want to show is that [in] the current structures of 
production/consumption...it is important that, far from being denied or left out of 
account, there is deliberate investment in it (Baudrillard, 1998, p. 129; original 
emphases). 
 
For Baudrillard, as for Foucault, power in consumerist societies does not deny the 
existence of the body. Foucault (1980, p. 57) writes: ‘one must set aside the widely 
held thesis that power, in our bourgeois, capitalist, societies has denied the reality of 
the body in favour of the soul, consciousness, ideality.’ Rather, there is a relentless 
effort to convince consumers of their bodies. There is a deliberate investment in the 
body in consumer culture since, as Simmel (1997) famously remarked, the body is 
an extension of personality and through its adornment we possess more. Consumer 
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 society once more turns on its head the top-down, repressive and ideological 
conception of power that Foucault worked his entire career to undermine. Far from 
being subjected to strategic power relations, the body is stimulated by them. 
[The body’s] ‘rediscovery’, in a spirit of physical and sexual liberation, after a 
millennial age of Puritanism; its omnipresence...in advertising, fashion and mass 
culture; the hygienic, dietetic, therapeutic cult which surrounds it, the obsession 
with youth, elegance, virility/femininity, treatments and regimes, and the sacrificial 
practices attaching to it all bear witness to the fact that the body has become an 
object of salvation. It has literally taken over that moral and ideological function from 
the soul (Baudrillard, 1998, p. 129; original emphasis). 
  
Since contemporary consumer society needs neither the physical or productive 
exertion required in earlier modes of sociality, it is the desire for consumption and 
not necessarily the demands of work that play a formative role in shaping 
individuals’ relations to their bodies (Baudrillard, 1998; Campbell, 1987; 
Featherstone, 1982; Featherstone, 2007; Featherstone, Hepworth & Turner, 1991; 
Foucault, 1980, 2000). The mono-functional body of the society of producers is 
replaced by the multifunctional spontaneous body of the society of consumers, 
representing a more general shift in emphasis from ascetic or Puritan values to what 
Featherstone (2007; see also Berthelot, 1991) referred to as the aestheticisation of 
everyday life. For the society of consumers, the fit body aligns with the body 
beautiful and, as Frew and McGillivray (2005) have explained, being fat-free, toned, 
and in proportion have become rationalised and idealised images. Being fit implies, 
as it always did, being “fit for...” However, if, as Bauman (2005, p. 93) argued, 
‘[fitness] is a certificate of ‘being in,’ of belonging, of inclusion, of the right of 
residence,’ then being fit in modern society implies what Smith Maguire (2008a, p. 




 2.3.2 The Consumer’s Body: Fit for Consumption 
That consumption plays such a crucial role here should seem hardly surprising 
since it is within the marketplace for products and services that the fit body’s 
liquidity can be readily transferred. Baudrillard explains: 
The body is not reappropriated for the autonomous ends of the subject, but in 
terms of a normative principle of enjoyment and hedonistic profitability, in terms 
of an enforced instrumentality that is indexed to the code and the norms of a 
society of production and consumption (Baudrillard, 1998, p. 131). 
 
The major lesson of the reversals of production and consumption is that the value of 
the body is not to be located in its production. In the consumer society, rather, the 
body is invested in in order to re-evaluate it beyond its functional value. As both 
Baudrillard (1998) and Žižek (2004) have shown, in modern consumer society, few 
objects are offered alone without a context of objects which speak for them. That is 
to say, the object fetishes of modern society (i.e. the body) are largely valued as a 
coordination or bundle of related objects. And so it is the case with fitness since the 
fit body, too, is nothing without its network of tools. 
 In her textual analyses of the construction of fitness in lifestyle media, Smith 
Maguire (2002, 2008a, 2008b) makes this point explicitly in relation to pleasure. Her 
work shows quite clearly that, rather than being pleasurable or valuable in and of 
itself, exercising for fitness has been constructed as a means to some other end. Like 
consumption more generally, Smith Maguire argues that this activity exhibits an 
instrumental rationality. Value is to be located in the prospects of consuming for fit 
the body. In the following excerpt, Smith Maguire explains how this problematises 
the common sense association between fitness and leisure16: 
[E]xercise is not itself pleasurable, but is a matter of discipline; pleasure comes 
from the effect one’s fitter body has upon others, the satisfaction in having made 
“good” use of one’s leisure time...Even when fitness activities are represented as 
                                                            
16 This is an important policy alignment, to be clear. 
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 enjoyable, they are rarely constructed as ends in themselves. Exercise is 
instrumentally rationalized as the means to other ends (Smith Maguire, 2008a, p. 
196).17 
 
The task of achieving fitness exists in an uneasy relation to leisure, though it is often 
naturalised as a leisure activity. In fact, on Smith Maguire’s account of media 
representations of fitness, exercising for fitness is constructed as a means of inserting 
the virtues of discipline and productivity into spaces typically associated with free 
time and freedom from obligation.  
That the fitness field demonstrates an ambiguity between leisure and free time is 
also a point developed in Sassatelli (2007). For Sassatelli (ibid, pp. 168-9), while the 
time spent participating in fitness activities often subverts the body’s daily 
constrictions and the different roles it is prescribed in everyday life (particularly the 
workplace), it is, nonetheless, time that is organised in terms of elements which 
derive their value from the world of work. Like work, it requires planning, goal-
setting, organisation, time-management, evaluation, re-evaluation, etc.  As Sassatelli 
(ibid; see also Sassatelli, 1999a) explains, time spent at the gym is not time spent 
free of all rules. Rather, it is, like work, based on shared rules and, at times, rigidly 
codified practices.  
The implication of these analyses is that the cultural imagery of leisure, recast 
through the lens of fitness practices, is constructed as a sphere in which freedom is 
increasingly being replaced by the obligation of self work. Naturally, consumption 
plays a pivotal role in this process, since it is through the wares of the marketplace 
that the production of leisure selves is most often accomplished. Smith Maguire 
explains further: 
                                                            
17 This view is inherited from Bourdieu (1984, p. 214) who argued that ‘health-oriented practices’ are 
understandable only in the context of ‘a rational faith in the deferred, often intangible profits they offer.’ 
‘It is therefore understandable,’ Bourdieu (ibid) continues, ‘that they [health-oriented practices] should 
find the conditions for their performance in the ascetic dispositions of upwardly mobile individuals’ (the 
type of individual for whom the modern consumer society provides a home). 
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 [T]he prospect of shopping for a newly fit body is a means to reward discipline 
with pleasure...Reconciling the hedonism of consumer culture with the asceticism 
of exercising by linking them as cause and effect (work out now; shop later) serves 
as an engine for consumption, and perpetuates the double bind of indulgence and 
restraint characteristic of consumer culture (Smith Maguire, 2008a, p. 196). 
 
Fitness discourse seeks to reconcile the aestheticisation associated with consumer 
culture with the asceticism of exercise by espousing what Featherstone (1982, p. 18) 
referred to as ‘calculating hedonism.’ And, since fitness does not lend itself 
immediately or easily to intrinsic rewards, material self-reward has become a 
standard technique through which to foster the habituation of healthy behaviours. As 
Smith Maguire has explained elsewhere:  
If bribery is a way to motivate fitness behaviour, it is significant that the bribe is 
shopping, linking the field of fitness to the reproduction of consumption more 
broadly. Consumer culture’s ethos of instant gratification is thus reconciled with 
the long-term self-discipline of fitness...Self-discipline and self-gratification are not 
irreconcilable, but are configured as temporally and spatially separate aspects of the 
same lifestyle (Smith Maguire, 2002, p. 461). 
 
Modern society’s shift in emphasis from production to consumption then, is one that 
takes place at the level of cultural imagery. In reality fitness is constructed as a 
precursor of consumption. It is a sphere in which cultural competence is developed, a 
necessary trait if one wants to be perceived as a good consumer. The production of 
the body and the consumption for the body are not incompatible. Rather, the 
consumption of pleasures is made permissible through the discipline of exercise. As 
Featherstone (2007, p. 45) has explained, (post-)modern culture requires a controlled 
decontrol of emotions in order to balance the instrumental and expressive 
dimensions of consumption. The point to be made here is that this lesson is now 
quite often being learned from the fitness field. Being a good exerciser requires self-
discipline. Being a good consumer requires self-restraint (Featherstone, 1982, 2007; 
Phillips, 2005; Smith Maguire, 2002, 2008a, 2008b; cf. Rojek, 2010a, 2010b). 
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 2.3.3 The Consumed Body: Fitness as Physical Capital 
In the previous section, it was established that the work of creating the fit body 
is not to be understood as merely the production of a use-value, but as the production 
of an exchange-value that has its meaning determined by its place in a self-
referential system of signs. Where investments pertaining to the body are undertaken 
in the consumer society, they are, as Baudrillard (1998) explained, always 
simultaneously investments of an efficient, competitive, and economic type. The 
body is re-appropriated to meet market or capitalist objectives and rationalities or 
invested in to produce a yield. However, even though the production of consumer 
bodies always already presupposes their conversion, the body is not merely 
something to be consumed for itself. 
That modern embodiment is now largely understood on the basis of a complex 
interplay between ‘my body for me’ and ‘my body for others’ is largely attributable 
to the work of phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. 122). For Merleau-Ponty, 
the body was characterised as much more than a mere instrument (or a means). 
Rather, it was the basis for our expression in the world and the visible form of our 
intentions. This notion that the body fulfils such a dual (and, notably, sign) function 
beyond itself and can be manipulated in order to stabilise meanings and foster 
improved social relations is one that has been taken up and developed across a broad 
range of sociological and anthropological research. However, the development of 
this view is perhaps best exemplified in the work of Bourdieu (1984) who takes up 
this discussion of the body-for-others in context of the transformational impetus that 
characterises the middle class habitus: 
Everything seems to indicate that the concern to cultivate the body, in its 
elementary forms–that is, as the cult of health–often associated with an ascetic 
exaltation of sobriety and controlled diet, in the middle classes. These classes, who 
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 are especially anxious about appearance and therefore about their body-for-others, 
go in very intensively for gymnastics, the ascetic sport par excellence, since it 
amounts to a sort of training (askesis) for training’s sake (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 213; 
original emphasis). 
 
The body-for-others is highlighted by Bourdieu in order to show how, in the absence 
of the economic and cultural capital typical of the dominant classes, the middle class 
are disposed towards investing in the body for its physical capital or symbolic power 
(see also Bourdieu, 1986; Frew & McGillivray, 2005; Shilling, 2003; Smith 
Maguire, 2008a). The middle class are, thus, disposed to investing much of their 
time, effort, and personal cost in accumulating forms of capital such that the social 
norms of self-presentation are met or exceeded. If, for Bourdieu (1986, p. 241), 
‘[c]apital is accumulated labor...which, when appropriated on a 
private...basis...enables [agents] to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or 
living labor,’ then physical capital is accumulated “self labour” that, if not given 
value by others, does not represent a tradable asset in the positional economy 
(Bourdieu, 1984, 1985b; see also Baudrillard, 1998;  Frew & McGillivray, 2005; 
Hirsch, 1977; Richins, 1994a, 1994b, 1999; Rojek, 2010a). 
Building on these theoretical insights, Smith Maguire (2008a) has attributed this 
increased emphasis on, and pursuit of, the socially desirable body to the strategic 
dispositions of, what she refers to as, the ‘post-industrial middle class’ or ‘service 
class’ (ibid, pp. 53-4). The transition to a post-traditional service economy from 
more monolithic social and political configurations has, according to Smith Maguire, 
given rise to cultural intermediary occupations. Since the service economy requires 
the management of interactions – or, since interactions are central to the service-
dominant logic of modern marketing (Holbrook, 1999; Vargo & Lusch, 2004) – the 
labour market relies increasingly upon impressions and appearances. Physical capital 
is, therefore, configured as an embodied, performative stance and as a means of 
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 adding value. To borrow from Baudrillard (1998, p. 139), discrimination in the 
modern service economy always presupposes the sign function of the body to the 
extent that difference is, from the very beginning, ‘somatized.’ Since it is this fit 
body-as-status-object which is necessary in order to belong and compete in our 
culture of images and impressions, the closer the match between one’s own body and 
normative ideals, the higher its exchange value (cf. Baudrillard, 1998; Featherstone, 
1982, 2007; Frew & McGillivray, 2005; Grogan & Richards, 2002; Smith Maguire, 
2008a, 2008b; Waring, 2008).  
Where Smith Maguire departs from the standard sociological impulse is in her 
attributing the connection between fitness and consumption as a sort of somatic 
pragmatism rather than as merely symptomatic of a narcissistic personality. This 
finding was also prevalent in Waring’s (2008, p. 306) analysis of how fitness and the 
pursuit of physical capital complement the ‘workstyle’ of the urban executive middle 
class by demonstrating and reinforcing the virtues of competition, success and 
professionalism. Waring explains: 
...the tacit expectation that individual employees [in a professional context] should 
engage in health and fitness practices...creates a situation whereby employees can 
raise their physical capital and demonstrate certain positive traits...In this way, the 
city workplace can be regarded as a competitive social space and in turn 
professionals appeared to be drawn to the premier club environment as a means of 
enhancing their competitive edge, assuming that fitness is some kind of prize, 
something they can compete for in their quest for social achievement (Waring, 
2008, p. 304). 
 
In this sense, both Smith Maguire’s and Waring’s analyses of the centrality of fitness 
(of physical capital) for service/executive class lifestyles resonates particularly well 
with the work of Giddens (1990, 1991) who argued more generally that reflexive 
lifestyles and investments are not merely narcissistic defences to socio-political 
conditions. Rather, they are also positive appropriations of circumstances in which 
the sign function of the body impinges upon the conduct of everyday life.  
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 To sum up, under the modern social configuration, fitness’ traditional 
association with instrumental efficiency is also supplemented by a requirement for 
communicative efficiency. The reversal in the roles of production and consumption 
has also played an important role in this process. Since it is the desire for 
consumption that plays a formative role in shaping individuals’ relations to their 
bodies, the production of modern consuming bodies always already presupposes 
their conversion. The fit body is an absolute imperative because it is itself a form of 
capital (and because it is convertible under certain conditions into other forms). 
Maximising one’s potential under the modern social configuration – under which we 
are implored to establish ourselves as credible consumers – requires an instrumental 
relation to the body. In the consumer society, the fit body is not merely invested in 
for the autonomous ends of subjects. Rather, as Smith Maguire so aptly put it, 
investments in it are directed almost entirely towards the optimal performance of 
bodies that are fit for consumption – fit to consume, and fit to be consumed by 
others. 
2.4 Fitness and Ambivalence 
There has been a tendency, under the veil of neo-liberalism, to see fitness as 
“the new health.” There has been a tendency to see it as akin to what Petersen (1997; 
see also Petersen & Lupton, 1996; Sallis, 2009) referred to as a new social 
movement with a primary concern to empower citizens, or as the product of what 
White et al. (1995, p. 160; see also Blackman, 2008) referred to as the new ideology 
of healthism. One of the primary lessons of the foregoing, however, is that fitness 
does not necessarily serve an ideological function in the traditional sense, but 
corresponds to a particular relation of the individual to society. Health and fitness, 
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 though they are often used synonymously, appeal to very different concerns 
(Bauman, 1998a, 1998b, 2000; 2001, 2005; Bauman & May, 2001; Glassner, 1990). 
This is because fitness corresponds to the needs of a very different society. It 
connects the body, self-identity and consumption in a manner that is peculiar to the 
reorganisation of risk under late modernity, and in a manner that is not well reflected 
in traditional conceptions of the contemporary health context. 
 That health and fitness remain largely conflated has been an important 
strategic move in that it serves to align both public and private hopes. It has led 
people to take for granted that exercise leads to fitness which leads to health which 
then leads to overall societal wellbeing. In the context of the sociology of the body 
literature, however, this connection has been deemed to be both complex and deeply 
political (Holmes et al., 2006; Markula, 1997, 1998; Pronger, 2002; Smith Maguire, 
2007, 2008a; White et al., 1995). It is complex in the sense that fitness has lost some 
of its modernist illusions; or rather, it never adequately serviced them in the first 
place. As Smith Maguire and other followers of Foucault and Bourdieu have shown, 
since the middle of the twentieth century (in line with the growth of consumer 
industries and the emergence of the service/executive class), the notion of fitness as a 
means of achieving individual improvement has become largely estranged from its 
earlier political corollary, societal improvement. Under its neo-liberal guise, 
modernity has both directed its subject-centred risks onto the individual and towards 
the market for their relief. In line with the growth of consumer society, those 
typically modernist understandings of body politics with their progressivist 
convictions to social regeneration and collective self-improvement have largely 
faded into insignificance (Foucault, 1980; Frew & McGillivray, 2005; Glassner, 
1989, 1990; Smith Maguire, 2002, 2008a, 2008b; White et al., 1995). The public 
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 hopes for fitness have, to a great extent, been met by a lament of private irony. This 
is not only because its instrumental logic appears to be at odds with civic 
responsibilities associated with neo-liberalism, but because exercising for fitness has 
been deemed an ambivalent practice. Although previous sections should be leading 
to the conclusion that matters of fitness have become quite apart from concerns with 
health, the purpose of the following sections is to explore this in more detail. 
2.4.1 Configuring the Role of Fitness in the Modern Experience 
Attention to the conditions under which fitness comes to the fore necessitates 
that a distinction be made between health and fitness since, as we have seen from the 
sections preceding this, fitness corresponds to a quite different relation of the 
individual to society. With sufficient consideration given to the foregoing (and on 
the basis of a number of important distinctions) the prevalence of fitness over health 
in the modern experience can be established on the basis of: (i) the type of risk 
engendered, (ii) the concerns with the body, (iii) the type of body presupposed, (iv) 
the relation to the body, (v) their orientation to time, (vi) the role to be undertaken by 
individuals, and (vii) the aims associated with this mode of sociality. These 
consequences of modernity within which fitness has become foregrounded are 




 Table 2.1 Configuring the Role of Fitness in the Modern 
Experience18 
  “Health” “Fitness” 
Type of risk engendered Object-centred Subject-centred 











What can a body do? 
Type of body presupposed Body-object Body-subject 
Relation to the body Having a body Being one’s body 
Orientation to time History Historicity 
Role to be undertaken Producer Consumer 
Aims Social engineering Performativity 
 
Just as dangerousness and risk appeal to very different orders of power, so too 
do health and fitness. Health corresponds to object-centred risk in that its object of 
analysis is the body at stasis and its principle concern is with causes, effects and the 
normal functioning of the body. Fitness, on the other hand, presupposes anything but 
stasis with the physically active body providing the first line of defence in the face of 
subject-centred risks and the impossibility of establishing concrete causal relations. 
Given the prevalence of subject-centred risk in the modern experience, fitness has 
come to the fore as a rather specialised branch of social security, as a means of 
minimising the risks and maximising the opportunities that modernity has to offer. 
                                                            
18 This table is presented as the primary contribution in my own article: Neville, R.D. (2012a) Exercise is 
medicine: Some cautionary remarks in principle as well as in practice, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy. 
doi: 10.1007/s11019-012-9383-y 
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 Fitness is the equivalent of “covering one’s bases” in the face of unremitting 
ontological ambivalence and insecurity. Whereas health follows a typically 
substantialist logic, insofar as its locus of knowledge is abstracted from its context 
and foregrounded in the material configuration of individual bodies, fitness is 
ontologically relational.  
Health and fitness appeal to quite different concerns with, and relations to, the 
body. With the onset of modernity, and the basis of this blurring of boundaries 
between inner and outer, there has been an overwhelming shift away from 
epistemological concerns with health and the effects imposing upon the normal 
functioning of the body to ontological concerns with its potential for fitness and the 
constitution of new sets of affective relations. In this sense, it is not only the case 
that modernity engages its members in an active rather than a passive manner. 
Rather, it implies a shift in emphasis from the body-object to the body-subject; that 
is, from having a body to being one’s body. In a manner akin to that outlined in 
Spinoza’s Ethics, it implies a shift in emphasis in life orientation from the question 
What is a body? to the question What can a body do? (see Buchanan, 1997; Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987; Fox, 2002).  
Because it has followed on from a seismic shift in social consciousness, the shift 
from health to fitness implies a general shift in orientation to time. Where health 
corresponds to history, fitness is linked to historicity. That is, fitness, unlike health, 
orients modern individuals primarily towards the future. Health speaks to the 
baseline requirements of the body for production and takes what has already 
happened as its principle referent. Fitness, on the other hand, speaks of the body’s 
potential; notably, it’s potential for consumption. As Bauman (1992, 1998a, 1998b) 
has explained, fitness is about the constant ability to move and to rise to ever higher 
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 levels of experience. This is an imperative because it is deeply pragmatic, a means of 
reorienting the body and self-identity in the face of the consequences of modernity. 
In fact, for Bauman, fitness is a powerful metaphor for modernity itself, for that 
general cultural appeal to ever-greater levels of experience. Since modernity 
implicates in individuals a shift in concern from the ultimate ends in human life to 
pragmatic concerns about the optimal performance of means, it is fitness that has 
replaced health as the desired normative status for individuals in modern society. 
This, it seems, implies a shift in emphasis from social engineering to performativity. 
2.4.2 The Problem of Fitness  
In his analyses of what was referred to previously as liquid modernity, 
prominent sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (see Bauman, 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2001, 
2005; Bauman & May, 2001) underscores this health-fitness dichotomy as providing 
seminal insights into the emergence of a new mode of sociality. For Bauman, the fact 
that we are concerned about matters of fitness is both symptomatic and paradigmatic 
of the problem of normativity that infects modern social life. While modernity offers 
a lens through which fitness (as a horizon upon which modern selves might be 
thought to converge) can be examined, fitness too is revelatory of modernity. In spite 
of this connection, Bauman’s account of fitness is largely polemical. Since 
modernity possesses an inherent ambivalence that extends to the body, Bauman 
argues that fitness presents problems of which the norm of health was free. The 
problem of fitness as it is presented in Bauman’s work can be illustrated along three 
separate lines (corresponding to the earlier discussion of fitness’ status as an official 
discourse). Though these are of course related in practice, Bauman’s problems of 
fitness are (i) normative, (ii) perspectival, and (iii) interpersonal. 
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2.4.2.1 Normative  
It is problematic for Bauman that fitness has replaced health as the desired, 
normative status for people in modern society because: 
…‘health’ is a norm, and norms are clearly delineated from above and below alike. 
‘Fitness’ has perhaps its lower, though rather blurred and murky threshold, but 
cannot, by definition, have an upper limit; ‘fitness’ is, after all, about the constant 
ability to move further on, to rise to every higher levels of experience. Hence 
‘fitness’ will never acquire the comforting exactitude and precision of a norm. 
‘Fitness’ is a never-to-be-reached horizon looming forever in the future (Bauman, 
1998a, p. 23). 
 
The problem of fitness is, first and foremost, one of legitimation. Fitness cannot 
acquire the comforting exactitude of such normatively articulated categories because 
health ‘is the proper and desirable state of the human body,’ whereas fitness ‘cannot 
by its nature be pinned down and circumscribed with any precision’ (Bauman, 2000, 
p. 77). This problem of normativity is undoubtedly related to the progress of 
ethnophysiologcal/ethnoscientific knowledge. Recall (pace Giddens) that, under the 
conditions of modernity, scientific knowledge is both mediated through expert 
systems and constantly re-examined in light of incoming information. Like any other 
official discourse, under the de-differentiating conditions of modernity, knowledge 
of fitness is reflexively mobilised and performs what Giddens (1984, p. 284; see also 
Giddens, 1990, p. 15) has referred to as a ‘double-hermeneutic.’ The biosocial realist 
account of fitness through which social agents are taken in (or rather, the rules by 
which they are taken into the game) does not proceed ignorant of them. Rather, it is 
parasitical upon them for its legitimation. 
This problem of legitimation is also linked to the fact that within the fitness field 
these expert systems are as disparate as they are varied. Given that the market for 
fitness abounds with multiple, and often conflicting, vernaculars (often fads!) there is 
64 
 no distinct authority from which the truths of fitness can be seen as a legitimate 
responsibility. They are, at best, locally determined. Also, advocating one vernacular 
over another is a matter of opting to take part in a particular game (a language game 
to use Wittgenstein’s well worn phrase). Knowledge pertaining to fitness, therefore, 
is partial. It is liable to re-examination and re-formulation in light of incoming 
information and because, unlike the more traditional hard sciences, there exists a 
great deal of internal dissention with the field of sport and exercise science itself. 
Fitness, however, is not merely reflexively mobilised (as would be the case with 
most categories under modernity). Rather, as Bauman explained, it is reflexive by its 
very nature: 
If health is a ‘no more and no less’ type of condition, fitness stays permanently 
open on the side of ‘more’: it does not refer to any particular standard of bodily 
capacity, but to its (preferably unlimited) potential of expansion…One may almost 
say that if health is about ‘sticking to the norm’, fitness is about the capacity to 
break all norms (Bauman, 2000, pp. 77-8). 
 
While Bauman’s analysis is nary on the empirical side, one might take as an example 
of this inherent ambivalence “generally excepted” principles as they are presented in 
sport, exercise and fitness manuals (see e.g. Bachl, Baron & Smekal, 2007; Rahl, 
2010). For sports persons, best-practice guidelines for training include the following 
principles: overload, adaptation, progression, reversibility, and variation. The case 
is similar for the general public. The F.I.T.T principle encourages participants to add 
variation and, in most instances, to increase the Frequency, Intensity, Type, and Time 
given to training. Fitness implies by its very definition the process of applying 
workloads through the organised sequence of exercises and in order to stimulate 
improvements or adaptations in individual anatomy and physiology. 
Even where principles are generally accepted, Bauman is at least correct in 
stating that fitness is an ontologically mutable category. In fact, there is much merit 
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 in the argument for the dislocation of health and fitness since, with fitness, sticking 
to the norm is most certainly contraindicated. In fitness discourse, the term norm is 
about as desirable as the dreaded plateaux. The following “Figure 2.4 Planes of 
Health and fitness” below usefully illustrates Bauman’s account of the dislocation of, 
and incommensurability with respect to, health and fitness: 
 















On the basis of this illustration, it might be said of Bauman’s work that, where 
Health (upper case) corresponds to a bounded vertical (or epistemological) plane of 
experience upon which norms can be imposed, fitness (lower case) represents its 
                                                            
19 This visual interpretation of Bauman’s views on health and fitness is presented as the central point of 
inquiry in my own article: Neville, R.D. (2012b) Considering a complemental model of health and fitness, 
Sociology of Health & Illness. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9566.2012.01494.x 
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 boundless horizontal (or ontological) corollary which is (by its very definition) 
resistant to any code of normativity.  
2.4.2.2 Perspectival  
For Bauman, the problem of fitness is also a perspectival one (cf. Frew & 
McGillivray, 2005). In section “2.1.2 Fitness and the Hegemony of Vision” it was 
demonstrated that the accrual of fitness requires that the body be frozen under the 
gaze of the third person. According to Bauman (1998a, 2005), however, this reifying 
process requires an unreasonably detached and instrumental relation to the body 
because the instruments with which consumers are exhorted to play are themselves. 
Whereas Smith Maguire (2008a, 2008b; see also Levin, 1993) has referred to the 
double-bind of modern consumption, according to Bauman (ibid), sensation-seeking 
through the body requires consumers to simultaneously play three different roles – 
‘the player, the listener, and the instrument’ (Bauman, 2005, p.  92) – and are 
prompted (and expected) to synchronise all three. These roles, Bauman concludes, 
are inherently incompatible and the reconciliation of these demands –for immersion, 
self-abandonment, distance, and sober judgement – is a tall order (if attainable at all). 
This perspectival problem is compounded by the fact that, in the social world 
(and in the social space of the gym in particular), individuals are often confronted 
not by, say, the unity of classical bodies, but by the fragmentation of carnivalesque 
ones. According to Frew and McGillivray (2005), individual body-parts tend to carry 
their own capital. Fit bodies are often negotiated, compared and contrasted on the 
basis of the objectification of particular body parts and not the objectification of the 
body as a whole. Fitness consumers, Frew and McGillivray (ibid, p. 172) conclude, 
tend to ‘construct physical capital in ‘Frankenstein’ fashion with aspirational body 
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 parts cut from the carcasses of celebrity icons.’ Therefore, despite the unified bodies 
that are on sale in the fitness field, it is often fragmentation that abounds.  
This fragmentation is not only concerned individual body-parts. In his study of 
the relationship between bodybuilding, drugs and risk-taking in the context of 
modern identity work, Monaghan (2001a, p. 51) found that bodybuilders’ 
ethnophysical knowledge of the ‘fragmented and divisible body’ was an important 
aspect of success. Bodybuilders actively engaged in weightlifting for the purpose of 
breaking down as many individual muscle-fibres as possible, so that muscular 
hypertrophy (growth) can occur. Thus, it is not only the case that the body needs to 
be broken down into individual body-parts (and then exercises) in order to instigate 
its (re)construction, but it is the muscles themselves that need to be broken down at 
an even greater micro level. Fitness workouts, even for those at the novice level, 
require the isolation of individual muscle groups – through mind-muscle connection 
– so that the body-part under tension/construction can be experienced as being 
figural. For those more experienced participants, workouts often require a wholesale 
desubjectivisation. The unity of the body is to be sacrificed so that individual 
muscles may speak, and that they may come to life as objects of jouissance20 in a 
manner that resonates with what Braidotti (1989, 1994a, 1994b) and Žižek (2004) 
referred to as “organs without bodies.” ‘[T]he whole discourse of the biosciences 
[sport and exercise sciences notwithstanding],’ Braidotti (1994a, p. 47) has 
explained, ‘takes the organism as its object [as an object], and it therefore takes the 
                                                            
20 It is noteworthy to mention in this connection the fact that corporeal sensations such as “the pump” 
have long been associated – psychoanalytically – with libidinal arousal. ‘The pump,’ according to 
Johnston (1998, p. 255), ‘is the result of high intensity training and muscle stimulation...[in which] 
[m]uscles become engorged with blood...short of oxygen...[and] [t]he skin stretches tight over the 
muscles.’ In the biopic Pumping Iron (1977), which documents the events leading up to the 1977 Mr. 
Olympia bodybuilding competition, Arnold Schwarzenegger famously described this experience as being 
“as satisfying...as coming is,” and “as satisfying as having sex with a woman.” He continued “so can you 
believe how much I am in heaven?” 
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 body as a mosaic of detachable pieces.’ It is in this sense that the project of fitness 
has become a perspectival problem – not of unifying bodies, but of prosthesis. 
2.4.2.3 Interpersonal 
Since it is “change” that the principles of fitness have in common, and since the 
nature of this change has become increasingly fragmented, Bauman also recognises 
the social burden with which fitness is now laden. According to Bauman (1998a, p. 
24), public hopes of fitness are met by private irony because it is about ‘Erlebnis,’ or 
‘subjective experience’ (Bauman, 2000, p. 78). Therefore, arriving at an 
interpersonal norm is a tall order since there is no objective criteria with which to 
make comparisons between individual degrees of fitness. ‘[L]ike all subjective 
states,’ Bauman (1998a, p. 24) continues, ‘the experience of ‘being fit’ is notoriously 
difficult to articulate in a fashion fit for interpersonal communication, let alone 
interpersonal comparison.’21 
On Bauman’s account, the pursuit of fitness is ambivalent by its very definition 
(or nature). The certainty afforded by official discourses is eroded by the fact that 
fitness consumers are unable to establish interpersonal norms for the regulation of 
behaviour. ‘[C]ertainty,’ Bauman (1998a, p. 24) explains, ‘can be only an 
interpersonal, social achievement.’ The search for fitness is sure to be one that will 
face ongoing hermeneutical problems resulting from the aim, on the one hand, to 
maximise the body’s potential, and also the inability to establish any reliable 
standards of reference. In place of this behavioural certainty is ambivalence – the 
acute discomfort that fitness consumers feel results from being unable to know how 
                                                            
21 In the sports and exercise science literature, this issue is referred to as ‘[t]he principle of individual 
differences’ (Bachl et al., 2007, p. 12). According to Bachl et al., however, the problem of individual 
differences may be sublimated: ‘[b]ecause we cannot expect...that all people will respon[d] to exercise in 
the same manner, a proper training program should be modified to take individual differences into account’(ibid; 
emphasis added). Bauman is clearly much less sanguine about this fact. 
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 far they have gotten and how far they have yet to go. It is on this basis that fitness’ 
normative status for individuals in advanced modern societies has become an 
illusion. To borrow from Baudrillard (1998, p. 49), it has become merely a ‘vehicle 
of an egalitarian myth.’ Fitness, as a means to achieve individual improvement, has 
been estranged from its earlier political corollary, societal improvement, because it 
is, somewhat ironically, “unfit” for purpose. As Bauman and May (2001) explained, 
although the prime motive in the turning of our attention toward bodily fitness was 
meant to offer security and certainty in a radically disembedding social-material 
environment, our preoccupation with matters of superficial embodiment has resulted 
(somewhat paradoxically) in the generation of more anxiety than less. 
2.4.3 Fitness and Sisyphus 
Bauman paints with a very broad brush, something which is sociological 
commonplace. His thinking on fitness, however, is equally broad and, with 
caricature-like effect, he conjures an image (shared by Frew & McGillivray, 2005) of 
fitness consumers as modern-day Sisypheans. The Gods, Camus (1983) wrote, 
condemned Sisyphus to ceaselessly roll a rock to the top of a mountain, whence the 
stone would fall back of its own weight. ‘[T]hey had thought with some reason,’ 
Camus (ibid, p. 123) continued, ‘that there is no more dreadful punishment than 
futile and hopeless labor.’ While the notion that leisure and consumption are forms 
of “hopeless labour” is one that few scholars these days would entertain as being 
adequate, the view that fitness is a form of “hopeless self-labour” is one that has 
earned greater merit.  
 Like Sisyphus contemplating his torment, Bauman (1998a) argues that the 
plight of the fitness-seeker is an agony of which our health-conscious ancestors had 
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 no inkling. This is because the common sense assumption that exercise leads to 
fitness, that fitness leads to health, and that health leads to overall wellbeing has 
turned out to be somewhat illusory. The logic of fitness is not one of health and 
wellbeing. In fact, as has been established in the preceding section, it never 
functioned entirely in this manner in the first place. Rather, the logic of fitness, like 
that of consumption, is one of the production and manipulation of social signifiers, 
whose nature implies both difference (evidenced in section “2.2.3 The Consumed 
Body: Fitness as Physical Capital”) and deferral (evidenced in section “2.3.2 Fitness 
and the Problem of Normativity”). It is this logic of différance, to use Derrida’s 
(1976, 1982, 2001) famous phrase (a logic of difference and perpetual deferral of 
gratification) that accounts for the ambivalent character of fitness. 
This ambivalent view of fitness consumption, the view that modern embodiment 
generates so much anxiety that it is never likely to be cured or stopped, is one that is 
very much reflected in Frew and McGillivray’s (2005) account of fitness body-
politics. On their account, by placing themselves within the fitness environment 
(health clubs in their case), individuals expose themselves to an ongoing embodied 
penance. Subject to the allure of the desirable body – ‘the desire for physical capital’ 
(ibid, p. 163) – consumers advance with pre-defined notions of male attractiveness 
and leanness and female beauty and shape. For Frew and McGillivray (ibid, p. 173), 
consumers willingly enter fitness clubs ‘keen to worship an aesthetic purity hoping 
to attain the robes of physical capital and its salvationary symbolism.’ What they 
experience, however, is something less sanguine. This is because the fitness club 
industry occupies a rather unique position within the leisure industries insofar as the 
final product desired by the consumer is seldom achieved (although consumers 
return again and again). They conclude thusly: 
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 As consumers pursue physical capital they occupy the consumer role of pseudo-
sovereignty, believing in the subjective attainment of capital, yet, naïve or 
ambivalent towards the mechanisms that drive and promote its consumption. The 
body beautiful becomes a rationalized and idealised image that is constantly 
displayed but, even for the few who attain it, an embodied state that is enjoyed 
ephemerally. Tantalized by, and desiring physical capital and its dreamscape 
symbolism, consumers find themselves caught in an aporia of capital. They become 
the modern day Sisyphus, where any physical peak and symbolic honour is quickly 
met with a return to dissatisfying desire (Frew & McGillivray, 2005, pp. 173-4). 
 
As consumers pursue physical capital, Frew and McGillivray argue that they are met 
with, and are constantly reminded of, the inappropriateness of their carnivalesque 
bodies. Moreover, it is within this ocular space that consumers are met with 
unrealistically high expectations, often lacking the cultural capital needed to 
transform their bodies to fit contemporary ideals (see also Philips & Drummond, 
2001). Fitness occupies a unique position within the leisure industries because it is a 
practice in which the ends almost entirely justify the means, even though we are 
often uncertain as to whether these ends can be defined, not to mention achieved. 
Hope in achieving fitness, like hope in the body beautiful is, for Frew and 
McGillivray as it is for Bauman, false hope and misplaced as the product of modern 
consumerism.  
It is clear for both Bauman and Frew and McGillivray that fitness consumers 
embody the modern day Sisyphus. Like Sisyphus ceaselessly rolling the rock to the 
top of the mountain, both Bauman and Frew and McGillivray argue that the pursuit 
of fitness turns out to be an inexhaustible source of self-reproach and self-
indignation. However, it is unclear as to why they fail to afford the Sisyphean task 
the same respect as Camus does in his original formulation of The Myth. In spite of 
the absurdity of his nauseating task Camus (1983, p. 123) concludes that we must 
‘imagine Sisyphus happy.’ And the words that best sum up Sisyphus’ noble heroism 
are those of Oedipus: ‘despite so many ordeals, my advanced age and the nobility of 
72 
 my soul makes me conclude that all is well’ (Camus, 1983, p. 122). Sisyphus 
becomes intensely aware of the fragile wonder of existence. His rock becomes his 
thing and he becomes the master of his days. Even much less clear is why Bauman 
fails to afford fitness as much respect as he does Sisyphus in a most recent work. 
According to Bauman (2010, p. 185), ‘even within the apparently hopeless and 
prospectless plight of Sisyphus...[he] may yet turn from a tragic figure of a slave-to-
things into their joyous doer’ (original emphasis). Might one suppose that fitness 
could be afforded a similar performative significance? Is there, contrary to the 
foregoing, value to be found in the doing aspects of fitness? Like Camus (1983) and 
Bauman (2010) I, too, would like to hold out more for Sisyphus. However, unlike 
Bauman (1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2001, 2005; Bauman & May, 2001) and Frew and 
McGillivray (2005), I would like to hold out more for fitness as well. The remainder 
of this thesis is given almost exclusively to this task. 
2.5 Summing Up: Re-Describing Sisyphus? 
In the opening chapter, it was argued that, in order to take fitness seriously, one 
would have to consider the type of society in which it comes to the fore. It was 
argued that making sense of fitness implied a break with its common substantialist 
representation (as a mere physiological phenomenon) in order to account for its 
social-cultural embeddedness. It was argued that a comprehensive account of fitness 
must also express the ways in which modern bodies are related to this second order 
of causality. In this chapter, the question of fitness’ cultural embeddedness was 
brought to the fore in order to identify its status as a “social-object” (to use 
Bourdieu’s phrase). In relation to this chapter’s primary objective – to answer the 
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 question: in what sort of a society has fitness come to the fore as a legitimate matter 
of concern? – a number of important findings have emerged.  
It was illustrated that the configuration of modern social life and its institutions 
have created an environment of risk that is very different from that of other modes of 
sociality. This individualising, neo-liberal risk environment is one in which 
individual bodies are affected, influenced, and infected by factors quite distant to 
them. On this basis, it was shown that fitness comes to the fore in terms of a society 
in which the bodies of individuals are emphasised and in which one is encouraged to 
act as autonomous, responsibly-informed, and to make cost-benefit assessment of 
life options. The organisation of society within which fitness is embedded 
emphasises the privatisation of risk and the desire for self-regulation. Importantly, 
this chapter has shown that, even in the context of an increasingly sophisticated 
official discourse which underpins claims to knowledge, the truths of the fit body are 
framed as truths of the individual. It was shown that, in the context of necessary 
improvements in cost-efficiency due to changing demographics and increasing 
demands, the social organisation of fitness is a reflection of a systematic effort to 
promote investments in individual bodies and to reduce the frequency with which 
deviation from the norm occurs. This, it was argued, has had a number of 
implications. 
One major lesson to be gleaned from the second half this chapter is the cogency 
of the proposition that fitness is not, prima facie, the sort of thing that sports, 
medical, and exercise scientists have supposed in the past. Rather, it was shown that, 
as an explanatory variable, being fit implies being “fit for...” and, nowadays, this 
invariably means being “fit for consumption.” Despite its somewhat utopian 
beginnings, it has been shown in this chapter that fitness has lost some (if not all) of 
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 its modernist illusions. It was shown that fitness comes to the fore in the context of a 
society emphasising consumption over production. It also comes to the fore in the 
context of a society that emphasises sensation-seeking, appeals to ever-greater levels 
of experience, and the manipulation of social signifiers. Fitness, it was also argued, 
is a reflection of how modern society’s politics of embodied self-identity is now one 
of différance (of how the modern identity narrative is one of difference and perpetual 
deferral of gratification). It is an ambivalent practice (or Sisyphean task), and 
lamentably, a paralysing gesture of the self-reflexivity inherent in modernity.  
The possibilities for re-describing fitness (Sisyphus!) are discussed and further 
developed in the following chapters. In spite of the obviously lamentable reduction 
of fitness to matters of individual consumption, the following quote from the late 
neo-pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty exemplifies the nature of the task of 
retrieval that is to be confronted herein: 
There is no way to rise above the conversational moment in which one finds 
oneself, survey the conversation as a whole and make principled recommendations. 
The most one can do is say something like: “This segment of the conversation...is 
getting a bit boring; it might profit from a little attention to what is going on in 














‘Modernity has its boosters as well as its knockers. Nothing is agreed here, and the 
debate continues.’ 
Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity 
 
 
In his short treatise, The Ethics of Authenticity, philosopher Charles Taylor 
marked as a distinguishing feature of modernity a sharp distinction between cultural 
optimists, on the one hand, who champion a neo-Nietzschean ethic of self-creation 
and cultural pessimists, on the other, who see this as nothing more than flabby 
pluralism and the latest expression of moral laxity. The freedom to affirm oneself 
and orient one’s life towards self-fulfilment is deemed modern civilisation’s finest 
achievement. At the same time, however, the thoughts of a society of self-fulfillers is 
deemed to be at odds with (and presents the gravest danger to) the identification with 
the community necessary for public freedoms to exist in the first place. Taylor 
(1992, p. 11) writes: ‘[m]odernity has its boosters as well as its knockers. Nothing is 
agreed here, and the debate continues.’  
Although not previously stated in this manner, this tension also seems to capture 
the problem of fitness as it was portrayed in Chapter Two. Fitness too has its 
boosters as well as its knockers. For example, in Chapter Two it was illustrated that 
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 our current understanding of fitness has come to the fore in the context of an 
increasingly individualised, risk-centred, neo-liberal economy. It was established 
that, on the basis of a shift in individual orientation to the self and society, our 
imagination as policymakers, legislators, and academics has been captured by the 
promise of fitness. From the perspective of those who might usefully be labelled 
“boosters” then, fitness has emerged as the desired normative status for individual 
bodies in modern society, providing nothing less than the opportunity for new and 
improved standards of wellbeing in the public domain. For yet others however – 
those who might usefully be labelled “knockers” – this emphasis on fitness is merely 
illusory, demanding nothing less than the squaring of a circle. For the “knockers,” 
fitness is disparaged at the level of cultural imagery for its almost wholesale 
association with consumer industries, products and services, and the construction of 
ideal body images to fit commercial logics. Most disconcertingly for the “knockers” 
is the fact that fitness, as a means of achieving individual improvement, has become 
estranged from its earlier political corollary societal improvement. It has failed to 
follow through on its modernist promise. It has become estranged from health. In 
line with the growth of consumer society, the progressivist convictions to social 
regeneration and collective self-improvement upon which the fitness field were built 
have largely faded into insignificance. For the “knockers,” fitness is not only 
revelatory of a reorientation towards the body and the self in liquid modernity. 
Rather, it is paradigmatic of the ambivalence that now extends to the body. Its logic 
today is one of consumption, scarcely health. Its logic is one of différance (of 
difference and perpetual deferral of gratification) and, on this basis, can be aligned 
with the plight of Sisyphus. For the “knockers,” exercising for fitness is framed as 
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 modernity’s ambivalent practice par excellence and as a paralysing gesture of the 
self-reflexivity inherent in our present stage of modern life. 
Taylor’s position relative to the “boosters” and the “knockers” is neither wholly 
optimistic (in the sense that everything is as it should be in modern culture), nor is it 
wholly pessimistic (in that he does not take authenticity seriously). Taylor is neither 
a cultural optimist nor pessimist about modernity. Rather, his position is pragmatic 
(or meliorist, to use William James’ famous phrase) in the sense that the picture he 
offers is ‘neither root-and-branch condemnation nor uncritical praise’ (Taylor, 1992, 
p. 23). ‘What we need,’ Taylor (ibid) urges, ‘is a work of retrieval, through which 
this ideal [of authenticity] can help us restore our practice.’ To borrow an equally 
pragmatic phrasing from Latour (2004a, 2008), what we need is an 
acknowledgement that critique has run out of steam and a thorough refocusing of our 
attention towards authenticity as a legitimate matter of concern. I, too, think that 
fitness is an ideal that has degraded but is still worthwhile. And, in seeking to hold 
out more for fitness herein, I hope to capture the spirit of this pragmatic attitude.  
The purpose of this chapter is to take stock of existing research and to 
acknowledge that critical accounts of fitness are perhaps running out of steam. In 
doing so, this chapter seeks to outline the basis for a work of retrieval in the second 
half of this thesis and an orientation towards matters of concern on the basis of the 
following proposition: fitness is something we negotiate, despite it being something 
we never really achieve. The first section of this chapter, “Re-Describing Fitness,” 
takes stock of existing, critical accounts of fitness and outlines the justification for a 
possible positive re-appropriation. Section two, “Ascertaining a Phenomenological 
Description,” addresses the phenomenological nature of this task of re-description. 
On the basis of an illustrative step-by-step model of the research, it outlines the 
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 research question and objectives of this second aspect of the study, the nature of 
preliminary fieldwork, the methodological considerations with respect to data-
generation, sensitive issues, interpretation, validity and reliability. In this chapter, 
fitness is framed as a set of relations that have to be negotiated. On this basis, a turn 
is made towards the lived-description of the structure of this process of “negotiation” 
in three important areas: (i) the meaning of fitness, (ii) the motivations for engaging 
in fitness practices, and (iii) the possibilities for experiencing pleasure. 
3.1 Re-Describing Fitness 
The task of the second half of this thesis was introduced in the concluding 
sections of Chapter Two. It was suggested that descriptions of fitness, especially as 
they have been portrayed in the sociological literature, have tended to be overly (and 
overtly) critical. While there is no way to step outside the conversational moment in 
order to ground an alternative view and make principled recommendations, it was 
suggested in contradistinction that the negative segment of the fitness conversation 
might be getting a bit boring and that there might be an opportunity to hold out for 
fitness by attributing to it a performative significance. But what does it mean to hold 
out for fitness? It will suffice to make three important points before answering this 
question in more detail. 
3.1.1 From Critique to Matters of Concern 
Firstly, if for parsimony we view the nature of social science as being divided 
into inquiry based on (i) social units (i.e. individuals, communities, subcultures, 
organisations, societies etc.), (ii) social processes (i.e. exercising, consuming, eating, 
mating, fighting etc.), and (iii) social products (i.e. fitness equipment, media, art 
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 works, literature, music, etc.),22 it is clear that the existing research on fitness has 
focused almost exclusively on the latter two. That is to say, existing research on 
fitness has taken its impetus from grand theoretical accounts of reflexive 
embodiment (or “body work”), and has tended towards structural explanations of 
how modern society has re-appropriated the body through consumption in order to 
meet increasingly superficial social norms of self-presentation.23 In spite of their 
importance in contributing to sociological understandings of the body, reflexive 
embodiment, and physical culture, the overly deterministic, critical thrust, and 
relative quietism of this research is lamentable in that it has tended to emphasise the 
socio-cultural production of the fitness consumer without also emphasising how we 
might go about rectifying some of the putative problems with fitness consumption. 
Secondly, and on this basis, where sociological accounts of fitness and body-
work are concerned, there has been a firm insistence that fitness is to be analysed at 
the level of signs. There has been an insistence that the body is merely a semiotic 
vehicle and that fitness is merely sign material being exchanged (to use Baudrillard’s 
phrasing). This approach, however, is insufficient insofar as it fails to account for a 
wide range of pragmatic considerations with respect to bodily fitness at the level of 
action, interaction, and where meaning relates to use and practice. Borrowing from 
Csordas (1990, 1993, 1994; see also Crossley, 1996, 2004a, 2005, 2006a; Latour, 
2004b), there has been a failure in the overemphasis of how people attend to their 
bodies as vehicles with semantic or semiotic properties at the expense of how they 
                                                            
22 This tripartite model of social science research is borrowed from the work of Hirschman (1986). 
23 Much of this research has taken impetus from the work of Foucault (1980, 1988, 1995, 1992, 1998; see 
also Bordo, 1993; Duncan, 1994; Kennedy & Markula, 2010; Lloyd, 1996; Mansfield, 2010; Markula, 
1995, 2001; Vertinsky, 1994). As can be seen from Chapter Two, the work of Giddens (1990, 1991, 
1993), Bourdieu (1984, 1986, 2004; see also Frew & McGillivray, 2005; Smith Maguire, 2002, 2008a, 
2008b; Waring, 2008), and Baudrillard (1998; see also Glassner, 1989, 1990) are also notable in this regard 
(though less so). In the area of health more specifically, applications of the work of Deleuze (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1983, 1987; see also Buchanan, 1997; Fox, 1993, 1999, 2002; Fox & Ward, 2008a, 2008b; 
Holmes et al., 2006; Markula, 2006; Pronger, 2002) are also noteworthy. 
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 attend with them as vehicles of practical activity. There is a failure in methodological 
impetus since it has tended almost exclusively towards the examination of the body 
as a site or field of representation, as opposed to an arbiter of practice. In their What 
is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari get at this issue in a way that is helpful for 
present purposes. They remark: 
In successive challenges, philosophy confronted increasingly insolent and 
calamitous rivals that Plato himself would never have imagined in his most comic 
moments...[T]he most shameful moment came when computer science, marketing, 
design, and advertising, all the disciplines of communication, seized hold of the 
word concept itself and said...This is our concern, we are the creative ones, we are the 
ideas men! We are the friends of the concept (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 10; 
original emphasis). 
 
I would hardly be remiss in saying that fitness too has confronted calamitous rivals. 
And the methodological impetus towards examining fitness as it is represented in 
field texts such as official documents, prescriptive texts, workout manuals, lifestyle 
media, glossy magazines, etc., is not only a testament to its seizure at the hands of 
the disciplines of communication but tends towards a gross overstatement of their 
representative character (cf. Collins, 2002; Crossley, 2004a, 2006c; Davis, 1995; 
Fishwick, 2008; Gimlin, 2002). 
Finally, in spite of their seeming importance in contributing to the sociological 
understanding of the body in physical culture, one might even go as far as to say that 
the critical attitude has hampered our understanding of fitness. As Latour (2004a) 
has explained in his scathing critique of critique(!), to accuse something of being a 
mere fetish – i.e. an object of representation and desire – is the social science’s 
ultimate gratuitous, disrespectful, and barbarous gesture. The problem with this 
critical barbarity, Latour argues, is that the critic is always right: 
When naïve believers [i.e. research participants] are clinging forcefully to their 
objects [or practices]...you [the critic] can turn all of those attachments into so 
many fetishes and humiliate all the believers by showing that it is nothing but their 
own projection, that you, yes you alone, can see (Latour, 2004a, p. 239). 
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The problem with critique, for Latour, is that none of us would like to see our most 
cherished personal objects or practices treated in this way: ‘[w]e would recoil in 
horror at the mere suggestion of having them socially explained’ (Latour, 2004a, p. 
240). The problem with critique, Latour explains, is that most of those involved in it 
hold multiple conflicting perspectives. The critic is an anti-fetishist (or, at least, a 
social constructionist) in respect of all those things they do not believe in, an 
unrepentant positivist for all the sciences they do believe in, and a sturdy realist for 
all of those things that they truly cherish. The trick is merely to avoid occasions in 
which this mismatch can be detected. 24 A more helpful strategy, according to 
Latour, is to associate inquiry within a suite of positive metaphors. A more helpful 
strategy is to acknowledge that ‘if something is constructed, then it means it is 
fragile and thus in great need of care and caution’ (Latour, 2004a, p. 246). In the 
chapters preceding this one (while I have had to incorporate a broad range of 
conflicting literatures), I hope to have been more cautious than critical. In this 
section in particular, I hope to have shown that, not only is the critical orientation 
unfortunately abstracted from any concrete phenomenological engagement, it is 
poorly equipped to cope with the pragmatic turn that has taken effect in the social 
sciences. It is poorly equipped to cope with the need to explore the limits of 
concepts, the uses they have for us, and the need for a refocusing of attention away 
from critique towards matters of concern. I hope to continue this careful approach 
herein since fitness is nothing if not a matter of concern. 
                                                            
24 Smith Maguire’s analysis of the fitness field is a good example. That is, Smith Maguire is an avowed 
structural constructivist and anti-fetishist about fitness (having written about the problems with the 
cultural production of the fitness consumer; Smith Maguire, 2002, 2008a, 2008b), a positivist about health 
(fitness is problematic in terms of, poses challenges for, and is poorly equipped to address the problems 
of health; Smith Maguire, 2006, 2007, 2008a), and a sturdy realist about the value of physical education 
(fitness provides nothing more than an individual solution to a social problem, which has resulted in the 
decline of childhood physical education and activity and other collective exercise, leisure, and recreation 
opportunities; Smith Maguire, 2008a). It is noteworthy to mention that I agree with Smith Maguire on the 
value of physical education. I would be less inclined to agree with her position on fitness and health. 
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 3.1.2 Negotiating the Fit Body 
We can now take up the question again: what does it mean to hold out more for 
fitness? For one, and taking into consideration the points outlined in the previous 
section, holding out more for fitness requires a reinvigoration of the critical attitude 
by being reflexive, yet remaining cautious. This attitude is exemplified in the 
following excerpt borrowed again from Latour: 
The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not 
the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of naïve believers, but the one who 
offers the participants arenas in which to gather. The critic is not the one who 
alternates haphazardly between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk 
iconoclast...but the one for whom, if something is constructed, then it means it is 
fragile and thus in great need of care and caution (Latour, 2004a, p. 246). 
 
Being critically reflexive, then, is not about being dismissive. Rather, it is a refusal 
of intellectualist tendencies towards pure theory and interpretation in favour of 
approaches that confront problems at the level of practice (where they have, in fact, 
gathered as “matters of concern”). Secondly, and related to this commitment, since 
much previous fitness research has tended towards the general (and generally 
critical) cultural overview, holding out more for fitness implies the need for a 
pragmatic methodological strategy in considering fitness as a reflection of reflexive 
embodiment or body-work (e.g. Deleuze and Guattari emphasise this notion of using 
concepts as strategies). If there is both attention to and attention with one’s body (as 
Csordas has usefully explained), then it is incumbent upon us to acknowledge that 
the body is not merely an object in the world. Rather, the body is of the world; it is 
“worldly.” It is a vehicle of practical activity (pratiquement) on the side of the 
subject that exists in an embodied relation to the world (Bourdieu, 1990, 2004; 
Marcel, 1977; Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 2002; Shilling, 2003; Todes, 2001). To 
emphasise the dual structure of the phenomenological body is to emphasise that, in 
action, we are bodily and open to multiple perspectival and temporal orientations 
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 (Crossley, 1996, 2001, 2004a, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Csordas, 1990, 1993, 1994; 
Heidegger, 1962; Leder, 1990, 1992a, 1992b). Moreover, it is to emphasise that it is 
only through this dual structure that we can come to have an understanding of 
meaningful and morally valenced lived experiences (see e.g. Shilling, 2005; Shilling 
& Mellor, 2007; Shusterman, 1999, 2008; Throop, 2005, 2010). Thirdly, and on the 
basis of this embodied practical emphasis, holding out more for fitness requires the 
acknowledgement that fitness participants are not merely the passive recipients of 
projects determined over and above them in objective structures. Rather, it requires 
the acknowledgement that they are active in the meaning-making process, that their 
actions (and interactions) have both a structured and structuring effect, and that this 
generative process is worthy of our deep consideration (cf. Crossley, 2006c; 
Sassatelli, 1999a).25 Finally, and on this basis, holding out more for fitness requires 
the acknowledgement that we have not yet come to terms with the task of talking 
about the fit body and that there is scope to follow through on the positive 
proposition that fitness is a negotiated endeavour. The negotiated nature of this 
research process is reflected in “Figure 3.1 The Phenomenological Research 





25 Although both Bourdieu and Foucault’s accounts of reflexive embodiment reflect this dual character of 
the structured and structuring body, with interpretations and applications of their work there has been a 
general tendency towards critique based on structural explanations of power acting upon the body. This is 
largely a fault of Bourdieu and Foucault themselves (though not entirely, of course). Despite arguing 
vehemently to the contrary, Bourdieu certainly exhibited clear bias towards the objective configuration of 
structured fields of practice as opposed to the structuring effects of the embodied habitus (cf. Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Johnson, 1993). Likewise, Foucault’s use of the term power to discuss the configuration 
of modern discursive relations acting upon the body is largely pejorative (see Rorty, 1982). These 
seemingly monolithic and negative structural emphases have had a large impact upon sociological 
understandings of the body and embodiment. And, because of this critical bent, these understandings 
have scarcely accounted for the fact that, in many instances, people do not attend to their bodies as sexed 
objects of representation. And even if they once did, they have a hard time accounting for how reflexive- 
embodied practices can change and acquire new meanings over time (see e.g. Collins, 2002; Crossley, 
2006a, 2006b, 2006c; Fishwick, 2008; George & Rail, 2005; Monaghan, 2001a; Sassatelli, 1999a, 1999b). 
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 3.2 The Phenomenological Research Process 
While traditional phenomenological analyses relied on disciplined forms of 
eidetic reflection, it is reasonable to say that recent phenomenological work has been 
broadened to fit into a suite of naturalistic research that undertakes to describe the 
made experiences of individuals from a contextualised perspective. And, while there 
are few immutable rules as to the appropriate means of conducting 
phenomenological work, the notion of ascertaining a description in response to a 
relatively direct question (or set of questions) has almost always been emphasised.26  
Clearly, much of this descriptive work has already been done in positioning this 
study in relation to existing research. You may recall that in Chapter One the 
decision to undertake a phenomenological description of fitness was made (i.e. a 
description of all of those things that have gathered in order form a relational field of 
meaning). Moreover, in bracketing the natural attitude with respect to fitness, 
Chapter Two was given to a lengthy description of fitness’ cultural embeddedness 
and the type of society wherein fitness has come to the fore as a legitimate matter of 
concern. Taking this into consideration, it is clear that the first two steps outlined in 
Figure 3.1 (Secondary Research as Focus) have been completed. It is now time to 
discuss more directly the unique focus of this research and how it attended to a 
positive re-description of fitness (Sisyphus). 
3.2.1 Delineate the Phenomenon Under Investigation 
In order to move forward with this positive appropriation of fitness, it will be 
necessary in this section to delineate the phenomenon under investigation and to 
                                                            
26 Here, I mean to refer to the tendencies of those empirical-phenomenological approaches that were 
developed at Duquesne University (see e.g. Giorgi, 1985; Giorgi, Barton, & Maes, 1983; Giorgi, Fischer, 
& Murray, 1975; Giorgi, Fischer & von Eckartsberg, 1971; Giorgi, Knowles, & Smith, 1979; Valle, 1998; 
Valle & Halling, 1989; Valle & King, 1978). 
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 carve out a research focus of my own. Specifically, the purpose of this thesis herein 
is to build on a number of studies that have granted ontological weight to the local 
organisation of the fitness experience and to examine the possibilities for fitness if 
the following proposition is taken to be the case: fitness is something we negotiate, 
despite it being something we never really achieve. The remainder of this thesis is 
directed towards the generation of a phenomenological description based on the 
following question: What is the structure of this process of negotiation?  
In order to answer this question, and to shed light upon what it means to 
participate in fitness activities on an ongoing basis, it is necessary: 
1. To explore meaning-making in the context of fitness participant’s lived 
descriptions. 
 
2. To examine the motivational impulses that encourage and nurture 
development in fitness activities. 
 
3. To examine the types of pleasures that accrue to participants through the 
engagement in fitness activities. 
 
The account of fitness participation presented herein is unique in the sense that, 
rather than asking about why people engage in fitness activities, it asks only what it 
is like. By indicating a special meaning for the word negotiation (the process of 
navigating obstacles along a leisure trajectory) the remainder of this thesis seeks a 
phenomenological description of the factors involved in negotiating one’s fitness 
activity in the context of everyday life, its commitments, and its responsibilities.27 
This deontological re-description of fitness (as opposed to a self-refuting fixed 
ontology of fitness) is not only a heretofore neglected area of inquiry, but reflects a 
phenomenological response to those hermeneutical problems associated with fitness 
                                                            
27 The question of “negotiation” is of much greater significance than mere critique when you take into 
consideration the fact that over half of people who begin a structured exercise programme give up within 
the first six months (Courneya & McAuley, 1994; Dishman, 1982, 1988; Dishman, Sallis & Orenstein, 
1985; Duncan & McAuley, 1993; Mintel, 2003, 2007; Robinson & Rogers, 1994). 
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 in our present stage in the history of modernity. The following sections illustrate the 
means through which this thesis’ re-description of fitness was ascertained. 
3.2.2 Conduct Preliminary Fieldwork 
Since it was reasoned that fitness is a negotiated endeavour undertaken in a 
consistent manner over an extended period of time, it was deemed necessary that at 
least one of the means of data-generation should have a logical relation with the 
temporal flux of the activities in question. While retaining the centrality of a 
contextualised description as the unit of phenomenological analysis, this aspect of 
the research took neither the written nor the verbal account as its primary method 
(see e.g. Colaizzi, 1978; Fisher, 1985; Kvale, 1983, 1996; McCracken, 1996; 
Polkinghorne, 1989; Pollio, Henley, & Thompson,1997; Thompson, Locander & 
Pollio, 1989, 1990; van Kaam, 1966). Rather, in fulfilment of the objectives of the 
second aspect of this research, it was deemed both appropriate and necessary to 
combine both real-time and retrospective data. 
A preliminary phase of ethnographic fieldwork proceeded from the position that, 
in order to understand the structure of the process of negotiation, there needed to be 
an acknowledgement that the research situation was complex and diffuse and that 
there was a need to experience the phenomenon in a contemporaneous manner as it 
was “lived through.” Although this type of fieldwork turned out to be an ongoing 
endeavour over the course of this research, a specific stage of preliminary fieldwork 
took place over a five-week period in a rural fitness club in Clane Co. Kildare 
(formerly, “Clane Health and Fitness”). The site was a commercial club within 
which fitness activities were undertaken through fee-based club membership and in 
participants’ leisure time. The reasons for the emphasis on commercial fitness clubs 
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 will be discussed in the following section. However, it will suffice to say for now 
that, since the majority of previous research has taken the fitness club as a general 
locus of activity for the field as a whole (and since the second aspect of this research 
was directed towards a re-description of fitness) it was deemed to be particularly 
useful in gaining an experiential insight into the vagaries of fitness participation. 
 Material for this ethnographic work was ascertained not only through a 
variety of observations and interactions with fellow participants, but also through a 
variety of roles undertaken by the researcher. Given my qualifications and previous 
experience as a fitness professional, approval was given by the club owner and 
manager to undertake two primary roles with respect to club member observation 
and interaction. The first role was undertaken in club uniform and involved an 
ethnographic stance from the perspective of “The Fitness Team.” This involved 
shadowing other members of the fitness team in the context of their interactions with 
club members (consultations, demonstrations and assessments, as well as group 
exercise activities). However, in certain circumstances, it also involved a more direct 
interaction with club members. This was especially the case since staff in fitness 
clubs are often inclined to spend time around the reception area of the club (a 
significant locus of activity in itself when the manager is not around!). In their 
absence, club members often asked for help with finding and using equipment, 
suggestions pertaining to exercise choice (“What’s a good exercise for toning my 
X?”), stretching (“How do I stretch my X?”), and timetabling of activities (“Is there 
a class on at X am?” “What class is on this morning/evening?” “Who is teaching X?” 
“Where do I need to sign in for X?”).  
Although descriptive material was ascertained through a participant and non-
participant role, an overly (and overtly) non-participant observation role was avoided 
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 in order to increase the naturalistic flavour of data-generation.28 The second role 
involved a more traditional participant observation where there was a concerted 
effort to immerse myself within the activities undertaken by participants. This 
involved participating in both individual and group exercise at various times and on 
various days (see next paragraph). It involved relating to others both in and through 
my body (i.e. intercorporeally) so as to be deemed a credible participant. This 
credible participation was an embodied activity. It was not primarily cognitive. It 
required “getting a feel,” “letting go,” “loosening up,” “going with it.” It required 
taking risks, not being afraid of doing something wrong, doing something incorrectly 
and being corrected. And, in the end, it often required a level of practical mastery 
(proficiency, at least) in relation to specified activities and in relation to others. For 
example, in an exercise class, participants not only have to manage posture, 
movement, balance, coordination, rhythm, tempo, and sequence demands, they also 
have to keep up with the instructor and others around them (i.e. you have to keep up 
with others in the class and they have to keep up with you). This phenomenon is not 
limited to group exercise classes. In an individual training session, for example, 
participants often ask for (or are asked to give) a “spot” while lifting weights so as to 
improve on previous workouts in a safe manner. In both instances, participants tend 
to help each other, talk themselves and others through the workout, and do this in a 
manner that elicits desirable responses (i.e. they psyche each other up, they get each 
other in the zone, etc.). Successful workouts not only tend to have a fluid feel about 
them, they tend to elicit shared affective responses. This is something that enables 
                                                            
28 Like Crossley (2004a, 2006c, 2008), general note-keeping was kept to a minimum and, instead, the 
observations and findings were written up and refined over the course of a number of drafts of the paper 
that was prepared for the ISTTE conference at the end of the summer of 2008: Neville, R.D. (2008) 
Peculiarities and Parameters Affecting Health and Fitness Research in C. Hu, (ed.) Proceedings of the 2008 
International Society of Travel and Tourism Educators (ISTTE) Conference, Dublin, September 30 – October 2, 
2008, St. Clair Shores, MI: International Society of Travel and Tourism Educators, pp.197-211.  
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 the experience of working out to tend towards consummation (i.e. it lets participants 
know when they are done). And notably, it is often the topic of post-workout 
(watering hole!) conversations. 
The time brackets in which observations were undertaken were (i) from 9am 
until 12pm, (ii) 3pm until 6pm, and (iii) 6pm until 9pm. The framing of 
observational work within these periods is significant. For one, it was agreed with 
staff at the club that these times (particularly on weekdays) were significant for 
engaging in formal activities and engaging with members in the pre-/post-workout 
periods. For example, it is generally agreed that fitness clubs are busiest in the post-
workday period (from about 6pm onwards) and that the majority of organised fitness 
would be allocated to this time bracket. The 9am to 12pm time bracket was also 
significant. Since the fitness club in question had a crèche, many non-working 
parents and those on shift-work would drop their older children to school for 
8:30am/9am, drop the younger children into the crèche, and then use the fitness club 
for anywhere between one and two hours. Organised fitness classes were also 
scheduled to cater for this demand. On most days, I stayed to cover two blocks of 
time. This often meant staying from 9am until 12pm and coming back at 3pm until 
6pm or coming into the club at 3pm and staying until closing time (often 10pm). In 
terms of undertaking a participant role (which, after a number of weeks appeared to 
have been the more fruitful of the two roles undertaken), it was often the case that 
the researcher would participate in club activities between 9am and 12pm and then 
again between 6pm and 9pm. These were certainly the club’s two busiest blocks of 
time during the weekday and the times at which one would encounter a diverse range 
of participants. The fact that the club would go on to ask their full-time staff to work 
split-shift hours during the week (post-economic downturn) is a testament to the 
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 importance of these two time periods over the middle of the day. That all 
observational work was undertaken on weekdays is also significant. Informal 
reviews of the study format with staff at the club confirmed my initial belief (based 
on previous experience) that the weekend was not a busy time (save for the use of 
wet facilities) and would be unsuitable for the purposes of this research.  
It is significant to mention as a final remark that, although only initially planned 
for a five week period, the latter participant role was maintained over the remainder 
of this research until the club closed down in May 2011. This not only helped in 
fostering a close working-out relationship with a number of participants (discussed 
in more detail in the next section) and in meliorating the existence of an explicit 
power relation between the researcher and the researched, it also allowed for an 
immersion into the experiential aspects of fitness consumption at a personal and 
inter-personal level. Though the researcher had been involved in working out at a 
fitness club in an on-and-off manner for most of his adult life, the time spent in this 
space during the second phase of this research was more structured – typically within 
the 9am -12pm or 6pm – 9pm time brackets previously discussed – amounting to 
approximately 1000hrs (a period of approximately two and a half years, going to the 
gym on average 5 times per week, and spending on average 90 minutes per session). 
The importance of this role cannot be overstated since it was central to the 
development of a phenomenological sensitivity to those parameters affecting fitness 
research, to coming into contact with “experienced fitness participants” (on this, see 
section “3.2.1 Sampling Considerations and Justification”), and to the 
phenomenological processing of researcher-participant relations which will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
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 3.2.2.1 Parameters Affecting Fitness Research29 
Building upon this practical involvement, the first major output emerging from 
this fieldwork undertook to describe some of the peculiarities and parameters 
characterising the fitness club environment as a meaningfully-infused social space. 
Various general matters that were already apparent (from previous research and my 
own experience) were reinforced during this stage. For example, the fact that the 
consumption of fitness for leisure exhibits patterns of seasonality making it appear 
like a different place at different times of the year became clear. This stage also 
reinforced previous research’s emphasis on the fitness club’s private status as a space 
for leisure, as reflected in my early observations of Clane Health and Fitness Club: 
Upon entering the club, one encounters a contained and protected space...At this 
point there is no confusion that this is a private club where rites of passage are 
either granted by a swift swipe of one’s membership key-ring or by the member of 
staff who occupies this first area of physical space – reception. Non-members are 
routinely dismissed...although the option to join...is certainly available as the 
plethora of information upon entry will attest. 
 
What this stage of the research emphasised most was the fact that, as a meaningfully-
infused social space, the fitness club also exhibited its own experiential aspects. That 
is, it appeared to exhibit aspects that made going to the gym and working out feel 
like an experience in itself rather than just another leisure activity. 
Following Spradley’s (1980) dimensions of a social space, this early 
descriptive work emphasised a number of important experiential aspects under the 
following headings: (i) participants within the setting, (ii) what participants do 
within the setting, (iii) the objective-material environment, (iv) the temporal 
sequencing of events, (v) salient goals, and (vi) related affective responses. 
                                                            
29 Material discussed in this section is adapted from early observations presented in: Neville, R.D. (2008) 
Peculiarities and Parameters Affecting Health and Fitness Research in C. Hu, (ed.) Proceedings of the 2008 
International Society of Travel and Tourism Educators (ISTTE) Conference, Dublin, September 30 – October 2, 
2008, St. Clair Shores, MI: International Society of Travel and Tourism Educators, pp.197-211. 
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 Following the objectives outlined in section “3.2.1 Delineate the Phenomenon Under 
Investigation,” this descriptive work sought to meaningfully capture an everyday 
experience of going to the gym to work out. This was done by making considerations 
for the negotiated character of this endeavour, its motivational impulses, and the 
emotive responses that it likely engendered. The following (part autobiographical) 
passage is taken from my early phenomenological reflections on the factors involved 
in negotiating physical activity in the context of everyday life and its various 
commitments and responsibilities: 
It’s 16:55pm and Enda, a young professional who commutes to work every day, is 
getting ready to leave work. On his way home he will, as he does every Wednesday, 
drop into the local gym for his scheduled workout. After all, Wednesday is “legs 
and abs” day, as Bill Phillips has informed him in the book he recently read, Body for 
Life. He estimates that the bus will make it to the gym at approximately 17:50pm, as 
it usually does. Once he gets there, he has about ten minutes or so to swipe into the 
club, briefly flirt with the receptionist and, finally, hit the changing rooms. Then, he 
will adorn himself with his exercise specific training gear, mentally preparing 
himself for the workout to follow. Ready to work out, he will bound up the flight 
of stairs, briefly pause at the doors to the gym and organise the playlist on his i-
pod. At the same time, he will gaze through the small window in the door to see if 
the gym is as busy as it was on Monday, when he had to wait for almost every 
machine. His disdain for the “resolution-makers” is quite strong, as it is for most 
regular gym-goers. After all, this is his midweek break, his chance to disengage 
from both the responsibilities he has left behind in work, and the ones he will face 
when he gets home to his wife and young child. Once he enters the gym, he will 
follow the dominant discourse of entering the weights area to mould, sculpt, 
and/or build the version of his desired body that has been branded into his mind 
(only, of course, after a brief five minute warm-up as the aforementioned book 
suggests). Among the many things he will do in the gym, Focus, Sweat, Push, 
Grunt, and Endure, are high on his agenda – all of which will be rewarded with a 
well-deserved cool-down, stretch and figurative pat on the back. Once he has 
finished his workout, he will stride proudly, flushed with positive workout 
endorphins, out of the gym and down the stairs to freshen up and go home. After 
all, dinner is always at half seven. However, it is now 17:10pm and the bus is late. 
He is starting to get agitated, as he will not start his workout until 18:10pm. He 
wonders if the gym will be packed. In fact, he wonders if he will make it there at all. 
 
Nothing I have seen over the course of my ethnographic work prompted me to alter 
my views here significantly. At a general level, what this description emphasised 
was the complex, multidimensional, apparently ritualised, and clearly engrossing 
nature of going to the gym to work out. To use a distinction developed in the 
94 
 following sections, it emphasised that going to the gym to work out is not merely an 
activity. Rather, it emphasised that activity is often accompanied by a continuous 
focus of attention outside of the gym that is unlike other leisure forms. It is a focus 
of attention that provides conditions for the possibility of working out and, hence, 
enables participants to become entirely engrossed within the activity. In fact, it 
emphasised the fact that exercising for fitness can exhibit an orientation so vigorous, 
energetic, and seemingly agonistic so as to seem aberrant to those outside of it (cf. 
Chelladurai & Chang, 2000; Hill & Robinson, 1991; Lehmann, 1987; Sassatelli, 
1999a). What would emerge more specifically from this ongoing phenomenological 
sensitivity are two considerations that are worth underscoring before proceeding: 
how my understandings of (i) negotiation and (ii) experience would change over the 
course of this research. 
Firstly, it emerged that, although almost exclusively framed as an 
encapsulated experience, going to the gym and working out is not merely 
sequestered from everyday life. It would emerge that, although the fitness club 
appears open to anyone with the economic capital to act as a consumer, going to the 
gym and working out is not mere consumption activity. Rather, success in acquiring 
the requisite cultural competence or capital to even act as a credible consumer 
requires a seamless weaving of tools, tactics, and affective responses into the life-
world. Indeed, acting as a competent and credible gym-goer does not leave the life-
world go unaffected. Rather, it often contests and, at its best, refreshes and renews it 
(see, in particular, section “4.3.1.3 Pleasure as Tension-Release” in Chapter Four). 
Importantly then, these thoughts left me to reconsider the implications of the fact that 
fitness is not merely negotiated in the context of everyday life (its commitments and 
responsibilities). Rather, it is always already a part of it. Acting as a competent and 
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 credible gym-goer is a commitment in itself, it is an important responsibility to 
uphold, and, therefore, requires the creation of a life-world of its own. This, perhaps, 
is something that I should have known only too well given my acquaintance with the 
phenomenological literature – that self-making is always already a world-making 
activity. However, perhaps it was a lesson better learned in practice. 
Secondly, and on the basis of this reorganisation of attention, my own 
general understandings of what it meant to explore experience changed (an 
epistemological shift informed by practice). It became clear that, if going to the gym 
and working out is not merely an encapsulated experience (or consumption activity) 
then it was not merely something that could be bought or sold. It was made. Or, 
more specifically, going to the gym and working out was a made experience. It 
became clear that, in order to come to terms with the meaning of fitness, I would 
have to focus, not only on individuals and their experiences, but on the factors 
involved in the making of individual experience. I would also have to focus not only 
on experience per se, but on the acts that constitute it, the environments in which 
these acts take place, and the significant others that render them meaningful. To use 
a phrase discussed in the following sections, I would have to focus on the shift from 
mere activity to made experience. Sampling considerations and a more thorough 
description of what is meant by this made experience (and experienced fitness 
participants) are offered in the next section. 
3.2.3 Sampling Considerations and Justification 
From a phenomenological perspective, the use or selection of research 
participants is not defined within any specific parameters. In fact, of the various 
anthologies that have presented the foundational principles of an empirical-
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 phenomenological inquiry (e.g. Giorgi, 1985; Giorgi et al., 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983; 
Valle, 1998; Valle & King, 1978; Valle et al., 1989) there is scarcely a paragraph, let 
alone a chapter, devoted to sampling considerations. In spite of this, a number of 
important criteria can be outlined.  
In terms of selecting research participants for the second part of this study, a 
number of preliminary requirements should be clarified. In line with the ethical 
standards and guidelines pertinent to the Institute in which this research is being 
undertaken, (i) all study participants had to be over the age of eighteen, (ii) they had 
to have participated in a de-briefing interview with the researcher prior to consent, 
and (iii) they had to provide written consent to take part in this research (see 
Appendix A). More specific secondary requirements, however, were based on the 
following four conditions.  
Firstly, the participant had to have experienced the phenomenon under 
investigation and be willing and able to talk about it. They had to have been 
participants in fitness activities at the time of the interview. Secondly, since the 
second aspect of this research was oriented towards description of patterns of 
negotiation, and since attrition has been a longstanding problem associated with 
exercising for fitness, study participants had to have had some level of experience 
and consistency along their fitness trajectory. “Experienced fitness participants” 
were defined specifically as having developed a steady trajectory of participation for 
a period greater than one year, where steady implied working out, on average, three 
times per week. “Experienced fitness participants” were also defined more broadly 
as those for whom a particular subjectivity had been constructed on the basis of this 
ongoing organisation of activity. This view of experience was an important factor in 
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 operationalising the emphasis on negotiation outlined in previous sections. And it is 
precisely for this reason that I will hopefully be excused for citing its source in full: 
I should say from the outset that, by experience, I do not mean the mere registering 
of sensory data, or a purely mental (psychological) relation to objects and events, or 
the acquisition of skills and competencies by accumulation or repeated exposure. I 
use the term not in the individualistic, idiosyncratic sense of something belonging 
to one and exclusively her own though others might have “similar” 
experiences...but rather in the general sense of a process by which, for all social 
beings, subjectivity is constructed...The process is continuous, its achievement 
unending or daily renewed. For each person, therefore, subjectivity is an ongoing 
construction, not a fixed point of departure or arrival from which one interacts 
with the world. On the contrary, it is the effect of that interaction...which I call 
experience...[I]t is produced not by external ideas, values, or material causes, but by 
one’s...engagement in the practices, discourses, and institutions that lend 
significance (value, meaning, and affect) to the events of the world (de Lauretis, 
1984, p. 159; original emphasis). 
 
This account of experience emphasises that individuals do not necessarily have 
experiences in some substantive sense but are, themselves, involved in a process of 
made experience. This is a use that resonates closely with the French expérience, 
which brings with it connotations of experimentation (of having undergone a trial, of 
having been tried and tested, and having changed).30 It is a use that is compatible 
with the work of Dewey (1958, 1997, 2005, 2009) whose distinction between “mere 
activity” and “experience” will be important herein. Notably, it is a use that 
resonates with my emphasis on the term negotiation as the basis for a positive 
appropriation of the term fitness. I use this account herein not to designate individual 
experience but, rather, to refer to this research’s broad engagement across all 
chapters with a variety of participants (i.e. those acts, actors, objects, ideas, practices, 
techniques, technologies, discourses, institutions, infrastructures, events, 
associations, etc.) that have had to congeal over time in order to make individual 
                                                            
30 It is also worth noting that this use retains much of the etymological richness of the term (Ayto, 1990; 
Barnhart, 1988; Dewey, 1958; Jay, 2006; Turner, 1986; Williams, 1985). However, it is also a view of 
experience that largely ceased to be associated with Anglophone uses of “experience” from the eighteenth 
century onwards. 
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 experience in the first place (see also Butler, 1990, 1993, 1994; Scott, 1991; see esp. 
Geertz, 1986). 
Thirdly, in order to further delimit the sample so as to increase the likelihood 
of generating such a performative account, fitness participants were defined as those 
who were members of private gyms.31 By using the gym as the primary site (for this 
research), considerations with respect to membership, average number of visits per 
week, length of membership, etc. could also be more clearly defined within the 
context of measurable parameters. It is almost impossible, for example, to define all 
of the parameters of what constitutes, and what contributes to, fitness. Indeed, 
considerations with respect to people’s general activity levels are extremely wide in 
scope. Whether people walk, cycle, drive, or get public transport to work, the choice 
to take the stairs as opposed to the lift/elevator at work, the increasing use of 
pedometers over the course of the day, etc. all clearly contribute to persons’ overall 
fitness and, as such, present a significant problem when it comes to sampling. As 
Crossley (2004b) has explained, because much of our lives are routinised, it is likely 
that we have little or no reflective access to many of the factors that impact upon our 
body composition. The use of the private gym, and the average number visits per 
week over a period of one year as a measure of experience then, was a pragmatic 
consideration made on the basis of this difficulty. 
The fourth and final consideration that was made with respect to participant 
selection was the issue of reliability. What constitutes a reliable participant? How 
does one define a reliable participant? In order that problems associated with 
reliability might be obviated, the selection of participants was undertaken in 
                                                            
31 The terms “health clubs,” “fitness clubs,” “health and fitness clubs,” “gyms,” “leisure clubs,” etc., have 
been used interchangeably to this point (as they have in previous research). The term “gym” is used 
herein in order to correspond with research participants’ own preferences in Chapter Four. 
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 conjunction with gatekeepers.32 In this study, four of the gatekeepers were fitness 
instructors working within the aforementioned gym that both vouched for and 
introduced me to participants. The three other gatekeepers were colleagues of mine 
at the DIT who, similarly, vouched for three additional experienced female 
participants and helped to level out what was (at the time) deemed to have been a 
gender bias. In addition to this, three participants undertook this gatekeeping role 
themselves having referred me on to previously unknown participants. The total 
number of elaborative phenomenological interviews undertaken in the second phase 
of this research was twelve. Save for the final three interviews (numbered 10-12 
below) that were undertaken in the DIT (meeting rooms in Cathal Brugha St.), all 
other interviews were undertaken in the researcher’s home office (having previously 
arranged to meet the participant in the gym prior to this). The following table 
overleaf illustrates a general breakdown of participant demographics as per the 











32 The gatekeeper represents an authority figure in social science research and has been utilised in studies 
of diverse and sensitive populations, such as substance abusers (Goode, 2000), socially excluded people 
(Emmel, Hughes, Greenhalgh, & Sales, 2007), lesbian, gay and bisexual communities (Lee, 2008; Yip, 
2008), and abuse victims (Chatzifotiou, 2000) with great effect. 
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 Table 3.1 Breakdown of Participant Demographics* 
No. Pseudonym Sex Age Education Occupation Gym 
Experience




2 Bob Male 22 College** Full-time 
student 
5 years 
3 Steve Male 74 Primary Retired 
farmer 
5 years 





Female 34 Graduate Consultant 14 years 















Male 45 Secondary Taxi driver 23 years 





Female 45 Postgraduate Academic 20 years 
12 Deirdre 
 
Female 42 Postgraduate Academic 8 years 
* All information accurate at the time of interview ** In college at time of interview 
With respect to this participant profiling, seven were male and five were 
female, with a diverse age range from twenty-two to seventy-four. The participant 
profile was also diverse in a number of other respects: varying levels of education 
(primary school education to postgraduate PhD), occupations (from being out of 
work due to disability to being a senior university lecturer), and levels of 
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 “experience” participating in fitness activities (one participant having been working 
out for longer than the youngest participant has been alive!). In addition to the table 
outlined above, the following figure illustrates the relationships between the 
researcher, gatekeepers, and these eventual interview participants: 























All participants are highlighted in the boxes above, with each having either a 
direct (orange) or indirect (yellow) relationship with the researcher. All gatekeepers 
are represented as having a direct relation and, where the gatekeeper acted 
him/herself in the role of interview participant, they are highlighted in orange. All 
other participants are highlighted in yellow. It should be made clear that the number 
here grossly underestimates the level of depth that was ascertained in this research 
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 process – given the level of experience of many of the participants and the amount of 
time and level of action and interaction invested by the researcher in the gym space 
itself (approx 1000hrs). Moreover, the nine initial interviews outlined above in 
“Table 3.1 Breakdown of Participant Demographics” were precipitated by a degree 
of involvement that is not typical in traditional phenomenological research. These 
relationships were sedimented over a number of years (some even longer than the 
number of years it has taken to complete this study). The elaborative interviews, 
therefore, should themselves be viewed on performative terms and seen as a coming 
together of a confluence of events, sedimenting over time in the context of a 
researcher-participant relationship. The elaborative interviews do not seek to merely 
represent participants’ experiences. Rather, they should be seen as the effect of a 
broader phenomenological processing of researcher-participant relations that have 
allowed for the comprehending of this made experience as subjective.33 Ethical 









33 This is a distinction that continues to plague social scientific uses of the term “experience.” It is a 
distinction between treating experience as the matter and not the method of inquiry – an ontological as 
opposed to an epistemological emphasis on experience, as Lash (2006) has explained. Moreover, it is one 
that I explore at length in my own paper under review: Neville, R.D. (Under Review) Leisure, and the 
luxury of experience, Leisure Sciences. 
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 3.2.4 Mitigating Sensitive Issues 
Although the threats posed when conducting research relating to fitness 
participation were unlikely to equate with those prevalent in studying deviant, 
unethical, or addictive behaviours (see e.g. Cooper-Martin & Holbrook, 1993; 
Goode, 2000; Hill, 1995; Hill & Robinson, 1991; Moschis & Cox, 1989; O’Guinn & 
Faber, 1989; Rojek, 1999; Rook, 1987; Truman, 2003), a number of sensitive issues 
with respect to reflexive embodiment were taken into consideration. 
Firstly, the private gym space was respected as a protected environment in 
which participants occupy very different social roles that would likely be expected of 
them outside of it. Participants were thought of as engaging in activities, caring for 
their bodies, and exhibiting postures and movements that might be thought of as 
being aberrant, if not indecent, outside of this space (Crossley, 2006c; Lehmann, 
1987; Sassatelli, 1999a, 1999b). Secondly, a sensitivity to the fact that fitness (and 
body-work more generally) has been commonly associated with carnal body-work 
was necessary (Featherstone, 2007; Frew & McGillivray, 2005; Lehmann, 1987; 
Monaghan, 1999, 2001a; Philips & Drummond, 2001).34 A great deal of research has 
shown that, even outside of the gym environment, exposure to media images of 
beauty, excessive thinness, and overt muscularity can negatively affect self-
perception, regardless of bodyweight or gender (see e.g. Cash, 2004; Kilbourne, 
1994; Philips & Drummond, 2001; Tiggemann, 2004; Wedell, Santoyo & Pettibone, 
2005).35 The second aspect of this research, therefore, had to be especially sensitive 
                                                            
34 The meaning of carnal body-work can be phrased thusly: engagement in practices that, while 
stimulating short-term changes in body composition, have adverse longer term health effects. Examples 
range from those that might be framed as “occasional” (where somebody loses weight quickly in order 
look better for a holiday or a wedding and puts back more weight) or “pathological,” where more serious 
conditions (such as anorexia- and bulimia-nervosa and body-image-dysmorphia) are concerned. 
35 The introduction of the international research journal Body Image in 2004 to the Elsevier collection is a 
testament to the importance of this claim. Even more revelatory of this issue is the fact that body image 
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 to participants’ body-image perception since probing into such topics could be 
construed as inappropriate, if not incriminating, and serve to amplify anxieties in the 
research process.  
In order to combat the threat of sensitive issues and honour standard ethical 
boundaries, a number of strategies were pursued. The gatekeepers were invaluable in 
at least two respects. Firstly, undertaking this work in conjunction with gatekeepers 
helped to rule out a number of potentially sensitive encounters by acting in this 
intermediary role. Secondly, where the gatekeeper in question was a qualified fitness 
professional, it was often the case that a great deal of rapport had been built between 
them and the prospective participant. This was a powerful relationship that was 
harnessed so that a greater level of trust could be extended to the research. The 
choice to focus on participants’ own descriptions in this phase of the research was 
also deemed of fundamental importance to this process. For example, the general 
approach to asking participants what it is like to go to the gym instead of asking them 
why they go was one of the most basic ways of avoiding situations of judgement or, 
indeed, ones in which participants needed to react with defensive responses. On this 
basis, it can be seen that the procedures for establishing a safe and supportive 
environment for study participants was established before they were solicited.  
Also noteworthy is the fact that, prior to being recruited for the study, each 
research participant: 
1. Participated in a debriefing session with the researcher in order to (i) clarify 
the intentions and length of the study, (ii) communicate the requirements of 
them in the fulfilment of research objectives, (iii) outline what’s in it for 
                                                                                                                                                                        
classes are being piloted in primary schools for the first time in the UK this year (source: 
http://www.channel4.com/news/body-image-classes-piloted-in-primary-schools) 
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 them, and (iv) give (potential) research participants the opportunity to ask 
questions.  
2. Was given a form to sign indicating consent and reassuring the maintenance 
of confidentiality. The form was to be signed by both researcher and 
participant. A participant was not considered a part of this research until 
they were been given the opportunity to participate in a de-briefing session 
and have committed on an informed consent basis. 
3. Was given a pseudonym to mitigate the possibility of their identity being 
unintentionally revealed. 
4. Was given the opportunity to withdraw their involvement at any time during 
the research process. 
See Appendix A for a copy of the participant information and study consent form 
utilised in this research as per the study’s correspondence with the DIT ethics 
committee. 
3.2.5 Conducting the Phenomenological Interview 
Although preliminary fieldwork provided a contextualised insight into the local 
organisation of the fitness experience, it proved to be less effective in terms of 
examining this experience as it was lived through and, in particular, from the 
perspective of the other. Material elicited also often turned out to be rather 
perfunctory and repetitive at times, scarcely offering more than mere lists of 
interactions and activities observed and undertaken. As the philosopher John Dewey 
was wont to say: ‘[m]ere activity does not constitute experience. It is dispersive, 
centrifugal, dissipating’ (Dewey, 2009, p. 153; see also Dewey, 1958, 1997, 2005; 
Turner, 1986; Turner & Bruner, 1986). An experience that is made involves change 
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 and stands out from the banality of mere activity. It is active as opposed to arbitrary 
and merely passive, involves an interplay of affect and being affected, and is 
structured according to lines of initiation, immersion, and consummation. An 
experience that is made, then, involves doing and undergoing. It erupts from (or 
disrupts) mere repetition and is characterised by a quest for meaning in that which 
has disconcerted us. As Dewey (ibid) explained, it is only when an activity is 
‘continued into the doing and undergoing of consequences,’ when a ‘change made in 
action is reflected back into a change made in us,’ that ‘mere flux...is loaded with 
significance.’ In order to facilitate a transition from mere activities to experience, the 
second part of this research sought to elicit an elaborative dialogue based on the 
stories participants had to tell about their everyday engagement with fitness activities 
and how this takes on an affective structure as experience. 
Whereas phenomenological interviewing has tended to be open-ended, eliciting 
a discussion on the basis of an opening statement or question, each interview in this 
study was framed around three overlapping themes relating to the study’s objectives: 
participants’ (i) fitness history, (ii) definitions of fitness, and (iii) descriptions of how 
fitness activities are negotiated in the context of day-to-day activities. The following 
figure overleaf presents a breakdown of the themes and questions attached to them 


















 How long have you been a member of a gym? 
 Has it been the same gym throughout this period? 
 Have you been a frequent attendee over this period? 
 What are the sorts of activities you do at the gym? 
 
 Would you describe yourself as a fit person? 
 What would it take for you to say “I’m a fit person? 
 What days of the week do you usually go to the gym? 
 What is a typical day like when you go (or have planned to go) to the gym? 
 What does it feel like before a workout? 
 What does it feel like after a workout? 
The questions outlined above were posed to all participants. They were deemed to be 
revelatory of this study’s objective of trying to elicit a description of how fitness 
activities are negotiated in the context of everyday life. Moreover, they were deemed 
to be revelatory of how this is a meaningful endeavour, how participants motivate 
themselves in order to encourage and nurture development in this leisure specialism, 
and how this process elicits affective responses. There were two primary reasons for 
following an explicit thematic structure and, hence, departing from the traditional 
open-ended phenomenological stance. Firstly, it was thought that eliciting a 
description of the participant’s history of undertaking fitness activities would 
provide a dual purpose. It would enable participants to adopt a reflexive position 
relative to the researcher without them even realising they were doing so. It was also 
reasoned that getting them to talk a little bit about themselves (as opposed to merely 
answering questions) would make them feel more comfortable. The second reason 
for departing from the traditional, open-ended repose was to facilitate some 
modicum of control across interviews. That is, since the second aspect of this 
research was given to a phenomenological response to issues previously outlined in 
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 Chapter Two, the thematic approach ensured that all participants sufficiently covered 
items of interest in their descriptions (as far as possible).  
While the interview protocol facilitated a thematic structure to each interview, 
the ensuing dialogue was (following Thompson et al., 1989; see also Arnould & 
Fischer, 1994; Thompson, 1997a, 1997b; Thompson et al., 1990; Pollio et al., 1997) 
necessarily open-ended so as to encourage elaborative dialogue. My role in this 
elaborative process was to facilitate a greater immersion on the part of participants 
into the lived dimensions of their experiences. It was deemed that this would provide 
an opportunity for expansion and would lead participants beyond the particularities 
and peculiarities of “mere activities,” to the nature, structure, and meaning of lived 
“experiences.” 
3.2.6 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
While the early philosophical-phenomenological tradition sought eidetic 
conditions from which the object of experience would “tell us what it is,” the 
pragmatic description sought herein aligns with no such Archimedean point. Instead, 
there was an acknowledgement of the role of the researcher within the process, such 
that the interpretation could be said to have emerged on the basis of a cumulative and 
interactive growth. The steps outlined below have been adapted from those outlined 
in Valle’s (1998) edited volume Existential-Phenomenological Perspectives in 
Psychology and detail the process through which individual interviews were framed 
and subsequently interpreted. While the following sections describe this phase of the 
research as a step-by-step process, this does not do justice to the back-and-forth 
nature of the interpretive process and how established meanings only became 
sedimented over time through multiple iterations. 
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 1. Transcribe the interview recording to get a sense of the whole 
This first stage of interpretation involved an analysis of the text in order to 
ascertain a preliminary understanding of it as a whole. This involved a close listening 
to audio-taped interviews in order to get a feel for the material. Listening to 
interviews allowed for an initial familiarisation with the material that would 
otherwise have been missing. The second component of this initial phase involved 
manually transcribing the interviews. Over the course of the research, it became 
evident that the transcription process was itself a useful means of increasing 
familiarisation with the interview material. 
2. Review transcript for significant statements 
Once a sense of the whole had been grasped, the transcript was read over and 
over again (as many times as was deemed necessary) in order to extract significant 
statements and break the text down into manageable units. Significant statements 
were selected according to what von Eckartsberg (1998, p. 22) referred to as an 
‘explication-guiding question.’ That is, they were selected on the basis of their 
relevance to the objectives outlined in section “3.2.1 Delineate Phenomenon Under 
Investigation.” Each statement was considered in terms of its relevance to how 
fitness activities are negotiated in the context of everyday life and its responsibilities. 
The following explication-guiding question was used: what does this statement 
reveal about how this individual negotiates fitness activities into their everyday life? 
Statements relating to meaning-making, motivation, and affective responses also 
guided interpretation. Only statements that were deemed revelatory of the 
phenomena under investigation were retained for further analysis. All other 
statements were discarded. 
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 3. Review transcripts for local themes 
The process of establishing local themes followed a similar process to that 
outlined in the previous step. However, instead of considering significant statements 
at the intra-interview transcript level of analyses, local themes were considered at the 
inter-interview level (i.e. across interview transcripts as opposed to within them). 
Interpretation was undertaken on the basis of part-to-whole iterations so that separate 
themes could be evaluated in terms of one another and so that potential themes that 
did not stand up to inter-interview comparisons could be discarded. Furthermore, a 
local theme was not considered unless it had emerged from a participants’ 
description (that is, unless it could be directly highlighted in one or more transcripts). 
4. Transformation of local themes into global themes 
At this point in the process, interpretation began to move from situation-specific 
elements of participants’ descriptions to constituents that are mindful of the whole. 
The transformation of local themes to global ones was facilitated by a movement 
from participants’ point of view to a more abstract theoretical description (in line 
with previous or complementary research, say). The establishment of a global theme 
required seeing what Wittgenstein (1963, p. 32) referred to as a ‘family 
resemblance.’ This notion of a family resemblance (following Bambrough, 1968; 
Fogelin, 1979; McNamee, 1995, 2008) is illustrated below: 
  1  2  3  4  5  
           abcde            bcdef             cdefg            defgh             efghi  
 
(McNamee, 2008, p. 11) 
 
To say that participants’ experiences at the local level (indicated by lower case 
letters a to i) came together to form a global theme (indicated by numbers 1 to 5) is 
to say there was a strong connection (a strong set of resemblances) between one 
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 grouping and the next (e.g. between 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and even 1 and 3), but there 
was no single common element holding all of these experiences together.36 
5. Transformation of global themes in a phenomenological description 
In the concluding sections of Chapter Two, fitness was rendered problematic on 
the following three counts: (i) there are no norms pertaining to fitness (ii) fitness has 
no upper limit, and on this basis (iii) fitness is an ambivalent practice. It was in the 
context of this tripartite problematic that the present study’s global themes and 
phenomenological re-description were developed and refined. The final stage of the 
interpretive process involved the working out of a description that would provide a 
phenomenological response to the problem of fitness under late modernity. It meant 
confronting the problem of fitness as it was outlined in Chapter Two (i. there are no 
norms pertaining to fitness, ii. fitness has no upper limit, and on this basis iii. fitness 
is an ambivalent practice) with the findings of this study under each the following 
pertinent objectives: (i) exploring meaning-making in the context of fitness 
participant’s descriptions (ii) examining the motivational impulses that encourage 
and nurture development in fitness activities, and (iii) examining the types of 
pleasures that accrue to participants through the engagement in fitness activities. 
Notably, this involved the confrontation of the findings of this research with 
previous (supporting and critical) accounts in order to create a synthesis of ideas. In 
order to facilitate a shift in emphasis from interpretation to phenomenological 
description, Chapter Four presents the findings of this stage of the research in the 
context of a corresponding tripartite structure of “meaning,” “motivation,” and 
“pleasure.” Chapter Five presents the concluding synthesis of ideas in the context of 
a Complemental Model of Health and fitness. 
                                                            
36 For a discussion of this in relation to leisure research, see Blackshaw’s (2010) Leisure. 
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 3.2.7 Considering Validity and Reliability 
In phenomenological analyses, validity and reliability are deemed to be mutually 
reinforcing, and conceived of on the basis of a relation between methodological and 
experiential concerns. This is expressed in the following “Figure 3.4 The Validity-
Reliability Dialectic:” 















Adapted from Pollio et al. (1997, p.55) 
Methodological concerns were deemed to be procedural and included the structure of 
the research and research design. Experiential concerns, on the other hand, focused 
on the meaning and significance of the interpretive process. Taking into 
consideration “Figure 3.3 The Validity-Reliability Dialectic” above, it can be said 
that the validity and reliability of the research approach was evaluated on the basis of 
(i) being rigorous and appropriate to the study at hand and (ii) that descriptions 
elicited were revelatory of the phenomenon under investigation and plausible across 
a number of experiences. In this sense, many of the delimiting and control factors 
have been discussed in the previous section. In terms of the interplay between the 
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 four factors, one had to consider whether the research question was appropriate (in 
the second half of this study, seeking a re-description of fitness was deemed an 
appropriate response to problem positions outlined in previous research). The rigour 
of the process was linked to how the question was operationalised (the use of a 
tripartite thematic structure and following an explicit protocol in the elaborative 
interviews was important in establishing a level of rigour that is often missing in 
more open-ended phenomenological analyses). It was deemed that the more rigorous 
the process, the more likely the participant’s descriptions were to be revelatory of the 
phenomenon under investigation (again, the use of a tripartite thematic structure and 
following an explicit protocol in the elaborative interviews was important in 
establishing what more traditional, quantitative studies would refer to as convergent 
validity). Finally, the plausibility of the overall description was linked to its 
resonance across the entire scope of interviews (if a description was thought to be 
implausible, then the question asked of the participant was discarded as inappropriate 
and the loop started again). Taken in the context of an interplay of methodological 
and experiential considerations, validity and reliability were thought of as being 
mutually reinforcing. 
3.3 Summing Up 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical and methodological considerations 
pertinent to the project of re-describing fitness and the project of uncovering how 
fitness activities are negotiated in the context of everyday life. It has positioned this 
thesis in contradistinction with critical accounts of fitness, ambivalence, and 
superficial representations of embodiment under late modernity. It is on this basis 
that it has opened up the possibilities for a refocusing of attention towards fitness as 
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 a negotiated endeavour, and as something undertaken by individuals (and with 
individuals) at the level of action and interaction. This project of re-describing 

























NEGOTIATING THE FIT BODY 
FROM CONSUMPTION TO VIRTUOUS PRODUCTION 
 
 
‘If...the machinery of culture is not to spin on in some frictionless paradise...it must 
engage some sort of felt life, which might as well be called experience.’ 
Clifford Geertz, The Anthropology of Experience 
 
 
In a famous anthology entitled The Anthropology of Experience, prominent 
anthropologist and ethnographer Clifford Geertz (1986) remarked that, without an 
account of experience (or something like it), analyses of cultural phenomena seem to 
float several feet above their human ground. In Chapter Three of this thesis it was 
argued that analyses of fitness (as they have been portrayed in the extant literature) 
are, in many respects, guilty of this shortcoming. To be clear, sociological 
understandings of fitness have been useful in highlighting social, political, and 
historical relations, in facilitating a bracketing of the natural attitude, and in making 
explicit the conditions under which people come to have a natural attitude about 
fitness in the first place. In their extensive treatment of the relation between fitness, 
the body, and society, Chapters One and Two clearly testify to the importance of this 
type of contextualising strategy. In spite of this, however, it was also argued in 
Chapter Three that abstract contextualisation can stray too far from the natural 
attitude, painting in strokes too broad to account for the phenomenological context in 
which meanings are taken up, negotiated, and breathed with new life. It was argued 
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 that, when it comes to fitness and its place in relation to modern embodiment, this 
abstract contextualisation has tended to be overly (and overtly) critical and that, 
perhaps, this critique was running out of steam. 
Although previous sociological accounts have provided the preliminary 
conditions in this thesis for A Phenomenology of Fitness, it was illustrated that they 
have conjured a negative image of the fitness industry (as a gestural field in which 
the ambivalence of social action and embodied identity politics are played out) and a 
negative image of fitness participation as the modern-day Sisyphean task. This view 
was criticised in Chapter Three for failing to account for (i) pragmatic considerations 
with respect to how fitness is taken up and negotiated at the level of action and 
interaction, (ii) how the meaning of fitness might relate to use and practice, and (iii) 
how this practical context might be thought of as eliciting its own affective responses 
and outcomes. It was criticised for failing to account for the active role played out by 
fitness participants in the meaning-making process of negotiation. By indicating a 
special meaning for the word negotiation (the process of navigating obstacles along 
one’s leisure trajectory) the second aspect of this thesis has been framed around the 
task of holding out more for and re-describing fitness (or re-describing Sisyphus, as 
it were).  
In order to provide conditions for this re-organisation of attention, this chapter 
follows through on the positive proposition that fitness is something one negotiates 
by focusing on fitness at the pragmatic level (where meaning relates to use and 
practice). The chapter presents a re-description of fitness in the context of the twelve 
elaborative phenomenological interviews discussed previously, participants’ 
descriptions contained therein, and in the context of three interrelated dimensions 
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 which correspond to the three primary objectives outlined in Chapter Three: (i) 
meaning, (ii) motivation, and (iii) pleasure.  
The first section, “Fitness, Health, and Meaning Holism” undertakes to establish 
the conditions under which meaning-making occurs in the context of fitness. It 
explores a number of definitional ambiguities and considers the possibility for health 
as a broader frame within which fitness makes sense. The implications of using the 
term “health and fitness” are also reconsidered. Section two, “Fitness, Motivation, 
and Performativity” configures the importance of fitness on performative (as 
opposed to instrumental) terms. In order to do this, Robert Nozick’s (1974) 
“Experience Machine” thought experiment is utilised as an analytic frame and as a 
means of understanding the motivational impulses that drive “doing fitness” and 
provide the conditions for the possibility of “being someone through fitness.” These 
two factors (it will be shown) are central to understanding how agency is established 
(and maintained) in the context of fitness participation. In light of this performative 
account, section three, “Rethinking Pleasure: From Tension to Release,” reconsiders 
the relation between pleasure and fitness activities. It argues that pleasure pertaining 
to fitness activities is a passive-active affair, presupposes a context of affective 
relations, and a body that is wholly animated through an experience of tension-
release. The chapter concludes with an overview of the main findings and explores 







 4.1 Fitness, Health, and Meaning Holism 
In this section, the findings in respect of Obj. 1 are presented: to explore 
meaning-making in the context of fitness participant’s lived descriptions. However, 
one has to be cautious when discussing meaning-attribution under the conditions of 
modernity. Recall that in Chapter Two, the status of knowledge and fixed meanings 
were undermined in relation to a distancing of time-space relations. While such 
cautionary remarks apply to any concept under our present stage of modernity, it is 
also important to mention that this very fact is radicalised when it comes to fitness. 
Fitness is reflexive by its very definition. Taking this into consideration, the use of 
the term “meaning” as a dimension of interpretation and analysis in this chapter is 
notably pragmatic. What is at stake in this chapter is how meanings are taken up and 
negotiated in the context of use situations. That is, this section does not seek to 
uncover what fitness means to participants per se. It does not seek a fixed ontology 
of fitness. Rather, what is at stake in this section is an examination of how 
participants used the term fitness, how it related to their everyday life, what sorts of 
commitments and responsibilities it elicits, and the implications arising therefrom. It 
seeks a deontology of fitness, as it were. 
In order to explore the meaning of fitness in the context of use and practice, the 
following sections discuss an array of responses to the questions: (i) “Would you 
consider yourself to be a fit person?” and (ii) “What would it take for you to say 
“I’m a fit person”?” The following sections locate, in the responses to these and 
similar follow up questions, some ambiguities and some conjunctive relations which 
helped participants in the organisation and understanding of their experience of 
fitness. Perhaps, even more interestingly, the following sections can be taken as 
119 
 revelatory of the way in which participants’ descriptions of fitness cohered in the 
context of health as an important standard of reference. 
4.1.1 Definitional Ambiguity 
Broached with the question “Would you consider yourself to be a fit person?” 
all study participants – however hesitantly at first – responded in the affirmative. For 
example, though Joan (22, female) wasn’t sure at first, she said “I’d like to think so:” 
“I know that when I’m doing activities with my friends I’ll be like “Oh come on, it’s 
not that hard!”” Others seemed to think of fitness on terms that were subject to 
gradation. Though she is not at her “peak fitness level,” for example, Louise (34, 
female) “would still consider [her]self a fit person.” For Deirdre (42, female), while 
she is “reasonably fit,” she “wouldn’t say very fit.”  Similarly so, self-proclaimed 
“gym bunny” Gail (45, female) acknowledged that, while she is “reasonably fit,” she 
was “not super fit.” And finally, Patrick (27, male) said that while he was not “100% 
fit,” he was “not a couch potato!” Although he had a “certain level of fitness,” 
Patrick went on to explain that he “would like to be a lot fitter” since he still wasn’t 
where he would “like it to be.”  
Others such as John (54, male) and Steve (74, male) also acknowledged that, 
while they were “fairly fit,” the answer to this question was also dependent on other 
factors, particularly age or broader health circumstances and/or concerns (more on 
this later in this in section). For Katie (26, female), fitness was also dependent on 
other factors beyond herself. While she said “I wouldn’t describe myself as being fit” 
she went on to explain that “people who know that I work out on a regular basis – 
but don’t necessarily go to the gym themselves – would say I’m fit.” Like Kate, Bob 
(22, male) and Dermot (28, male) exhibited what might be referred to as a 
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 comparativist view on fitness. Bob was quite explicit about being able “to go for 
seventy minutes in a [football] match.” However, he didn’t know if he could “run a 
marathon...because of the specifics of his training.” Similarly so, while Dermot said 
“I do not believe I am fit in the conventional sense,” he did believe he was “in better 
shape than would be average for the general population.” He explained: “I mean, I 
would struggle badly with running at 10kph for more than five minutes, yet I could 
probably run someone into the ground with weight training over the course of an 
hour.”  
Contrary to the other participants, both Kevin (34, male) and Liam (45, male) 
were much less hesitant. Kevin was “definitely fit.” In response to the question 
“Would you describe yourself as a fit person?” Liam responded “Ah yeah,” laughed, 
and said “That’s basically it” (as if, in a zero-sum sense, “You either are or you 
aren’t”). In the context of Kevin’s narrative in particular, it was even suggested that 
one “can’t go to the gym and not consider oneself fit.”37  
Also noteworthy was the fact that telling somebody one is fit and explaining 
what this meant turned out to be two entirely different tasks. That is, when 
participants were confronted by a follow-up question to the effect of what they might 
mean when they say they are/are not fit – or, more precisely, what it would take for 
                                                            
37 Perhaps a more appropriate way of articulating Kevin’s position would be to say that one can certainly 
go to the gym and consider oneself unfit. However, one’s chances of success in negotiating the demands 
of this social space (without possessing the requisite cultural capital) are significantly diminished 
(Bourdieu, 1984; Crossley, 2004a, 2006c; Frew & McGillivray 2005; Sassatelli, 1999a, 1999b). It is also 
worth noting here that this phenomenon was encountered in the preliminary phase of research. During 
ongoing conversations in this ethnographic work, one particular personal trainer (Matt) discussed how he 
was helping a client to lose weight in the confines of her own home so that she could muster up the 
courage to do it by herself in a gym environment. This is a finding that seems to further radicalise Smith 
Maguire’s (2008a) notion that to be fit is to be “fit for,” whilst bringing to the fore an even deeper level of 
sensitive issues than previously research seems to have acknowledged (e.g. Frew & McGillivray, 2005; 
Philips & Drummond, 2001). In terms of what Kevin said, it is perhaps more reasonable to assume that 
this not what he was alluding to. Rather, as more excerpts from his narrative (and other’s) are utilised in 
the text herein, it will become clear that his comment more likely meant “shouldn’t go to the gym” (see 
section “4.2.2.4 Not Being Someone Through Fitness”). 
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 them to describe themselves as fit/unfit – participants were (although no less 
forthright) far less explicit.  
Perhaps the clearest example of this definitional ambiguity came from former 
fitness instructor Louise’s (34, female) narrative: 
Ross: What would it take for you to describe yourself as being fit? 
 
Louise: Ooh, that’s a tough one. I think if somebody can actually motivate themselves 
to go to the gym three or four times a week and get through a workout of an hour 
long, then they have a reasonable level of fitness. Yeah, I don’t know, I have a weird 
idea of what fitness is. Fitness to me is like if someone can push themselves beyond a 
comfort zone and remain there. I don’t know if I’m describing it well. Yeah, at the basic 
level, if someone can bring themselves to the gym three or four times a week and 
do a fairly steady workout, then they must be acquiring some level of fitness. And, 
if they can maintain that over a long period of time; like, you know, months rather 
than a couple of weeks. I don’t really know if I’m explaining it that well if you wanted to 
probe a little bit further. 
 
Ross: So you relate fitness to being able to keep or maintain something? Is 
that what you mean? 
 
Louise: Yeah. I think so, yeah. I think fitness is a very personal thing. Like, you 
could take twenty people into a room and you couldn’t say...Oh, I don’t know what 
I’m trying to explain. I didn’t think describing fitness would be so difficult. 
 
It will be useful to put into abeyance the detail here in order to show how this 
excerpt provides a useful example of the problems participants encountered in 
making explicit what they meant by fitness. Not only did Louise have trouble 
articulating what she meant by “being fit” (though her answer, as will be discussed 
further in section “4.2.1 Doing Fitness” does offer some reconciliation here), she 
also seems to have experienced frustration during the process. Her asking to “probe a 
little bit further” is noteworthy. By this, it appears as though she is assured that the 
answer is in there and that, from a phenomenological perspective, the interviewer 
should be able to let the phenomena come to the fore to show itself as it is in itself. 
Perhaps this would have helped to sublimate this sense of frustration. 
While not a source of definitional ambiguity, it was also rather surprising to find 
that, despite the emphasis in previous research on the fitness industry’s re-
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 appropriation of the body to meet superficial norms of self-presentation (see e.g. 
Bourdieu, 1984; Bordo, 1993; Duncan, 1994; Featherstone, 1982; Frew & 
McGillivray, 2005; Lloyd, 1996; Markula, 2001, 2006; Pronger, 2002; Sassatelli, 
2006a, 2006b; Smith Maguire, 2002; Vertinsky, 1994; Waring, 2008), participants’ 
accounts of fitness were largely disembodied. That is, descriptions of fitness 
reflected little evidence of an explicit attempt at grounding in corporeal terms or in 
terms of those feelings, sensations, movements, postures, gestures, abilities, 
capacities, etc., that are typically associated with it. Rather, participants’ views 
echoed the traditional, and that is to say dualistic, conception of fitness. For 
participants, being fit implied having something “in the head” (John, 54, male; Joan, 
22, female), while working out involved “getting into that frame of mind,” “getting 
one’s head sorted” or “head around” (Kevin, 34, male) the idea of going to work out. 
For others, it implied the mobilisation of “subconscious” forces so that the “seed” 
could be “planted in your head” (Louise, 34, female). Liam explained, “it’s 
mental...you know you’re fit...it’s in your head.” One’s fitness was something that 
had to be rationalised or mobilised, a task that participants seemed to link to the 
process of bridging intention and action. As Louise (34, female) described, “If I go 
to the gym, then I’m fulfilling what I had on my mind. I’m aligning my actions with 
what was on my mind.” 
It might be said in a preliminary sense that findings presented here are similar to 
those reported in Sassatelli (2006a; see also Sassatelli, 2005) in which participation 
in fitness activities was found to promote a special form of body-self dualism. This 
cleavage between the body and self, it must be noted, is one that runs counter to 
almost all prevailing perspectives on embodied subjectivity. However, a plausible 
explanation for the prevalence of this “body-self dualism” in participants’ 
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 descriptions is Braidotti’s (1994a) remark that, in modern society, there is both an 
under- and over-exposure of the body. Modern work environments, decorporealize 
and encourage recessive bodies (to use Leder’s 1990 phrase) given their increasingly 
sedentary character, whereas modern leisure environments often encourage (and 
even demand) a thoroughgoing corporeality. Given this, “body-self dualism” serves 
as an adaptive response to the increasingly sedentary nature of modern life, so 
prevalent because it is what has to be overcome. Contrary to this, the experience of 
fitness – of going to the gym and working out – requires a body-self that is wholly 
animated. There is a need to acknowledge a cleavage that has occurred between the 
body and self and a reawakening of the recessive body must be initiated. The 
alignment of intention and action, therefore, follows as a natural corollary of the 
alignment of the body and self. This notion of the tension between the under- and 
over-exposure is taken up again in section “4.3.1 The Lived Experience of Pleasure 
Through Fitness.”  
It will suffice to say for now that, for participants involved in this study, 
participation in fitness activities espoused (or is perhaps dependent on) typically 
modernist values in which rationality and self-determination were emphasised over 
spontaneity and impulse. Fitness was not, as Bauman would have it, merely oriented 
towards an ever-expanding plane of experience but was, from the very beginning, 
mobilised towards fulfilling some quite specific end (however difficult this was to 
articulate initially). For most of the participants, this specific end was health and the 
rationality of working out was based on its consensus relation to fitness. How this 




 4.1.2 Finding Fitness Through Health 
Even though a rather compelling argument was made for retaining a sharp 
distinction between health and fitness in Chapter Two, for participants it was 
actually through health that the initial ambiguity with respect to fitness was 
sublimated (i.e. they “found fitness through health”). That is, health provided a 
standard of reference from which accounts of fitness tended towards coherence. The 
following sections explore this connection in more detail. 
4.1.2.1 Fitness, Health, and Holism 
The conjoined phrase “health and fitness” was used on numerous occasions over 
the course of the dialogues with participants. In particular Louise (34, female) 
utilised this expression in order to frame her past experiences as a fitness instructor. 
She described how she “did a course in health and fitness,” how her “qualifications 
are in health and fitness,” and, on a more general level, that she has always “trained 
to be healthy and fit.” This was also the case for Deirdre (42, female) and Bob (22, 
male). Deirdre, for example, distinguished between someone who is “very fit” and 
whose “life centres around the gym” as opposed to someone who is “fit for lifestyle 
reasons” – for “health and fitness.” Similarly so, Bob made this distinction between 
himself (who was “fit for the sport that [he is] in”) and his mother (“who would do 
her thirty minutes of activity a day” and, therefore, “is fit”). Bob explained that he 
was “generally healthy and fit” because he does “the required amount of daily 
activity,” but was also probably “above” this more general level of fitness (fitter than 
his mother, that is!). Yet, for others, the indispensability of each term was clearly 
evident. Take, for example, the following sequence of dialogue taken from Kevin’s 
narrative: 
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 Ross: Would you describe yourself as a fit person? 
 
Kevin: Well, I don’t think you can go to the gym and not consider yourself fit. I’m 
definitely fit yeah (34, male). 
 
Ross: And for you to say... 
 
Kevin: Fit as in going to the gym and...playing football and all that. In terms of 
eating as well...I suppose that’s a different thing, or would that be the same? 
 
Ross: I’m not sure I know what you mean. 
 
Kevin: Health wise. 
 
In spite of the confusion, it seems reasonable to assume here that Kevin was trying to 
articulate a holistic conception of fitness that takes into consideration what he 
referred to as the “broader” concerns of health. His responses seem to resonate with 
Glassner’s (1990) assertion that these longer expressions (i.e. health and fitness) are 
primarily invoked in order to draw attention to the non-active or non-exercise aspects 
of overall health or wellbeing. Importantly then, is the fact that, in trying to locate 
fitness, participants tended to direct their attention towards health as a first (and 
perhaps unconditional) standard of reference. At the very least, with health and 
fitness, each term necessarily tended to solicit the other. 
4.1.2.2 Legitimising and Enabling Fitness 
Contrary to the position outlined in Chapter Two that health and fitness are now 
used synonymously (and that this, naturally, is a mistake), participants in this study 
made no such claim. Rather, where they acknowledged both health and fitness 
within their narrative descriptions, it was suggested that they were separate, though 
related spheres.  
John (54, male), for example, acknowledged that health and fitness, although 
functionally separated, are closely related. In the context of “regular flare-ups” he 
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 experiences with regard to his arthritis, he told me about a conversation he had with 
his wife about working out at the gym: 
John: [T]he wife does be on to me – “It’s the gym. You shouldn’t be in the gym 
when you have arthritis” – so I said it to the specialist one day in the hospital. I said 
“What do you think about exercise? I go to the gym. I go to the gym three times a 
week and I do a fair bit of exercise. Do you think it’s doing harm or good?” She 
Said “It’s definitely not doing any harm anyway.” When you think of if, it wouldn’t 
be doing any harm. You’re keeping yourself loosened up. So, I just said to the wife, 
“Now, that settles that one. We won’t go into that anymore!” [laughs]. 
 
It can be seen here that, where epistemic reasons are largely unavailable or 
inaccessible, John “trusts” that his specialist can provide the requisite justification 
for his belief that exercising is not “doing him any harm.” The justification for 
continued participation in fitness activities involves John (and presumably his wife 
thereafter) making what Brandom (1994, 2000; see also Giddens, 1990, 1991) 
referred to as a “reliability inference.” John infers from his consultation with the 
specialist (whom he deems to be a reliable counsel on such matters) that going to the 
gym is not contraindicated and that he can continue exercising. Moreover, in doing 
this, he is also following established practice in the screening process for gyms in 
that he is ascertaining medical clearance. This is a practice that is routinely employed 
in the fitness consultation process in order to account for certain at-risk populations. 
John’s belief that engaging in fitness activities is not doing him any harm – and, 
thus, the relation he attributes to health and fitness – is, therefore, doubly 
sedimented.  
Take, as another example of this, the following excerpts and sequences of 
dialogue from Gail (45, female) and Joan’s (22, female) narratives (respectively). In 
the following, Gail underscored the relation of fitness to health in the context of a 
general feeling of a loss of “wellbeing:” 
Gail: In more recent years – I’d say, the last two years – I’ve focused more on 
weight training than aerobic training, and that is linked to a health issue because it 
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 turned out that I was anaemic. I was very low on iron and I found it difficult in 
some of the aerobic classes. 
 
And later in our conversation: 
Gail: There have been times when I haven’t necessarily felt fit. You don’t feel great 
and you don’t have the same amount of energy...When I was anaemic, I felt 
completely unfit. My children would notice that when I walked up the stairs at 
home that my breathing was very heavy. Just before that period, in my family both 
of my parents died in the space of six months and I was looking after them every 
day going to the hospital. So I wasn’t going to the gym as often as I had previously 
done. In combination with the anaemia then, that made me feel really unfit. And I 
suppose I didn’t feel well in myself because of that...I knew I was tired and I knew 
I was exhausted...I didn’t have the same amount of energy. I’d go to the hospital 
and I’d come back and...be fit for nothing. I’d just be physically and emotionally 
exhausted. 
 
In terms of Joan’s account of the relation between what she deemed “healthy 
behaviours” and their effects on any subsequent activity in the gym, the following 
dialogue ensued: 
Joan: I definitely think I’ve improved my fitness, but I do think that I could be 
fitter. 
 
Ross: What would a fitter you be like? 
 
Joan: Oh, better diet. Eat better foods and try to avoid the crappy foods, while 
exercising more. I used to be such a bugger for sweet things but it’s just not the 
same anymore. I feel better if I have healthy foods. Even when you’re going to the 
gym, you feel like you can do more than if you have been having crap food. Even if 
it was hours ago you can still feel “Bleurgh.” With healthy food, you can push 
yourself more.  
 
Ross: So you don’t believe that because you exercise you can eat whatever 
you want? 
 
Joan: You can go to the gym and you can eat what you want, but then you have to 
pay for it in the gym. You have to go and work it off. You can do that, but then 
you’re struggling more to have to work it off. I enjoy being able to eat healthily. 
That works for me. 
 
For Gail, there is a composite of both physiological and psychological factors 
impacting on her fitness and, as a result, her felt sense of “wellbeing” (the term she 
used) has been compromised. For Joan eating “healthy foods” makes her feel good, 
whereas eating “crappy foods” makes her feel “Bleurgh.” For Joan, eating healthy 
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 foods takes on a propaedeutic role with respect to her fitness participation. It allows 
her to “do more” – to “push [her]self more” – and is, as such, a naturally expansive 
activity. It orients her to the task of going to the gym and working out in quite a 
specific way that would not be the case had she done otherwise. Eating crappy foods 
(elsewhere she referred to “McDonalds” as an example of this), conversely, 
promotes a feeling that is quite the opposite. It is restrictive and places an affective 
halt on her. With experiences such as these, her organisation of attention is altered. 
For Joan, eating “better foods” and avoiding “crappy” ones allows her to feel that her 
time at the gym is not merely compensatory and that she is not merely engaging in 
compensatory consumption. 
In a most rudimentary sense, it might be said that, for John, Gail, and Joan, the 
broader health field provides both an enabling and legitimising function with respect 
to fitness. However, both Gail’s and Joan’s descriptions do not merely relay expert 
knowledge about an assumed relation between health and fitness (as John’s mostly 
does). Rather, to borrow from Leder (1990), there is a uniquely qualitative to feel at 
stake. For both Gail and Joan, the relation between health and fitness implies a 
general awareness that health – or those behaviours typically considered as being 
“healthy”– provides an appropriate qualitative threshold from which to 
improve/increase levels of fitness.38 It is a threshold which Gail seems to have lost 
and it is something that Joan is conscious to maintain. A difference in age is perhaps 
noteworthy again. But this is only a difference in extent, and not a difference in kind. 
That is, regardless of the difference, for both Gail and Joan, health (construed as a 
sort of qualitative baseline) provides conditions for the possibility of fitness in the 
first place. It provides what Illich (1976; see also Leder, 1990; Svenaeus, 2001, 
                                                            
38 Perhaps it is health to which Bauman (1998a, p. 23) is referring when he says that ‘[fitness] has perhaps 
its lower, though rather blurred and murky threshold,’ though he does not say this explicitly. 
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 2009) has referred to as that unique cultural gestalt which enables openness to 
human performance. 
4.1.2.3 Fitness and Health; Means and Ends 
When reflecting on the position fitness occupies in their life, participants also 
made clear that health and fitness belonged to the same (or some related) order of 
causality. Fitness, Kevin (34, male) remarked, is “just about staying healthy.” 
Similarly, for Liam (45, male), fitness is “all about health issues.” For Patrick (27, 
male), a fit person is both someone who has a “healthy appearance” in a general 
sense and, more specifically, “good cardiovascular health.” Indeed, this was 
something Patrick wanted to “factor into his daily [workout] routine,” explaining 
that, if he were to “be a lot fitter,” this would imply “better cardiovascular health.” 
Others, such as Steve (74, male) and Deirdre (42 female), remarked more 
specifically that their fitness trajectory launched only in the context of overall health 
concerns. When asked whether he would describe himself as a fit person, Steve 
replied by saying that he was “not on any tablets or anything like that” and that he 
“never ha[s] taken any.” Moreover, when asked if there were any specific reasons 
why he started going to the gym, he said the decision was made in the context of 
“want[ing] to get a hip [replacement] done.” Fitness was oriented towards health in 
the sense that “getting the bit of weight down” would likely increase the chances that 
the operation would be a success.39 This causal relation was most expressly 
articulated by Deirdre who said and fitness “gives you better health.” She also 
explained that going to gym had helped to obviate a number of common ailments.  “I 
                                                            
39 It is noteworthy to mention as an aside that, for Steve, locating fitness implied the use of health as an 
ostensive lens. According to Eco (1979, pp. 224-5), ‘ostension occurs when a given object or event [i.e. 
the taking of tablets] is ‘picked up’ by someone [i.e. Steve] and shown as the expression of the class 
[fitness] of which it is a member.’ Moreover, this process of ostension – what Eco (ibid) referred to as 
‘the most elementary act of....signification’ – not only allowed participants to cope with the expression of 
tacit/embodied knowledge, but with the problem of signification more generally. 
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 haven’t had any doses of the flu or anything like that so far this year,” she explained. 
As such, going to the gym for her has “the extra benefit of being healthy.”  
For Steve and Deirdre in particular, health and fitness were viewed on “means-
end” terms. That is, where health = Y and fitness = X, the following relationship was 
relayed: one wants to achieve an end, goal or purpose Y which is believed to be 
brought about by a certain means X. Fitness and health are to be treated in a discrete 
manner since fitness contributes to health. The chain of causality expressed in 
narrative data, thus, configures fitness not as equal to health– and for which Bauman 
takes it to task – but, rather, as a propaedeutic requirement for it. In other words, 
participation in fitness activities is framed here as being oriented towards health as a 
higher order construct.40  
It should be clear that this is not an entirely unproblematic conception of health 
and fitness. The idea put forth in this section (and the previous one) that fitness leads 
to health, yet health provides basic conditions for the possibility of fitness, shows 
that there is a more complex interplay between health and fitness that would seem to 
eschew the consensus position of simple linear causality. How can health provide an 
enabling or baseline function for fitness yet, at the same time, function as its higher 
order goal? While this question is further problematised in the following section, it 
will have to wait until Chapter Five for an adequate and logically plausible 
redescription (and avenue for future research). Suffice to say for now that, at the very 
least, where health and fitness are concerned, participants did not use them as 
synonyms for one another. 
 
                                                            
40 This, of course, is the position that has formed the consensus in the sports and exercise science 
literature (see section “2.1 The Consensus Statement with Respect to Fitness”) and can be aligned to the 
hierarchical model outlined in Chapter Two (“Figure 2.2 The Hierarchical Model of Health and Fitness”). 
131 
 4.1.2.4 Fitness, Health, and Desiring Production 
Perhaps the most interesting finding with respect to health and fitness was the 
fact that (despite modern discourse’s elevation of fitness to the desired, normative 
status for individuals in relation to their bodies) this relation does not go unaffected 
by age profile or perceived life-cycle position. Both Kevin (34, male) and Liam (45, 
male), for example, made explicit that getting to a “certain age” marked a significant 
transition point in their developmental trajectories.41  
Kevin: Once you get to a certain age, it doesn’t become about physique...It’s just 
about staying healthy...I suppose it’s a natural progression from being a twenty 
year-old to now...[A]s you get towards thirty, you start realising that you need to 
look after your diet a little bit because your engine is not quite as good. [O]nce you 
hit thirty-two [or] thirty-three...you’ve gotten your diet [to where it] should be. 
You’re at a very good point...You’re eating good food [and], without realising it, 
[you’re] at a point where you...probably wouldn’t put on weight anyway; well, not 
that much...It’s all a natural progression; evolution in seventeen years. 
 
Compare this extract with the following sequence of dialogue from Liam’s narrative 
to which it is akin: 
Liam: You have to put your age into it...I’m forty-five now. I’m not going to go in 
[to the gym] and spend an hour lifting weights and end up pumped up like a gorilla 
and [get my] heart in a heap. It’s no use to me. It’s the whole package you want 
now. You want a certain level of fitness [and] a certain amount of strength. 
 
Ross: So, it’s a combination? 
 
Liam: Yeah...that’s what it is. That’s exactly the way I have it now at the minute...I 
don’t want to get big. I’ve done all that...It’s more the health side of it [now]. Let’s 
face it, up until then you’re just poncing around trying to look good. It’s the health 
side of it you’re worried about now. Like, my father died at sixty-one of a massive 
heart-attack. My grandfather died at sixty-one...[and] my father’s brother died...of a 
massive heart-attack...So, there isn’t a good track record there now, is there? 
 
Ross: So, you’re changing your perspective? 
 
Liam: Yeah, when you get to a certain age you do change it. It’s more the health 
benefits. It’s great to be able to run down the road and you’re not puffing and 
panting...[T]here are mates of mine that can’t walk across the road. 
 
                                                            
41 Gail (42, female) alluded to this point, though it was not laboured at length and did not appear 
especially significant in the context of her overall narrative. 
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 This point was reiterated later in the dialogue by recourse to a similar metaphor used 
previously in Kevin’s (34, male) extract: 
Liam: It’s like a car. If you don’t look after it, it’s going to stop. Do you know what 
I mean? You’re not going to get thirty years out of it if you’re not looking after it. 
You’re alright [comment directed at interviewer]; guys in your twenties [and] 
thirties. But when you get into your forties, it’s a different ball game...It’s all about 
health issues...Once you start coming into my age group, you hear of so and 
so...after having a heart-attack. Down in Celbridge [Liam’s home town] last year, in 
the space of three months, five guys in their forties died of heart-attacks. [They 
were] [a]ll overweight, all drinkers, all smokers, who have never been in a gym. 
[These are] guys that I would know from when I was drinking. They’re all fucking 
dead now. 
 
The machinic metaphor appears to take on two principle forms that are relevant here. 
In one sense, its use resonates with the prevalence of body-self dualism (that has 
already been highlighted). That is, for some participants, the self is constituted on 
Cartesian terms as ‘the ghost in the machine,’ to use Ryle’s (1963, p. 17) phrase.42 
Fitness is conceived of as the product of a rational and constitutive subjectivity 
acting upon the docile body. While this is hardly a novel thought in fitness 
discourse,43 the machinic metaphor also resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1983, pp. 1-2; see also Buchanan, 1997; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Fox, 2002) 
depiction of the body as a ‘desiring machine’ and as a site of ‘desiring production.’ 
For Deleuze and Guattari, this desiring production is not merely negative, repressive 
or an affirmation of lack, nor is desire merely a means to an end. Rather, it is a 
productive affirmation. It is fluid, processual, implying movement, creativity and 
experimentation, and, is the force by which individuals move in the first place. As 
Buchanan (1997, p. 83) has explained, ‘machines are not metaphors.’ Since the body 
                                                            
42 The notion of a “ghost in the machine” is utilised by Ryle (1963) in his famous The Concept of Mind to 
describe Descartes’ epistemological principle of the distinction between the res cogitans and res extensa, or 
between mind and body (see also Foucault, 1995, p. 136 account of ‘Man-the-Machine’). 
43 For example, the American College of Sports Medicine’s Fitness Book (ACSM, 2003, pp. 41-58) goes on 
at length in the chapter ‘Getting Ready to Exercise’ about the merits of mobilising one’s motivation. ‘It is 
important to...emphasize,’ the manual explains, ‘that motivation is almost there in most of us’ (ibid, p. 55). 
It continues: ‘we have to unleash it within ourselves’ and ‘[o]nly when the connection is made between 
the thought or feeling and the action is motivation mobilized’ (ibid). 
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 is the ‘capacity to form new relations,’ and ‘the desire to do so,’ ‘it too is a machine’ 
(ibid). 
That the fit body corresponds to such “desiring-production” and “flows of 
desire” was discussed at length in Chapter Two (though not specifically in these 
terms). What is at stake here, however, is the universality of such claims. For Kevin 
(since his “engine is not quite as good”) and for Liam (“coming into his age group” 
means hearing of “so and so after having a heart attack”), keeping fit is valued for 
meliorating the effects of ageing, and the increasing prevalence of object-centred 
risks that come along with it. For Kevin and Liam, this emphasis is, in effect, 
tantamount to saying that, “at your age,” you ought to be more concerned with the 
normal functioning of the body, than with concerns about its appeal as a consumer 
object (that is, as an object to be consumed and an object to be consumed for).44 It is 
tantamount to saying that, at a certain point, it should be health and not necessarily 
fitness that becomes prominent. A number of specific questions and considerations 
are worth highlighting here.  
For one, does the use of this machinic metaphor not point towards a more 
general observation that getting to a certain age marks a shift in emphasis in bodily 
orientation? Surely, given the vulnerability and precariousness of human 
embodiment, individuals are not oriented towards the future in a wholesale manner 
(as many sociologists of modernity are wont to believe). Rather, just as the body is 
something to be lived through, it is also, at times, something to be maintained or 
                                                            
44 This is a point that has been flagged at a more general level by Moor (2008) who argued, contrary to 
Smith Maguire’s (see Chapter Two, section “2.2 Fit for Consumption”) assertion that “fitness” and 
“compulsory self-production” are merely “harnessed as the engine of consumer industries.” Moor (ibid, 
p. 295) explains: ‘[t]he focus on ‘consumerism’ as an outcome of the growth of private fitness clubs...feels 
slightly superfluous.’ She concluded: ‘[I do not believe] that people locate ‘meaning, identity and 
relationships’ primarily in acts of consumption, nor [do I believe] that private fitness clubs make this any 
more likely to occur’ (ibid; original emphasis). The prevalence of factors internal to fitness practices are 
discussed in greater detail in the following sections “4.2 Motivating Selves: Fitness and Performativity” 
and “4.3 Rethinking Pleasure: From Tension to Release.” 
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 rationalised, even something to be overcome or salvaged. Kevin and Liam’s 
concerns about the frailty of their embodiment – of their desiring machine – certainly 
leads one to question to what extent an increase in age profile corresponds to a shift 
in emphasis away from the fit body to questions of health. In fact, it is worth asking 
to what extent and under what conditions individuals’ orientation towards their 
bodies change. It is certainly true that modern individuals’ experiences of their 
embodied selves are structured according to being fit for the future (and its 
possibilities). But it is also the case that the present state of the body at stasis can 
directs individuals’ focus of attention (the body in pain is perhaps the most 
prominent example). What happens when this machine breaks down? Surely it is 
reasonable to posit that, at some point and under certain conditions, there is the 
potential for one’s desiring-machine to malfunction. 
4.2 Fitness, Motivation, and Performativity 
In this section, the findings in respect of Obj. 2 are presented: to examine the 
motivational impulses that encourage and nurture development in fitness activities. 
A useful context for considering motivation in the context of fitness is Robert 
Nozick’s (1974) thought experiment, the “Experience Machine.” In this, Nozick asks 
his reader to imagine that a machine exists which could give you any experience you 
desired. Neuroscientists, Nozick emphasises, have the ability to stimulate the brain in 
ways that enable people to think and feel like they are writing an epic novel, making 
friends, or reading an interesting book and all the while they would be floating in a 
tank with electrodes attached to their brains. Taking all of this into consideration, the 
question then, according to Nozick, is whether or not people should plug into the 
machine, pre-programming their life on the basis of desirable experiences. 
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 At closer inspection, Nozick’s much overlooked work actually prefigures much 
of the material that was presented in the second half of Chapter Two. Consumer 
culture and its idealised images are nothing if not playing out Nozick’s Experience 
Machine thought experiment. If one were to take existing perspectives on fitness into 
account as they were presented in Chapter Two (particularly section “2.3 Fit for 
Consumption”), one could clearly grant that, with the Experience Machine, 
neuroscientists could too stimulate the brain in order that people would think and 
feel like they were the bearers of the fit body. Indeed, the relevance of this thought 
experiment to fitness cannot be overstated. This is especially the case since one of 
the primary lessons of the shift in emphasis towards a consumer society is the fact 
that investments in the body are made in order to re-evaluate it beyond its functional- 
or use-value. Maximising one’s potential for fitness under the modern social 
configuration, or so it goes, requires nothing less than an instrumental relation to the 
body and, on this basis, fitness has been constructed as a mere precursor to 
consumption. The logic of fitness is that of consumption. Or, to put it another way, 
the consumption of pleasures is made permissible through the discipline of exercise. 
If it is true that the fit body has value only in an instrumental sense (as yet another 
commodity to be invested in) and if it represents nothing more than mere ‘sign 
material being exchanged’ (Baudrillard, 1998, p. 132),45 then one would surely be 
inclined to plug in to Nozick’s “Experience Machine.” That is, since the project of 
fitness – of reorienting the body and the self in the face of the consequences of 
modernity – has aligned with the project of consumption (as opposed to mere 
individual) activity, there is little doubting that the answer to Nozick’s question here 
                                                            
45 In the actual quote, Baudrillard (1998, p. 132) says that ‘beauty is nothing more than sign material being 
exchanged.’ However, since he says also that ‘fitness stands next to beauty...[t]heir signs [being] 
exchanged within the framework of personalization, that anxious, perfectionist manipulation of the sign 
function of the body’ (ibid, p. 139), the replacement of beauty with fitness here seems reasonably apt. 
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 would be “yes.” So why, when Nozick addresses the general question as to whether 
or not plugging in is desirable, does he emphatically say “no”? In what ways might 
existing perspectives on fitness have been flawed in assuming that it is only the 
consumption of external ends that matters to fitness participants? 
4.2.1 Doing Fitness 
Nozick’s first reason for saying no to plugging into the “Experience Machine” is 
that people ‘want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing 
them’ (1974, p. 43, original emphasis). In the present study, for example, many of 
the participants exhibited an attitude towards their activity in a manner akin to the 
old Nike Slogan – “Just do it” – insofar as, for them, going to the gym and working 
out was something they “just do.” “It’s something to be done and I do it,” Steve (74 
male) explained. Similarly, Liam (45, male) explained that going to the gym and 
working out is “something I know I have to do and I just get on and do it.” In fact, 
Liam explained how he “wouldn’t be thinking about not going.” It wouldn’t even 
dawn on me,” he said. Yet, for others, this going to the gym and working out was not 
an entirely conscious process at all. Rather, it had become such a routine aspect of 
their daily lives that it was not really a reflexively mobilised activity at all.46 They 
never really thought about it. “I didn’t actually realise it until I was saying it...I 
didn’t see it like that before,” Louise (34, female) explained. Similarly so, Gail (45, 
female) added “It’s only talking about it now that I actually realise it. Perhaps it’s 
because you don’t take the time out to reflect.” And, even if they did have to think 
about it, this was often only in the context of what Bob (22, male) referred to as 
“overdoing it.”  
                                                            
46 In spite of its routine character, it would be something of a stretch to say that this routine was merely 
the effect of a prior habitus (Bourdieu, 1984, 1985a, 1990, 2004), or of power relations acting upon the 
body and embedded in modes of conduct (Foucault, 1995; Giddens, 1984). 
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 Perhaps the most striking example of this “doing fitness,” however, is 
demonstrated in an expression used by Deirdre (42, female) in order to explain the 
extent of her activity undertaken outside of the gym over the course of a week. “I 
don’t just gym,” she explained, as if to say “Sure, I go to the gym. But it is not all I 
do.” This usage, were it to be accepted into the dictionary would be added (and 
extended) as follows: 
gym n. (Sports) 1 a gymnasium. 2 a course in physical education. 3 a metal 
frame supporting equipment in outdoor play. ● v. (gym·ming, gyms, gym it) 1 
to attend a gymnasium. 2 to engage in physical activity in order to keep fit. 3 
to exercise. ■ gymmer n. 
 
For Deirdre, “gym” is used as a verb in order to designate it’s doing aspects. One 
might be asked, for example, “Did you gym it today?”, “Were you gymming it 
today?”, or, indeed, “Do you fancy gymming it later on?” To gym then is to exercise, 
though in quite a specific sense. For example, to ask “Do you gym?” might be 
thought of analogous to asking somebody “Do you tan?” (i.e. referring to the self-
care reflexive disposition of tanning or using sun-beds) A better analogy might be 
made with golfing (“Do you golf?”) which involves not only the undertaking of 
certain activities, but the accumulation of requisite embodied and cultural capital 
which is appropriate to the field in question. It is on this basis that one might even go 
further and say that “to gym” is not only to attend a gym or merely engage in 
physical activity and exercise, but also implies the accumulation of requisite capital 
such that one might be referred to as a credible “gymmer” (more on this in section 
“4.2.2.1 Being Oriented Towards One’s Environment”). 
4.2.1.1 Look Forward To; Looked Back Upon 
In a manner perhaps less abstract, analyses of responses to questioning on the 
meaning of fitness demonstrated the significance working out for participants (the 
138 
 significance of gymming, as it were). The following responses are arranged 
according to the extent of enthusiasm attached to the significance of “doing fitness:” 
Kevin: Going to the gym is fantastic...I’d like to think that I’ll never stop exercising (34, 
male). 
 
John: It’s more important than my work. I know you have to go to work every day, 
but to me you have to go to the gym your three days. I never mind going to work. Work 
never bothered me. I’ve worked since I was fourteen. But the gym would always be 
first (54, male). 
 
Louise: I actually really look forward to going to the gym because my job is quite 
monotonous (34, female). 
 
Joan: It’s a feel-good factor. It’s not like an obsession. When I go I feel better (22, 
female). 
 
Steve: Oh, I do be looking forward to it. I like going. And if I didn’t enjoy it, I 
wouldn’t go (74, male). 
 
Dermot: On the way to the gym I’m always on a high knowing that the workout is 
just about to happen...Immediately before the workout I’m excited by the 
prospects of lifting more weight than last time...[and] looking forward to the 
pump...of the muscles (28, male). 
 
Patrick: I usually look forward to the gym and working out. Some days I could be 
more tired than others and the enthusiasm could wane a little bit but once I start 
training and get my heart rate up I’m usually good to go for sixty to ninety minutes 
or so of training (27, male). 
 
Liam: I still have to be in the gym Monday to Friday. Whether I do an hour or an 
hour and a half, it has to be done... There’s always something in your head saying 
“You have to do it. You have to do it.”...It should just be something that you do, 
and you enjoy it (45, male). 
 
Deirdre: I do it for fitness – health and fitness – and because I like it. I wouldn’t be 
looking forward to going to the gym like it was the only thing I had in my life, but I 
do enjoy going because it’s an outlet. I’m not jumping through hoops because I’m 
going to the gym. I mean, I’m not dreading it either. I wouldn’t do it if I dreaded it. 
There’s no point. I don’t do things I don’t like doing (42, female). 
 
It is clear that there is a normative element at play here. Going to the gym and 
working out is something that can be looked back upon as something done 
(something that should be done or, rather something that one can be proud to have 
done). What is also clear here, and this is a point that is often omitted from 
sociological accounts of gym-going, is that participants want to go to the gym 
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 because they like doing it. And, contrary to the overly instrumental perspectives 
outlined in the second half of Chapter Two, “doing fitness” can be meaningful on the 
basis that it is something to be looked forward to rather than something that is 
merely to be looked back upon. It is not only something to be done and undergone, 
but something worth doing and undergoing. 
While it is clear that participants would not go to the gym if it was something 
they didn’t like doing (Steve asserted that if he “didn’t enjoy it” he “wouldn’t go” 
and Deirdre that she “wouldn’t do it if [she] dreaded it”), it is also clear that there is 
some underlying rationalisation process at work in “doing fitness” which transcends 
the superficial binary between liking and disliking working out. The following 
sections illustrate how this rationalisation process comes into play and how it is 
central to ongoing participation in healthy activities. 
4.2.1.2 Pre-Emptive Rationalisation 
This notion of a rationalisation process seems hardly novel or surprising when 
you take into consideration the fact that guidelines for physical activity and exercise 
often speak of the merits of assessment, planning, and goal setting in order to 
mobilise motivation (see e.g. ACSM, 2003, pp. 41-58). This was reflected in 
participants’ descriptions of the importance of their workout “routines” or 
“programmes,” particularly Katie (26, male), Dermot (28, male), and Patrick (27, 
male). Katie, for example, explained the importance of “start[ing] with the treadmill 
for twenty or thirty minutes” because if she “do[es] it after doing weights” she will 
“feel too...tired to run.” She also explained the importance of sequencing: “After 
cardio I...do weights for my legs (squats, lunges, and hamstrings), arms (shoulders, 
biceps, and triceps) and, at the end of all that, if I still have [enough] energy, 
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 I...spend ten minutes or so on abs.” This was also the case for Dermot who explained 
that he has typically followed either one of two very specific routines. The first is a 
“whole body workout” in which he “pick[s] three or four exercises...and 
train[s]...three to four days per week.” The second, alternatively, is a “split system” 
where one body-part is trained per day over four to five days.”47 The extent of the 
importance of keeping to the routine is best expressed in Dermot’s admission that, 
over his fifteen years of training, he has been “affected too much by information [in] 
books, magazines, and the internet” and has focused too much on “different training 
routines which meant a lack of focus on a[ny] specific one at a [give] time.” 
In spite of the clearly sophisticated nature of participants’ workout routines, it 
also became clear that other factors beyond mere planning were important in terms 
of providing conditions for the possibility of working out. In the following sequence 
of dialogue, for example, Joan (22, female) outlined some of the additional factors to 
be taken into consideration prior to a workout if she is to bridge intention (“I’m 
definitely going to the gym tonight”) and action (“I was zonked and I still went. And 
I was glad to have broken through it”): 
Joan: Well, if I know I’m definitely going, I wouldn’t be eating a lot of crap food 
beforehand...I would be more conscious of what I’m eating compared to a day 
when I’m not going...I usually come home and say to my mom “I’m going to the 
gym” and tell her to stop pestering me with a big dinner...[because] I won’t be able 
to move if I eat that. I rarely sit down at home beforehand because I’m afraid that 
I’ll get too comfortable. 
 
Ross: It’s interesting that you don’t let yourself get too comfortable. Does 
that mean you wouldn’t turn on the television or anything like that? 
 
Joan: No, I might turn it on but I will usually hover... because I know that if I sit 
down I will...probably be like, “This is way too nice; too comfy”...Usually, it’s if I’m 
                                                            
47 Patrick (27, male) also explained that he followed a split system routine: “Back and Lats on Monday, 
Chest and Biceps on Tuesday, Rest [on] Wednesday, Shoulders, Traps, [and] Triceps [on] Thursday, [and] 
Legs on Friday.” 
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 really tired when these feelings kick in. On Friday, I have a late lecture so I’m 
always geared up and ready for the gym. 
 
Ross: You don’t even get the time... 
 
Joan: ...to think about it or process it. But on Tuesdays, because it has been a long 
day, and because I’m wrecked after a long day on Monday, it’s the tiredness factor 
that gets you. I’m just like “Don’t let it hit you yet.” 
 
For Joan, this emplotted sequence of events is all about getting geared up and ready 
for the gym. She is, to borrow from Crossley (2006c, p. 40), sedimenting an 
appropriate ‘frame’ so as to render more probable the chances that she will go to the 
gym. This frame allows her to avoid getting too comfortable. It literally suspends the 
nature of how she feels in the situation, whilst opening her up to the possibilities of 
working out.  
This was also the case for Katie (26, female) and Gail (45, female) who both 
explained that they preferred to go to the gym immediately after work and/or before 
dinner. When asked whether there was any specific reason for this, Katie explained 
that she goes straight to the gym from work and avoids eating prior to working out 
because it makes her “feel sluggish” or “less able.” Because of this, she 
“immediately change[s] into gym clothes” once getting home from work and “find[s] 
it best not to sit down or make dinner” because the longer she “put[s] it off, the 
harder it will be to go.”48 Gail also explained how she feels like she has “more 
energy” when she doesn’t have “a full stomach” and how she is more often than not 
“less likely to go [to the gym] if I’d had my dinner.” For Joan, Katie, and Gail, there 
appears to be something of a rational management of the sequence of events 
preceding a workout. Their pre-workout frame serves the function of orienting them 
                                                            
48 In broader terms, Katie also explained that this helps her “avoid any disruptions to [the] weekly 
workout plan.” She mentioned that she “generally do[es] not make midweek evening plans” because if 
she “miss[es] a workout” she “feels a certain level of guilt and disappointment” in herself. 
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 towards the task of going to the gym and to the possibilities of what might arise 
therefrom (feeling good, having more energy, etc.). To borrow from Crossley 
(2006c) again, they manage to reframe pre-workout feelings so as to perceive them 
as markers of a need to exercise. For Joan, it “comes down to getting there [the gym] 
in the first place.” For Katie, “once you get warmed up and into what you are doing 
the workout will go according to plan.” For Gail, “you have to keep on the go.” It is 
as if when they do get to the gym, the activity environment will elicit the appropriate 
responses out of them. 
This rationalisation does not only take place immediately before a workout (as is 
the case for both Joan and Gail). Rather, one might implement a more generally 
structured plan with respect to going to the gym, as was the case for Deirdre (42, 
female). She explained this in the following sequence of dialogue: 
Deirdre: I would go [to the gym] on the days that I don’t have to work late nights. I 
usually do two afternoons/evenings in the gym and I’ll do one morning... And 
that’s over seven days. It’s not over the five weekdays. I usually end up with one 
morning midweek and then I go to the gym one evening early in the week and, 
then again, one later in the week. 
 
Ross: So, you wouldn’t be sitting at home saying “Sure maybe I’ll head up to 
the gym now?” 
 
Deirdre: No, it’s planned. It’s either that or it’s not going to happen. 
 
This emphasis on structure was also discussed by Patrick (27, male) and Dermot (28, 
male) who talked about the importance of both a specific “workout routine” and a 
more general “daily routine.” In fact, for both Patrick and Dermot in particular, much 
of their day is spent preparing for the gym. Like Joan and Gail, both emphasised the 
importance of nutrition in the framing of their daily routine. For Patrick, this meant 
“having eaten enough and taken in enough water for my workout.” For Dermot, this 
meant “getting the food intake consistent” in order to keep “the energy levels high.” 
And like Deirdre, the relation between the workout routine and the daily routine was 
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 also quite clear. “[U]sually my daily routine goes to plan,” Patrick explained, though 
“if not, I might...suffer a little bit in the gym energy-wise.” Failure to plan 
adequately results in Patrick “feeling lethargic,” like he “couldn’t lift as much,” and 
having to work harder because he gets “tired a little earlier [in the workout] than 
usual.” Similarly, Dermot explained that, because sometimes he “trains...in the 
morning before work,” “strength levels would be slightly decreased compared to 
training in the evening when there is more fuel...in the body.” The routine allows for 
the elimination of guess work since a failure to do so “can mean being unsure as to 
how the workout will go.” 
In light of the foregoing, it might be said that these participants implement 
something of a pre-emptive rationalisation (in that it comes into effect before the 
fact). It is also noteworthy to mention that all five found it more difficult to attend 
the gym on different days (and at different times of the day)49 but acknowledged that 
this difficulty could be meliorated once it was adequately planned for. In the context 
of this pre-emptive rationalisation, Deirdre’s words best sum up what going to the 
gym and working out is like for all four: “You have to do it. You just make time for 
it and you plan in advance.” How this rationalisation might be thought of as 
sedimenting over time (and at the level of practice) is discussed in the concluding 






49 Gail even mentioned in passing that getting to the gym can be affected by the seasons. “I do think that 
in the winter time it’s much easier to light the fire and curl up and say “Ah no, I won’t go to the gym” 
[laughs].” She continued, “midweek in the winter, going to the gym would be a challenge for me...It’s the 
dark and the wet and the wind and the thoughts of going out again into that.” 
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 4.2.1.3 Rationalisation Across the Participation Cycle 
The importance of this rationalising process is also evident across the 
participation cycle. Take Louise (34, female) who, in the following excerpt, 
describes the aftermath of a workout that did not go as planned. Reflecting on her 
failure to complete a run due to getting shin-splints, she explained how she would: 
Louise: ...be disappointed initially that I can’t do the run, but I wouldn’t allow it to 
ruin the fact that I’m happy I’ve done a workout...I should be proud of myself that 
I’ve gone to the gym so I tend not to harp on about it or beat myself up that I 
haven’t done the run. I’m like “No. You know what? I’ve gotten up and done the 
workout.” 
 
Louise’s “failed experience”50 provides a useful counter to the argument that 
participation in fitness activities is evaluated solely on an instrumental basis. There is 
a sense here that there is something internal in relation to the activity of significance, 
something worth salvaging or feeling good about. When asked whether or not it is 
important to remind herself of such things, she replied: 
Louise: Yeah I think so...I try not to entertain negative thoughts anyway so if the 
initial reaction is “Ah God, I’m really disappointed,” it’s important for me to go 
“Louise. Cop on. This is something really silly. Don’t let that annoy you.” But it’s 
something I’d consciously do; talk to myself and say “Don’t get annoyed over 
something like this.” 
 
For Louise it is important that she has done the workout and its significance is 
largely pragmatic, attributable to the performance of means rather than the fulfilment 
of ends. This fact was also alluded to by Patrick (27, male) who explained that, while 
sometimes he can “feel a little defeated” after a workout, the fact that he has “gone 
to the gym and done something” makes him “feel good.” In the context of an 
ongoing trajectory of participation, it might be said that one’s capacity to commit 
can, at times, outweigh an (in)ability to achieve as a measure of significance and 
                                                            
50 For van Alphen (1999, p. 25), the notion ‘failed experience’ designates those instances of trauma in 
which linguistic, reflexive, and conceptual mediation are resisted. This was also mentioned briefly in 
Joan’s (22, female) narrative. She explained that working out “can be a bit frustrating sometimes because 
you want to have done more.” However, reflecting on workouts such as these, she explains “I feel better 
that I actually came.” 
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 value (presumably with a thought to those who can do neither). And, what is most 
important here (for Louise at least), is the need to remind oneself of this fact. 
Take as another useful example of this type of rationalisation, Steve’s (74, male) 
description of how he gets through a “monotonous” workout: 
Steve: When you get on the treadmill and you switch it on, the first thing you look at 
is the minutes and you’re waiting for the next minute to go and the next minute to 
go, you know? 
 
Ross: Can you remember any particular time when you were there and the 
time went particularly slowly? 
 
Steve: No. The trouble with me is that I was always competitive and I’d never mind 
what position or stress I put my body through. I wouldn’t mind. It’s a thing to be done 
and I do it. 
 
Steve’s is not a peculiar dilemma. Since modern experiences of fitness are so 
dependent on technology for simulation, their temporal organisation is quite often 
oriented towards the present as a series of nows yet to be fulfilled (anyone who has 
spent longer than a half an hour on a treadmill will likely testify to this claim). He 
continued: 
Steve: They have televisions on the equipment and you can plug in and put 
earphones on and work way and the time flies; if there’s anything interesting on 
that is. 
 
Ross: So when you’re on the treadmill... 
 
Steve: ...I plug into the television. 
 
Ross: Does it matter that the time flies? Is that a good thing? 
 
Steve: No, but when you’re doing something against the clock you’re looking at it all 
the time and it feels longer. Some fellas over there [in the gym] cover the timer with 
a towel. They don’t look at the clock at all. Now I noticed one day when I was 
down there and David Heffernan [friend] was beside me on the treadmill and the 
fifteen minutes went by quickly because I was talking to him. You don’t feel it. 
 
Ross: Because of the interaction? 
 
Steve: Yeah, the interaction. That’s what it is. Now, a lot of people would say “I 
wouldn’t go on that treadmill” because it’s too monotonous for them. But, if you 




Ross: And would you often have somebody there that you know? 
 
Steve: No, not often now. But I got a pair of earphones and I have them on me now 
and I just plug into the television and sure you don’t feel it [the time]. 
 
For Steve, the monotonous nature of his workout is a function of its boundedness to 
time and how time takes on a noticeably antagonistic character. Heidegger (1995) is 
useful here. For Steve, what is at issue here is the desire to overcome the vacillation 
of time which he experiences as having impressed upon him. As Heidegger would 
explain it, the monotony of Steve’s working out is a product of being affected by 
time as it drags and by the enigmatic essence of time in general. For Steve, getting 
through the workout means overcoming this by diverting his attention. Strategies 
that Steve noted include plugging earphones into the television or being lucky 
enough on occasion to have a friend to talk to to facilitate this process. For others, he 
explained, this might mean putting a towel over the clock so as to obscure the 
temporal organisation of the experience. Regardless of how this is done, it is only on 
the basis of this reorganisation of awareness that “time flies.” In fact, it is not 
necessarily the case that “time flies” (though this is certainly a useful metaphor). 
Rather, what is at stake in all cases here is an attunement to something other than 
time. ‘Time,’ Heidegger (ibid, p. 100) explains, ‘goes more quickly because its 
dragging is no longer there...we forget time altogether.’ It exists only in abeyance, 
suspended temporarily at least until it runs out. ‘It is now impossible for time to 
tarry...for too long because it cannot tarry at all’ (ibid). 
Unlike Louise, Steve is not necessarily competing against himself (or even 
others for that matter), but against the unreasonable silence of this technological 
environment. He is competing against the slowness of time and the hold it has upon 
him. Other differences are noteworthy. For Louise, the process of rationalisation is 
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 certainly more explicit than it is for Steve. Steve’s behaviour appears more 
normalised. This is a point that might be attributed to the 40 year age difference. In 
spite of the differing circumstances, however, there is a performative trait that marks 
a similarity between the two. However consciously or unconsciously, both manage 
to refocus their attention to what is important – “doing fitness” – and towards a 
rational management of their behaviour. For Louise and Steve, not only have they 
used strategies or skills from other areas of their lives to rationalise doing  (in 
Steve’s case) or having done (in Louise’s) a workout, but, in doing so, they have 
come up with normatively appropriate responses to the issues normally encountered 
in the context of working out. 
4.2.1.4 Rationalisation and Vicarious Doing  
It is not only getting over “failed experiences” (as in Louise’s case) or getting 
through potential ones (in Steve’s) which highlights the importance of “doing 
fitness.” Consider as a final example the following excerpts from my discussion with 
John (54, male), a regular fitness enthusiast who, after many years working-out 
within the gym environment, was forced to sever the trajectory of his activity in the 
face of greater responsibilities in other spheres of his life: 
John: Last year I missed ten weeks at the gym because the wife wasn’t well from 
November till after Christmas. I said to myself “Ten weeks out of a gym is a long 
time.” Ten weeks doing nothing is a long time. The wife said to me “Go back” and 
I said “I don’t know. I don’t know if I’d be able for it. Ten weeks is a long time.” 
At my age, ten weeks is a long time. 
 
Ross: How did you feel when you had to stop? 
 
John: Oh, that was bad. It was serious. It was a big decision to have to make but it 
had to be done. I was heartbroken after it, you know. On the nights, say Monday 
night, you’re looking at your watch saying: “Seven o’clock, spinning class is starting 
now”; “Eight o’clock, the boys are coming out of the class now”; “They’re 
probably going in next door to the gym now...” And then I couldn’t let on that was 
affecting me. The wife said to me “Do you miss the gym?” and I’d say “No, no, I 
don’t miss it at all. Sure I had to give it up sooner or later anyway.” Tuesday night 
148 
 would be alright, Wednesday night the same as Monday. And that lasted. It didn’t 
get any easier after three or four weeks. I was saying to myself “Ah, after a few 
weeks it’ll be alright. I’ll get used to it.” But it never got easier for the ten weeks. 
The tenth week was the very same as the first week. I still wanted to be there, you 
know. 
  
In one important sense, John’s account illustrates how it is not only from the 
perspective of presence that significance is established. Rather, significance is also 
disclosed in instances of absence (perhaps increasingly so in this case). John recalls 
how missing “ten weeks” was “bad,” it was “serious.” Moreover, the decision to 
sever the trajectory of his participation was “a big decision to have to make,” 
nonetheless “it had to be done.” Later in our dialogue, John would go on to say that: 
John: The gym is really part of my life. Your family is first, but the gym is next. 
There’s nothing else. The family is here. Well, the gym is next; there next to it you 
know. The family comes first, but to me the gym is second. 
 
How does John cope with losing out on what is second in his list of life priorities? 
Heidegger (1995) is useful here again insofar as he makes a distinction between 
‘being-there [Da-sein]’ and ‘not-being-there [Nicht-Da-sein]’ (original emphases). 
How often it happens, Heidegger explains, that our experiences are characterised by 
both presence and absence? John’s is certainly a case in which there is a peculiar 
interplay of presence and absence. He is both present to and absent from the gym 
environment. And, it might be said on this basis that John is not, in fact, missing out 
entirely. He “still wants[s] to be there” and, in a sense, he is. To be sure, his distress 
is veiled so as not to “let on” that missing the gym was affecting him. However, by 
recounting the normal sequence of events on particular workout days, he seems to be 
able to cling on to his former (if only fractured) self by experiencing, vicariously, the 
events through others. For John, what “the boys” are doing (“coming out of the 
class,” “going in next door to the gym”) appears tantamount to what he feels (though 
he is too respectful of the situation at home to say so) he should be doing. It is, in 
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 fact, what he would be doing if the were situation otherwise. John’s fractured self 
coheres somewhat by replaying or narrating an emplotted sequence of events and, it 
is this plot (to borrow from Ricoeur, 1980) that serves a connecting function between 
his being-there and not-being-there. This period in John’s life is thus reorganised 
and reconfigured as narrative coherence because even “vicariously doing fitness” can 
save him from “losing the plot” entirely. 
4.2.2 (Not) Being Someone Through Fitness 
‘In the case of certain experiences,’ Nozick (1974, p. 43) explained, ‘it is 
because first we want to do the actions that we want the experiences of doing them 
or thinking we’ve done them.’ At a certain level of abstraction, this certainly seems 
to have been the case for participants. However, what is more compelling is the 
evidence for rationalisation processes that appear to be at work, and which serve to 
contribute to the ongoing negotiation of fitness trajectories. However consciously or 
unconsciously, participants manage to refocus their attention in a manner that 
requires the rational management of their behaviour. Whether this meant a pre-
emptive stance (Joan, Gail, and Deirdre) or the use of strategies or skills from other 
areas of their life (Steve and Louise), it is clear that participants had the ability to 
come up with normatively appropriate responses to those issues encountered in the 
context of working out. Their actions, to borrow from Austin (1975), Searle (1969), 
and Ricoeur (1973), exhibit “perlocutionary force” and compel them to conjure up 
the necessary inductive resources to either orient themselves towards action or help 
them cope with potentially disruptive series of events.51 “Doing fitness” implied the 
ability to establish, implement, and maintain a set of inductive resources so that one 
                                                            
51 Borrowed from speech act theory, the notion of “perlocutionary force” implies that, in doing p or 
saying q, one intends to elicit a quite specific response s. That is, performing certain acts or utterances is 
done so with the intention of affecting future behaviour in a specific direction. 
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 might deal with normal as well as potentially disruptive sequences of events. In fact, 
there is evidence to suggest that participants’ prior knowledge of the performative 
significance of working out contributed to the maintenance of a steady trajectory of 
participation. This rational management, it seems, goes some way towards 
explaining how people find themselves in situations in which they feel obliged to 
exercise. 
Whether anybody can “do fitness” is a more complex question. As the saying, 
goes, sometimes reason does not go all the way down. 52 The second component of 
Nozick’s thought experiment offers a useful lens for framing our understanding of 
agency as it relates to fitness. The question to be asked is: what capacity/capacities 
of the individual needs to be actualised so that one might account for how intention 
relates to action? 
4.2.2.1 Being Oriented Towards One’s Environment 
What else matters to us in addition to our experiences, Nozick (1974, p. 43) 
explains, is that ‘we want to be a certain way.’ Should it be surprising, Nozick asks, 
that what we are is important to us? For Nozick, the “Experience Machine” does not 
allow for genuine, meaningful action to occur, rather, only the appearance of it. 
Saying “no” to plugging in is tantamount to acknowledging that action has structure, 
content, and that individuals are meaning-imputing agents. From the perspective of 
the participants involved in this study, going to the gym and engaging in fitness 
activities was also a meaningful endeavour. The following excerpts from Bob’s (22, 
                                                            
52 For example, it would hardly be remiss to say that there are many people who “should” be 
incorporating healthy activities into their lifestyles who (in spite of this normativity) do not. In fact, a 
number of studies suggest that a greater emphasis directed towards the promotion of beneficial outcomes 
can act, somehow paradoxically, as a barrier to the uptake of such behaviour (Crossley, 2006c; Mintel, 
2007; Sassatelli, 1999b; Tsai, 2005). 
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 male) and Joan’s (22, female) narratives provide some useful examples of how this is 
the case. 
Discussing the difference between his gym training now and when he was 
younger, Bob explained that: 
Bob: When I was younger, I was just lifting weights with no concept behind it and 
no real technique. Now, with the football team, we have a strength and 
conditioning coach that looks over us. So, if you’re lifting weights...you’re being 
watched and, if you’re doing it wrong, you’re corrected...There would also be some 
guys...who would be poor at lifting and wouldn’t have good technique so they 
wouldn’t be able to advance to some of the stuff other guys are doing...They can’t 
progress like others...but she [the strength and conditioning coach] works around 
this to do things that can help them. I find it really good. Like, I might think I’m 
doing the right thing or feel I’m lifting right. But when someone else sees you 
doing it, there might be something small that you’re doing wrong that you might 
not notice...I find it really good because you learn a lot from it...Being able to get 
feedback is really important...Some other people might not like it but I learn a lot 
from it – from the practical side of it. 
 
For Joan, who was discussing gym going in a more general (that is, not sport 
specific) sense, she explained that she tries “not to stay there [in the gym] too long.” 
When asked what was significant about this, she explained how she tries to “get in 
and get what I have to get done in a time frame that is useful” as opposed to “staying 
there for two hours and not actually benefitting.” Later in our dialogue, Joan 
expanded on this pragmatic attitude towards working out: 
Joan: It’s a mental thing. You need to be in the right mind-frame to do it. If you’re 
not, you’re wasting your time. If you think “I don’t want to be here” then you 
might as well not be there. You’re not going to push yourself. You’re not even 
going to sweat. You’re just going to walk on the treadmill and not really burn 
anything [fat or calories, presumably]. You might get your heart-rate going a little 
bit, but afterwards you will be like “That was pointless.” 
 
Expanding on this point again, Joan makes a distinction between her own attitude 
towards working out, and that of her friends: 
Joan: I mean, I have friends who go [to the gym] and have a takeaway afterwards. 
It’s pointless. They’re like, “It’s grand. I just went to the gym.” They’re just going 
for the sake of it. They’re not going to benefit in the long term, I don’t think. It’s 
just like “the thing to do.” 
 
Ross: So, what’s the difference between them and you? 
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Joan: [Laughs] It’s so obvious; some people just go to the gym for the social 
element. You can spot it a mile off. You’re like “What are you doing you posers?” 
Personally, my own opinion is that you have to be there for yourself. I mean, you 
can tell a mile off when people are just there to be there. 
 
Ross: And do you have friends like that? 
 
Joan: [Laughs] Oh yeah, I have friends who definitely do that. 
 
Ross: Do you ever work out with them? 
 
Joan:  No. Hardly ever. It’d be too much of a distraction. They would kill me if they 
heard me [Laughs]. 
 
In these excerpts, both Bob and Joan provide a useful distinction between merely 
going through the motions and the involved application of oneself that is necessary 
in order to become more meaningfully oriented to the fitness training environment. 
Like Bob, Joan also reflects on the fact that, as a novice, she often “wasted time” and 
did not often “get the most out of it.” And again, like Bob she reflects on how there 
was a change in “focus” and “intensity” that has helped her to more meaningfully 
orient herself to this activity environment. In fact, both Bob’s and Joan’s accounts 
are particularly revelatory of what Dewey (2009, p. 153) meant when he said that 
‘mere activity does not constitute experience,’ meaning that, an experience is ‘loaded 
with significance’ only insofar as it is linked to some form of ‘cumulative growth.’ 
According to Dewey, when one is meaningfully oriented towards one’s environment, 
doing must become a form of trying – ‘an experiment with the world to find out 
what it is like,’ to use Dewey’s (ibid, p. 154) own words – and it is only in this shift 
that there is growth which makes it an experience in the vital sense of the word. For 
Joan, since her friends are merely going through the motions – since they are “just 
going for the sake of it” – their action cannot be elevated to the level of what Dewey 
(2005, p. 36) referred to as ‘an experience.’ For Bob, since his teammates are poor at 
lifting and have poor technique, they look elsewhere for this shift (presumably 
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 towards things that they are good at that Bob is not so good at). In Joan’s case, the 
Other in question are not credibly engaging in meaningful action. For Bob, the Other 
in question are unable to do so. Perhaps the only difference between Joan and Bob is 
that Joan appears to consciously avoid working out with them; the Other for her is 
something of a barrier to engaging in meaningful action. What is noteworthy, and 
evident in both, is the notion that, when it comes to fitness, being a certain way 
requires not only a cognitive commitment to its normatively articulated qualities as a 
social practice, but also a practical commitment to its demands as an embodied, and 
meaningfully skilful activity (cf. Collins, 2002; Crossley, 2004a, 2006c; Sassatelli, 
1999a; Shusterman, 1999, 2008). 
4.2.2.2 Being Someone Through Fitness 
Building on Nozick’s more general work, in this study being a certain way also 
implied being a certain type of person. “A fit person,” Patrick (27, male) explained, 
“is somebody with good cardiovascular health.” This emphasis was also important 
for Dermot (28, male) who explained that “[fitness] has the association with 
cardio[vascular fitness/exercise] and being able to run, jog, cycle, or swim for a 
length of time...with the heart rate...being lower than for an average person doing the 
same activity.” Similarly, Katie (26, female) explained how she would “probably 
associate someone who is very fit” with “someone who runs marathons, does 
triathlons, cycles, does cross-country, or plays a sport.” Building on this, it was 
Deirdre (42, female) who quite explicitly made a distinction between “being 
reasonably fit” and “being very fit,” and the type of person that might be associated 
with each: 
Deirdre: Someone that’s very fit continuously works out and all of their life centres 
around the gym. I would say people who are very very fit are totally focused on 
some club team or they’re into team sports or whatever. They’re doing a lot of 
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 activity. Like, my fitness level is not for playing football three times a week. I think 
that someone would have to be very fit for that. 
 
In order to further explain what it meant to be a very fit person, Deirdre employed a 
further, corresponding distinction between her and her brother: 
Deirdre: I could compare myself to brother who would be very fit and would train a 
lot. Like, everything in his life centres around his training schedules. He’s very fit. 
My life centres around all the other things I have to do as well. For me, it’s not a 
focal point. 
 
The distinction made here by Deirdre appears to have a correlate in the figure/ground 
relations of Gestalt psychology (e.g. Gurwitsch, 1979; Köhler, 1992). In this 
example, a “very fit person” is one who has constructed their world in such a way 
that the gym and working out stand out as being figural and act as a locus of control 
around which other daily activities are organised. It might even be said that, when 
this person is at the gym all of these other activities (necessarily) recede into the 
background (this is obviously the other way round for Deirdre). Being someone 
through fitness is not merely an effect of doing fitness (it is not about “just getting in 
and doing it,” as Deirdre bluntly also put it). Rather, as Katie and Deirdre have 
explained, there seems to be something of a broader horizon of significance at play 
which gives rise to and reinforces fitness in the first instance. 
Take as another example, the prevalence of sport as an horizon of significance 
in the establishment of a fitness trajectory the following excerpts from Louise’s (34, 
female) narrative. 
Louise: Because I’m a naturally sporty person, I have always been involved in health 
and fitness, and have always been surrounded by people that are involved in fitness, 
when I’m not working out I feel like I’m not being true to myself. So, I feel slightly, 
without getting into the all the health, mind and body stuff, out of alignment. 
 
For Louise, being a “naturally sporty person” has played a formative role in the 
establishment and maintenance of her fitness trajectory. Although she is not involved 
in sport in any direct way anymore (acknowledged elsewhere in our dialogue) the 
155 
 performance of this fitness identity now represents both a localisation and an 
extension of her previous sporting narrative. In fact, when she is not involved in this 
type of activity she feels out of sync with this “natural” self. In the absence of 
context, Louise experiences a reduced sense of equilibrium that results in her 
describing experiences of herself as being “out of alignment.” She continued: 
Louise: I’ve often heard people say it to me that I’m happier when I’m actually 
involved in sport or I’m involved in health and fitness. It’s like something I’m meant to 
be doing. It’s just part of who I am. So that’s probably the biggest thing for me, rather 
than the physical side of things or the confidence side of things. It’s that feeling 
that everything is as it should be; everything is right. 
 
Ross: It fits? 
 
Louise: Yeah, it’s part of me. So, if I’m not doing it, I’m missing something. 
 
Louise’s experience of going to the gym and working out is characterised by a 
general feeling that “everything is as it should be...everything is right.” It is 
constructed as a means of bringing her body and mind into equilibrium (or 
“alignment”), as an expression of virtue (“being true to myself”) and character (“it’s 
part of who I am”), and can be linked to the possibility of authentic selfhood (“it’s 
something I’m meant to be doing”). What is perhaps less clear is the extent to which 
the importance of fitness for Louise is marked by the possible threat of being not 
only untrue to herself, but also being untrue to others (“I’ve often hear people say it 
to me...”). 
The clearest example of the importance attributed to some horizon of 
significance was to be found in Bob (22, male) and Dermot’s (28, male) narratives. 
Taking Bob first, while he (like Katie, Deirdre, and Louise) emphasised sport as an 
important horizon of significance for framing fitness, more importantly, he gave an 
insight into the need for the development and sedimenting of such a frame of 
reference: 
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 Bob: Ever since I was young...I was playing sports and never really focused on the 
gym...My local [football] manager suggested that I start doing...weights... I was 
more into aerobic fitness and he thought that, since I was really good at football, I 
should start trying to get a bit of size on me. 
 
It seems to have been this event that launched an entire trajectory for Bob, one that 
would have him go to college to do a degree in Sports Rehab and one that would also 
have him taking up sport at an elite level: 
Bob: I did my undergrad in Sports Rehab and in the first year or two of that we 
focused a lot on how to design your own [fitness] programme...So I was gradually 
getting an idea of how to train...Gradually, I got into knowing more about it...[and] 
planning how I would go...Now that I’m at such a level with a team, everything is 
specific...Everything is in phases and periodised...At the start, it wasn’t like that...I 
was young and naïve in listening to my manager who was telling me to get more 
size so I used to do it just to bulk up. But I was doing it the wrong way...I wasn’t 
translating it. 
 
This view would go on to help Bob articulate what he now understood by fitness: 
Ross: Would you describe yourself as a fit person? 
 
Bob: Yeah. It’s mad how you would describe fitness though. I would class myself as 
fit. I would be able to go for seventy minutes...[so] I’d say I was fit for that. 
Whereas, if you asked me to run a marathon. Would I be fit for that? I don’t know, 
because of the specifics of our training...Fitness is a hard one to describe. Like, I 
would personally say I’m fit. I’m in good shape and have a good level of fitness. 
But it is only really for the sport that I’m in. If that makes any sense! 
 
Finally, and importantly, this view was taken to its extreme in the following passage 
from Dermot’s narrative: 
Dermot: I do not actually believe in the term fit. It is...based not only on the 
performance of a person in a [specific] activity at a specific time, but is also linked 
to the appearance of an individual...I think the term fit should refer to “fit for 
purpose.” My training is designed to increase muscular size and strength...and I 
would classify myself as fit for [that] purpose. A marathon runner trains for long 
distance...but not for an hour of high intensity weight training. 
 
In a similar manner in which health functioned in the previous section, the lesson to 
be learned here is that fitness is meaningless without some context of 
comprehension. Health and sport are notable, though not exclusive in their purchase 
of the term (as Dermot asked quite provocatively, “Is a sedentary individual with a 
quick metabolism fit for purpose given that his body had no additional requirements 
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 [for exercising] beyond what he does each day? Is that person not fit for purpose?”). 
Rather, the lesson to be learned is that there is no sense of fitness-in-itself (or even -
for-itself). Fitness comes to the fore as a matter of concern, develops, and becomes 
sedimented in the context of some broader horizon of significance. Borrowing from 
Latour (2005, p. 16) and taking into consideration participants narrative descriptions, 
when it comes to understanding and achieving fitness, it pays to be a ‘good 
relativist.’53 
4.2.2.3 Oneself as An Other 
Though it appears to be the most personal of things, the previous section opens 
up the case for the assumption that these identities often presuppose an Other. 
Louise’s narrative, outlined in the previous section, opens up the possibility that 
being a certain way might imply being a certain way to, or being a certain person for, 
others. That individuals can find in an Other an aspirational counterpoint is a well 
developed theme in fitness discourse (Smith Maguire, 2002, 2008a, 2008b; 
Mansfield, 2011; Markula, 2001). However, for some participants involved in this 
study, there was a tendency to define themselves (their current, fit selves) in 
juxtaposition with their Other (or former) self. Former selves functioned as indexical 
markers which meaningfully frame their present experiences of fitness. In John’s 
(54, male) case, for example, it would have been remiss to discuss what fitness 
meant to him without recourse to the fact that he was “always inclined to be heavy” 
and given the fact that he “put[s] on weight very easily.” Such is the significance of 
                                                            
53 Contrary to the common claim that relativism implies an “anything goes” attitude, what I mean to 
imply here is the importance of a relational approach to fitness. As Latour (2005, p. 96) explained 
(following Deleuze, [1993] 2006, p. 21), relativism does not imply the ‘relativity of truth’ but, rather, a 
‘truth of relation[s].’ 
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 this picture of his former self, John reasons that going to the gym and keeping fit is 
“probably [just] a routine that [he] got into.”  
With Steve (74, male), however, we can get an example of how fitness comes to 
the fore in the context of two former selves, both of which (though related) differ in 
their level of complexity. The first, and of the least complexity, is his former self 
prior to having an operation. Going to the gym was his idea to “get a bit of weight 
down,” since he “was up to about twelve stone, eight [pounds] at the time.” At the 
time of the interview, Steve explained how he was “back [down] now to eleven 
[stone], ten [pounds].” For Steve, this seems especially to be the case since his 
former self at “eleven [stone], seven [pounds]” functions as a reference point with 
which to focus his attention in the gym. At a broader level of abstraction, Steve’s 
commitment to keeping fit is linked to a very significant narrative event – his 
retirement. “I finished up work which I was at...nearly night and day.” He reflected 
on how, given the physically intensive labour requirements of the post-WW2 period, 
even if there even was a gym back then “you wouldn’t have time to go to it!” Steve 
(74, male) recalls how: 
Steve: At that time, things weren’t good because of the war. We went on ration 
books for clothes and food and everything like that. And every small farm, whether 
it was small or big, had so much to till – what they called compulsory tillage – and 
that had to be done. That had to be ploughed and tilled with the horses and 
everyone had to do that. That was from 1946 on. I was born in 1934 so we’ll say 
that from the time I was ten or twelve I was doing a bit of work all the time. You 
had to. 
 
 He also recalled how this work had to be done “before [he] went to school” and, 
moreover, how you had to “walk to school, a mile and a half down and a mile and a 
half back.” “Everyone walked everywhere and they were working nearly up until the 
time you died.” It is “a completely different way of life now.” For Steve, keeping fit 
not only takes on a compensatory role, rather, it requires a hybridisation of values. 
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 Those virtues (of control, productivity, efficiency and discipline) inculcated in him 
help in negotiating the somewhat ambivalent conditions of this late modern mode of 
sociality. At his age (74), Steve’s is a good example of how those who grew up in 
the society of producers have had to re-evaluate the trajectory of their selves and 
have had to learn to cope not only with a new mode of sociality, but a new sense of 
self. On this basis, it might be said of the argument that the society of consumers 
does not need those previous values (associated with the society of producers) is 
misplaced. They are merely in scarce supply. 
The trajectory of this break away from one’s former self need not be as 
considered, calculated, and compensatory as it was for John and Steve. Rather, 
Liam’s (45, male) encounter with his former self was more abrupt. Reflecting on 
how he had to give up training due to a flare up of gout (something, Liam explained, 
that was an “affliction”), Liam described the day he realised that he had really let 
himself go: 
Liam: I was putting the barbeque out the back with a pair of shorts on and, 
whatever way I spotted myself in the double-doors, I thought to myself “You fat 
fucking fool. You’d want to sort yourself out.” 
 
This represented a significant narrative event for Liam. Since he has been working 
out in one way or another for all of his adult life,54this marked a point of departure 
for re-establishing his fitness trajectory. In contrast to John and Steve, for Liam 
“there was no build up to it.” He explained: “There was no gradual “Ah yeah, I’ll 
have to go to the gym.” Rather, his mind “was made up...on the Saturday” and he 
“joined the gym on the next Tuesday.” What is even more interesting here, of course, 
are the conditions under which this realisation (finally) came to prominence. The 
double-doors expose Liam to his visual demonstration of lack. “You’re just looking 
                                                            
54 To the question “How long have you been a member of a gym?” he replied “Forever. Since I was 18 
anyway.” 
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 at yourself,” Liam explains, and he reacts in the following manner: “Fuck me man, I 
didn’t realise I got that bad.” When asked how this had eluded him for so long, Liam 
explained that: 
Liam: ...over the course of time you just go out and get bigger clothes, don’t you? 
You’re in jeans and they’re a size forty inch waist, and it doesn’t dawn on you. 
They’re just a pair of jeans. It’s only when you’re standing there in a pair of shorts 
with your gut hanging down. 
 
By getting clear on what was reflected in this image, Liam realised that his body and 
his self had somehow been dislocated. Up to this point, however consciously or 
unconsciously, he had developed strategies of body-image avoidance (i.e. his affinity 
for baggy/bigger clothes) which reflect a broader affinity to a body-self dualism. But 
it is in this encounter that he discovers a discrepancy which existed in his experience 
of self as both a body-subject and body-object. To use Louise’s phrasing from earlier 
on, it was in this encounter that Liam experienced his body and self as being “out of 
alignment.” It was this cleavage of the body and self that oriented Liam towards the 
task of working out. 
Two points are worth highlighting here. Firstly, these findings resonate closely 
with ethnographic work undertaken by Crossley (2006c), who found that many gym-
goers are not, in the main, setting out to construct a particular body. Rather, in line 
with Crossley’s (ibid, p. 31) work they were ‘seeking to recover something they had 
lost, [or] return to former glory.’ Building on this work, it might be said that this 
former self (whether it be construed as a single historical fixation or as an entire 
narrative event) functioned not only as an indexical marker of a prior embodied self, 
but as a fixation of energy which directs one’s organisation of attention towards 
working out. That is, it serves an organising function as well as acting as a 
motivating force. Secondly, the findings presented here have significant implications 
for the notion of the phenomenological body. On the basis of findings outlined in 
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 this section, it is worth asking to what extent the maintenance of a body-self dualism 
enables individuals avoid the problems associated with body image (to be, in effect, 
absent from one’s body) and to negate the demands put on their bodies in the context 
of broader physical culture. 
4.2.2.4 Not Being Someone Through Fitness 
Finally, and in contrast to the strategies outlined in the previous sections, both 
Kevin (34, male) and Liam’s (45, male) narratives offer examples of how an 
apophatic stance towards identity construction enabled participants to organise their 
experiences of self. That is, how “being a certain way” can also imply “not being” a 
certain way (i.e. how “being a certain type of person” can also imply “not being” 
someone else). The following excerpt from Kevin’s shows his tendency to frame his 
identity in terms of the Other: 
Kevin: It takes a lot for a fat person to go to the gym in the first place. Apart from 
anything else, people will be going “fucking hell, look at the size of him.” And 
that’s unfair. I do see these lads coming in and you feel great. I personally feel great 
because you’re going “fair play to you mate.” It’s not easy coming down here 
wearing a pair of shorts and a t-shirt when you can practically see his stomach 
underneath. And he’s still willing to do that. But then it’s not just that simple, going 
down to the gym, especially for those people. They have to really really push 
themselves a lot harder than you or I because we have already got that in ourselves to do 
it. You know, the gene or whatever. Or the aptitude to go. There’s a lot of 
ignorance out there in terms of exercising. You know, I’d be reasonably well up on 
exercising. As I said, people think that if they go to the gym for an hour, or two 
hours, then they can go home and scoff. 
 
Kevin’s description highlights the importance of the Other as a constitutive feature 
of the identity formation process. In the first instance he appears to empathise with 
the Other. However, this empathy is interestingly tempered by his description of the 
Other as “those people” who “really really have to push themselves,” who “go home 
and scoff,” those people, presumably, radically different from “you or I.” Being a 
certain way for Kevin is, thus, clearly constituted by the fact that he is none of these 
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 things. It implies not being this Other (not being fat, not being ignorant and, 
therefore, not going to go home after the gym and “scoff”).  
This view of the Other was also prevalent in Liam’s (45, male) narrative. Upon 
encounters with the Other, Liam described how the first thing that would come into 
his head was “Are you for fucking real?”” When asked what he meant by this, the 
following dialogue ensued: 
Liam: I often look at people and say to myself, “How did you get yourself into that 
state? Have you no self-pride to go around looking like that?” You’d be looking at 
guys jogging on the treadmill and they’re doing a few bits and pieces but they’re not 
doing what they should be doing...You’re not going to get rid of them man boobs 
by just running around like a clown. You need to lift weights to tone yourself up. 
But a lot of guys don’t know that. 
 
Both Kevin and Liam’s descriptions clearly resemble Featherstone’s (2007, pp. 77-8) 
distinction between ‘classical’ and ‘carnivalesque’ bodies. Their descriptions, like 
Featherstone’s carnivalesque, emphasise bodies with “protruding stomachs,” of 
“walking heart-attacks,” “big lazy slobs,” “panting clowns,” and “fat fools” who 
“have man boobs and the lot.” But they are not only characterised by sloth and 
intemperance. Worse yet, they are associated with a perpetual sense of lack (lacking 
“knowledge,” “aptitude,” the right “gene,” etc.); lacking all of those things that 
characterise modern, fit selves. For Kevin and Liam being a certain way implies 
(apophatically) not being this carnivalesque Other because it is something that they 
do not seem to hold out much hope for: “We already have it in ourselves to do it,” 
(Kevin, 34, male); “It’s either something you are or you aren’t” (Liam, 45, male). 
This “not me” attitude towards identity formation is an important finding. 
However, it is clear that it is not just about being different from the Other. Rather, 
there is an irony in the general distinction of classical and carnivalesque bodies. As 
Featherstone (ibid, p. 78) explains, although the carnivalesque body represents ‘the 
otherness which is excluded from the process of form[ing] [a]...middle-class 
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 identity,’ this ‘other which is excluded...[often] becomes the object of desire.’ Here, 
the Other in question is desirable in so far that it plays a formative role in the self-
making process (however unwilling they are to acknowledge this or, indeed, 
however blind they are to this process in the first instance). For Kevin and Liam, 
“being someone through fitness” makes sense only in the in the presence of 
something or someone that they do not want to be, an Other that is to be legislated 
against. They are perhaps unaware of the fact that identities are not merely singled 
out or differentiated from the other, but are, from the very beginning, constituted in a 
dialectical relation with a multiplicity of Others.55 However, as Simpson (1994, p. 
146) has usefully explained, ‘identity by negation is better than no identity at all[!]’ 
4.3 Rethinking Pleasure Pertaining to Fitness 
In this section, the findings in respect of Obj. 3 are presented: to examine the 
types of pleasures that accrue to participants through the engagement in fitness 
activities. Pleasure pertaining to fitness is perhaps the most problematic aspect of the 
tripartite system (of meaning, motivation, and pleasure) outlined at the outset of this 
chapter. There are a number of reasons why this seems to be the case.  
In one sense, the problem of offering an account of pleasure is related to the fact 
that so much has been said about it already. For example, it is difficult to conceive of 
individuals being meaningfully and interpersonally oriented towards any activity 
were it not pleasurable in some sense of the term. The level of investment of 
resources that goes into managing the trajectory of one’s fitness participation must 
be a testament to its pleasure producing effects. To this, of course, there are a 
number of conflicting perspectives about how pleasure is connected to fitness. The 
                                                            
55 This is exemplified in the now famed Deleuzian epithet that, ‘difference is behind everything’ but 
‘behind difference there is nothing’ (Deleuze, 2004, p. 69). 
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 knocker position was illustrated in Chapter Two and need not be rehearsed entirely 
here. However, it will suffice to say that, for the knockers, it is the consumption of 
other pleasures that are made permissible through exercise that is of most 
importance. They accept that certain pleasures are to be located in the embodied or 
kinaesthetic experience of working out. However, these are framed as very much an 
exception to the instrumental rule. The boosters, in contradistinction, hold no such 
reservations about these pleasures. Although a number of competing hypotheses 
exist, it is generally accepted by the boosters that pleasure is a biological 
phenomenon (see e.g. Acevedo & Ekkekakis, 2006; Bird, Smith & James, 1998; 
Brown, 2001; Morgan, 198556; Morgan, 1997; Morgan & O’Connor, 1988; Sharkey 
& Gaskill, 2006). Fitness activities affect a physical-chemical change in brain/central 
nervous system states due to the release of β-endorphins and increased levels of 
monoamines (serotonin, dopamine, and/or nonrepinephrine) in the brain. On this 
basis, pleasure is conceived as an internal (mentalistic-materialistic) phenomenon 
which results in response to the stressor effects of exercise (or to an increase in brain 
temperature). In effect, pleasure states are deemed to be coeval with brain states. 
In trying to bring these accounts together, it might be said that they are almost 
so disparate as to defy easy comparison. In spite of this, there is a quite distinct trait 
that both perspectives share. For both the boosters and the knockers, one exercises 
for rewards external to it as a practice and, as such, pleasure is thought of only in an 
instrumental sense. It is to be taken from the activity as an aside or an afterthought 
rather than being found in the activity. By exploring how pleasure pertaining to 
                                                            
56 Since Morgan (1985; Morgan & O’ Connor, 1988), it has been generally accepted within this biological 
realist approach to sports/exercise science that there are four credible hypotheses with respect to 
exercise’s mood-altering effects. These are (i) the distraction hypothesis, (ii) the endorphin hypothesis, (iii) 
the monoamine hypothesis, and (iv) the thermogenic hypothesis. Albert Bandura’s (see Bandura, 1997) 
work on self-efficacy might be added here as a useful supplementary (or fifth) hypothesis. 
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 fitness might be understood phenomenologically through participants’ descriptions, 
the following sections go some way towards rectifying this shortcoming. 
4.3.1 The Lived Experience of Pleasure Through Fitness  
At a most rudimentary level, one should recall that participants made clear that 
going to the gym and working out (broadly conceived of as “doing fitness”) was 
something that they liked to do. Moreover, it was clear for some (Steve 54, male, 
Gail, 45, female, and Deirdre, 42, female) that, were this not the case, they would 
likely not do it at all. In terms of the participants’ own descriptions, the topic of 
pleasure was most explicitly discussed in the context of completing a workout. In 
discussing what it feels like in this post-workout period, most participants described 
this as a space within which they experienced “feeling good” (Patrick, 27, male, and 
Deirdre, 42, female), “feeling happy” (Joan, 22, female), or a more general “feel-
good factor” (Deirdre and Joan). Others spoke about how working out usually leaves 
them “feeling great” (Katie, 26, female, Gail, 45, female, and Steve, 74, male), how 
working out gives them the feeling of being in “great form” (Kevin, 34, male), and 
how the intensity required in getting through a workout often results in a “great 
buzz” (John, 54, male) or in an “energy buzz going through you” (Bob, 22, male). 
Louise (34, female) was more explicit about the “obvious...biological side of it.” She 
explained how she “rarely feel[s] bad after a workout” and how “those little 
endorphins flying around your body are quite nice[!]” Similarly, Gail (45, female) 
emphasised how going to the gym can “set me up for the day...in terms of energy 
and mood...because [of the] release of serotonin.” Finally, for Dermot (28, male), 
“the elevation of mood and endorphins running through you” after a workout “is a 
major motivating factor for going back [to the gym] the next day.”  
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 4.3.1.1 Pleasure as Gratification 
For most participants, the pleasure that accompanied completing a workout was 
related to that very fact – that the workout had been completed and something of 
significance had been achieved. The following excerpts are reflective of this: 
Joan: It’s like a happy feeling; a feeling of accomplishment. It’s always a good 
feeling (22, female). 
 
Gail: Certainly after the gym you feel great and full of energy and, I suppose, a 
sense of achievement (45, female). 
 
Patrick: I usually feel good after working out as I feel I’ve done what I set out to do. 
I feel good if I’ve done better than previous sessions as I feel as though I’ve made 
some progress...Most days I feel good about working out. It feels as if I have done 
something good for myself (27, male). 
 
Kevin: Sometimes you don’t be in a great mood [before going to the gym] but when 
you come out you do be in great form. You know? You feel great. You feel great in 
terms of doing a good workout (34, male). 
 
Deirdre:  Coming out of the gym you do feel good. You’ve put the effort in and you 
feel like you’ve achieved something. A good workout would be that I enjoyed it. I 
felt “the burn.” You feel that you’ve achieved something by pushing yourself (42, 
female). 
 
Dermot: The immediate thirty minutes after a workout [is] great if you have had a 
successful workout...The feeling of the pump in the muscles...immediately 
following a workout is fantastic. Nine times out of ten, I would have this feeling. 
The sense...of accomplish[ing] something is a driver (28, male). 
 
Katie:  Once the workout is complete, I feel great that I have done it...I always feel 
great after a workout...I feel that I’ve achieved something...It’s at the end of the day 
when I’m in bed that I feel the best about what I’ve done in the gym that evening – 
there’s nothing better than the sleep I get after working out (26, female). 
 
John: Well, it’s a great achievement. If you think coming back down [the stairs from 
the gym] what you’re after been thinking about going up and you think of what 
you’re after doing. To come back after cooling down and everything, and knowing 
that you’re after going through what you did...It’s a great feeling (54, male). 
 
In one sense at least, the notion of pleasure pertaining to fitness was clearly reflected 
in the fact that having gone to the gym and worked out meant that something had 
been overcome. In fact, for John (54, male), his “t-shirt drowned in sweat” even 
functioned as an indexical marker of this critical overcoming. Also characteristic of 
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 this pleasure was an acknowledgement that the experience was genuinely worth the 
undertaking. Even though it was something that had to be rationalised, fought for, 
and earned, the pleasure experienced was worth the doing and undergoing the 
consequences (to use a Deweyan turn of phrase). Moreover, the achievement of 
which participants spoke was not only of an instrumental kind, but was characterised 
by a sort of gratification. That is, in their experiencing pleasure, there was a 
gratification that something significant in itself had occurred. It was not merely a 
gratification about what might likely accrue from the activity but was related to the 
activity. There was pleasure in the activity. As Ryle (1963, pp.103-6; see also 
Crossley, 2001, 2006a; Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 2002; Szasz, 1988) would explain it, 
the pleasure was not some separate ingredient added to working out. It was 
characterised by an openness and receptivity to the environment to the extent that the 
pleasure was the experience.57 The nature of this openness and receptivity to the 
doing aspects of fitness, and how the resulting pleasure relates to a sort of empathic 
reconciliation, is explored in more detail in the following sections. 
4.3.1.2 Pleasure as Tension Relief 
While it is clear that there is pleasure to be accrued in having done a workout, it 
is also important to understand how pleasure relates to the doing itself. For 
Crossley’s (2006c), gym-going conforms to a tension-release model in that it enables 
agents to experience a temporary relief from frustrations that are triggered in their 
everyday (presumably) working lives. Gym-going, Crossley explains, often requires 
layers of overcoming in order for its rewards to be accrued. In terms of fulfilling a 
mimetic function, Crossley explains further that: 
                                                            
57 Even for Liam (45, male) who explained that, although he doesn’t necessarily “get a buzz out of it” 
(“It’s not like I’m all excited about going to the gym”), he is “always glad” to have done it. For him, too, it 
is about the experience: “When I’m there I enjoy it.” 
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 ...[gym going] allows for the release of tensions, frustrations and impulses that are 
triggered in everyday life but cannot be acted upon satisfactorily...[I]t invokes in a 
euphemized form the structure of situations that are prohibited in everyday life but 
that the agent might be disposed towards, such as combat, and allows playful 
enactment (Crossley, 2006c, p. 41). 
 
For Crossley, gym going enables participants to experience the type of excitement 
and pleasure that is more traditionally associated with pugilistic encounters and 
activities. The release of tensions, frustrations, and impulses is associated with the 
departure from the structure of everyday life thus enabling individuals’ expressive 
qualities to be foregrounded (see also Dunning & Rojek, 1992; Elias, 2000; Elias & 
Dunning, 2008; Rojek, 1995).  
Kevin (34, male) and Louise’s (34, female) experiences of pleasure-as-tension-
reduction are worth noting here. Kevin emphasised “boxing” as a “good way of 
ventilat[ing] a bit of anger” when his regular routine in the gym “didn’t do the 
normal trick.” It provided an opportunity to “do something that you normally 
wouldn’t do,” a means of relieving tensions by literally “pounding away at 
something.” In spite of the similarities here, a number of additions to Crossley’s 
tension-release model might be considered in the context of the present study. For 
example, for Kevin, the reduction of tension was only one aspect of working out that 
was deemed pleasurable. For Kevin, this alternative approach to working out 
involved the recruitment of “particular muscles,” a “completely different movement 
of the body” so that “you are using a lot more muscles than you...would use in 
everyday life.” Similarly, Louise “really look[s] forward to going to the gym” 
because her “job is quite monotonous and boring.” “I sit at a desk for nine hours of 
the day,” she explained. For Louise, there is an acknowledgement that, with work, a 
cleavage between the body and the self has occurred (recall that Louise spoke earlier 
about the importance of getting into “alignment”). The sedentary nature of her 
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 vocation engenders a decoporealizing effect such that her body at work aligns to 
what Leder (1990, p. 36) referred to as ‘the recessive body.’ In fact, it might be said 
that Louise merely brings her body to work. As Dewey (2009, p. 155; see also 
Wolkowitz, 2006) has explained, the sedentary nature of these environments puts a 
premium on ‘physical quietude...silence [and] rigid uniformity of posture and 
movement’ such that ‘a machine-like simulation of the attitudes of intelligent 
interest’ can be ascertained.58 It is likely because of this that Louise explains, “I’d 
nearly be thinking about the gym all during the day, just thinking “I can’t wait to get 
to the gym and just go for it.”” “Because I’m quite an energetic person…it’s my time 
when I can use some energy.” Contrary to the analyses of fitness as self-work 
portrayed in Sassatelli (2007), Smith Maguire (2008b; Smith Maguire & Stanway, 
2008), Waring (2008; see also Rojek’s 2010a, 2010b account of “the labour of 
leisure”), going to the gym for Louise is completely different than work. “It’s the 
exact opposite,” she explains. It offers means of overcoming the body’s recessive 
aspects, of countering its quiescent nature by initiating a sensory intensification (one 
might even say that the “alignment” of which she previously spoke follows as a 
natural corollary of the alignment of her body and self). The body, Dewey explained, 
is, of necessity, a wellspring of energy. It has to do something and, if neglected, is 
likely to break forth. This appears to be what is at stake for not only Kevin and 
Louise, but for most of the participants involved. Within the gym they experience a 
heightened sensitivity to an embodied self. But this is not “a given.”59 Working out 
                                                            
58 For example, when a person talks about having to “drag” themselves to work on a Monday morning, it 
is likely that it is the body to which they are referring (and which is being “dragged”). As Dewey (2009, p. 
155) explained, ‘[h]aving nothing, so it is thought, to do with mental activity [which is a premium in the 
work context], it [the body] becomes a distraction, an evil to be contended with.’ 
59 That this process is not “a given” was well articulated by Dermot (28, male) and Patrick (27, male). 
Dermot explained that, “if the stresses of work or home are on his mind,” he can “lose focus and...end 
up leaving [the gym] without the same sense of accomplishment [as usual].” Talking about pleasure 
pertaining to working out, Dermot explained that “if external pressures...distract...[you] during the 
workout, then this feeling can be blunted.” Similarly, Patrick explained that “[o]n days or weeks when 
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 affords the opportunity of experiencing pleasure. The heightened kinaesthetic 
awareness that is experienced through working out has conditions of possibility and 
requires quite a specific shift in bodily orientation. A previously backgrounded 
embodied self has to be summoned, one that, in the gym, must direct one’s focus and 
organisation of attention.60 This notion, of an interplay between tension and release, 
is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
4.3.1.3 Pleasure as Tension-Release 
An important caveat to Crossley’s position is imminent here. It is unclear as to 
whether Crossley has adequately distinguished between the experience of tension-
relief and tension-release since he seems to have used these terms interchangeably. 
The former, it might be said, aligns closely to what has been referred to elsewhere as 
“the distraction hypothesis” (Morgan, 1985). That is, when engaging in physical 
activities, individuals experience a respite from the constraints and tensions 
impressed upon them in the “outside world” (however broadly conceived). One is 
distracted in the sense that there is an immediacy to, and immersion in, the activity. 
One is present to something else, as it were. The question to be asked, however, is 
whether being relieved of tension is the same as experiencing a release from it.  
If we take Kevin and Louise’s descriptions, it is clear that, with the release from 
tension, there is an experience of the body which presupposes being in an embodied 
relation to some activity environment. Being distracted in the sense of being relieved 
of tension need not be of this kind. In fact, one might even posit that shutting oneself 
off from the world might as easily be conceived as being primarily cognitive. With 
                                                                                                                                                                        
I...haven’t made much progress I don’t feel as good.” And, because of this, “[I]t’s not always the same 
[feeling] when finishing a session in the gym.” 
60 These points are scarcely emphasised in the affective beneficence literature regarding exercising or in its 
application in public policy research (i.e. research after Morgan, 1985). 
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 mere distraction, one need not open up to a new world at all. One merely seeks to 
disregard a prior world of affect. This was certainly not the case for both Kevin and 
Louise. Rather, for them, going to the gym was not only an opportunity to facilitate a 
departure from the structure, stability, and sedentary nature of normal working life, 
but an opportunity to reawaken a previously dormant body-self. In fact, the latter 
presupposes the former as its necessary condition. That is, there is both a “that-from-
which-we-are-coming” and a “that-towards-which-we-are-heading” taking on a 
complemental relation. For both Kevin and Louise, gym going is not merely a means 
of being relieved of tension. Rather it is an opportunity for the body to be released 
from the dualistic context in which it is merely latent. The following excerpts from 
Joan (22, female), Bob (22, male), and John (54, male) offer additional material for 
exploring what the distinction between the relieved body and the released body 
might imply (John’s description, notably, offers a more nuanced example of how this 
might be the case, but their similarities are worth noting nonetheless).  
The notion of getting away or being distracted was clearly the case for Joan who 
was, at the time of being interviewed, undertaking her final exams in college. When I 
asked her why she finds working out so useful at a period when she is under so much 
pressure – and when her time might rightly be directed away from activity – she 
explained initially how it provided “stress relief.” She explained further:  
Joan: It [working out] stops you thinking about it [studying]. But then when you’ve 
done the workout and you go on to do something else your head is so much 
clearer. It’s a means of refocusing. I think that with the gym, or any physical activity 
that you’re doing, it’s nice to get away from other things that you have going on. 
You can just take yourself out of it and focus on something else. And, with 
exercising, it gives you the feeling that you can be more logical about it [her study]. 
It’s another advantage or positive way of looking at it. 
 
Despite the prevalence of, and importance attributed to, working out as a means of 
facilitating a distraction – doing something else seemingly unrelated – it is clear that 
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 there is bi-directionality at stake here. The experience of working out enables her to 
bracket the stresses of study, only to be directed back to them in a more “logical” 
manner. If the notion of relief is perhaps too narrow, the notion of distraction 
certainly is. In finishing the workout, there is not merely a ceding to the reality that 
her break is over and that she must encounter those previously held stresses. There is 
not merely a distraction or relief from the world. Rather, there is also the facilitation 
of a turn back toward it. 
A more detailed account of this phenomenon of tension-release was provided by 
Bob who described how his especially challenging workouts (“strongman sessions!”) 
tend to exhibit (or demand) something of a shifting landscape of affect: 
Bob: Some days you come down to the gym and you’re buzzing. But some other 
days you might be going “Ah, this is a bit of effort.” It’s really hard to pinpoint, but 
generally when I go to the gym the mentality is “I’m going in to do this and I’m 
going to have to get in the right frame of mind.” I’m of the mentality that its best 
to leave everything outside of the gym. But you don’t just go in and do it. You do it 
right. You have to get something out of. When I was younger...I would have just 
gone in and done it for the sake of doing it, whereas now I have more purpose in 
doing it. 
 
Ross: Can you think of the last time when you felt “This is going to be a 
really tough one”? 
 
Bob: Yeah. We do strongman sessions and they’re tough. They’re mentally 
challenging. It’s probably one of the only sessions I have ever gotten sick at. 
They’re a different level... 
 
Ross: How do you get through it? 
 
Bob: I think mentally you stop thinking about it because you’re focusing on what 
you’re doing. It’s before you start that you are kind of battling, going “How am I 
going to do this?” But once you start and you get into it...I think you can take a lot 
from the other lads that are doing it with you...If I have other guys around me that 
are pushing me, I just buzz off that...You have to go into it with the frame of mind 
that it’s going to be tough but it’s only going to last for a certain amount of time. 
The pain is only temporary. It’s not going to last forever...After it, you think “That 
was a hell of a workout,” but you feel really good from it...You get a rush from it. 
 
Bob’s was a shifting landscape of affect because, even over the course of one hour, 
he had to negotiate the demands of an entire geography of emotions. Like Kevin and 
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 Louise previously, he had to facilitate a departure from prior structure (e.g. “hard day 
at work”). He also had to rally all of his energies in order to do so since the “rush” is 
a possibility (not a given) and certain conditions have to be met in order to 
experience it. In addition, he had to facilitate a shift in orientation, reawaken a 
previously dormant body-self, and, in the face of evidently torturous workouts, 
become but an empty head turned towards the world (Dreyfus, 2005; Leder, 1990; 
Merleau-Ponty, 2002). In fact, given his emphasis on the support of significant 
others around him, this rush not only inaugurates a heightened corporeality, but a 
thoroughgoing intercorporeality. 
Finally, the most well developed account of this notion of tension-release, bi- 
directionality, and of a landscape of affect was articulated by John through the use of 
a metaphor. Pre-workout tensions were reflected in him having to negotiate the stairs 
that lead up to the gym. When I asked him to explain what it is like when he is 
getting ready to go up to the gym, he replied in a true Sisyphean fashion: 
John: Sometimes it feels great. Sometimes you’re in great form. But then you would 
get the odd day when you wouldn’t be but you say “Okay, I’ll go.” “It’s such and 
such a day. I’ll go.” You could feel the same when you get down there [to the gym]. 
It could be the same when you’re changing. It could even be the same when you’re 
going up the stairs. I often went up those stairs saying, “For feck sake. I’m not even 
able to get up these stairs.” You know? You feel drained and tired. I remember 
meeting a lad at the top of the stairs one time and he was coming down. I said, “I 
think I feel as bad as you do.” “I doubt that,” he says. But I was serious. I was at 
the top of the stairs and I looked into the gym. The doors were open and it was in 
the summer. I looked in and said to myself, “What the hell am I going to do when I 
go in here?” But I went in and I got going, and it was as good as any other 
workout. 
 
As was previously the case for Bob, John rallies to take this task head on. He rallies 
to get up those stairs to “get in there, get warmed up, loosened up [and to] get 
involved.” His effort is surely a noble one and there is no doubting that it would have 
been easier not to have gone to the gym at all. But he is neither naïve nor wholly 
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 ambivalent about his condition on this particular day. And, in explaining what it 
feels like after the workout, he shows us why: 
John: Aw, it’s a great feeling. Once you come down those stairs, go into the locker 
room and strip off, then you go into the shower. I feel as good in the shower at 
eight o’clock at night after the gym as I feel in the shower at home at half-six in the 
morning. You feel so clear. Your mind would be so clear. Your body would be so 
relaxed. It feels so good; as good as if you were after having five or six, even eight 
hours sleep. And it’s actually after two or three hours after going home from the 
gym that you’d be going to bed. Sometimes you’d go home and you’d be just so 
bright and full of life. It’s a great feeling. Whereas, the night that you wouldn’t go – 
we’ll say a Tuesday night – you wouldn’t be going to the gym and you’d be lagging 
around the place. You’d be after having a shower. But even after having a shower 
of a Tuesday night, you still never feel as good as you would after having your 
shower of a Wednesday night after the gym. 
 
To the recognition of “achievement” he and others spoke of previously, John 
acknowledges a clarity here that accompanies the experience of completing a 
workout (one that appears quite specific to it). In fact, the shower, too, seems 
somewhat metaphorical. His “cleaning,” in effect, opens up a “clearing,” to use a 
Heideggerian turn of phrase. In this space he feels invigorated, “full of life,” and in 
the thralls of what Leder (1990) referred to as pleasure’s naturally expansive 
character. The following excerpt from John’s narrative expands on his metaphor of 
getting up and coming down the stairs to/from the gym. In adding a more rooted 
context he describes how, in addition to this aforementioned clarity, there is a sense 
of a reorientation to the world being at stake: 
Ross: What sort of feeling is it? Could you describe it? 
 
John: Yeah, even in your head; your head feels so clear. You don’t seem to have any 
problems or any worries. When you come out of the gym and get into the shower, 
everything seems to be gone. Your whole body feels completely clear and fresh and 
full of life. You don’t seem to have any worries whatsoever; whereas everybody has 
them, you know. Everyone has worries and everyone has problems. I could be 
driving down from my house to the gym and I could be saying to myself, “Feck it. 
I don’t know what I’m going to do about this and I don’t know what I’m going to 
do about that.” Someone is in bad form, or my daughter is unwell. “What am I 
going to do?” “I’ll have to do something about that.” “I have to get her to the 
doctor tomorrow.” If I go down to the gym and I’m thinking this on the way 
down, the gym will change it. If you’re not talking to someone when you get to the 
gym, then you might still be thinking about it when you go up to the gym and start 
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 exercising. But when I come out of the gym and have my shower, everything seems 
to be like, “That’s no problem. I’ll do that tomorrow.” Everything seems to be a 
completely different way now. Everything seems to be so straightforward and it 
doesn’t seem like a problem anymore. It seems like something that is going to be 
done. Everything seems to fit. There it is: that fits there, that fits there, and that fits 
here. 
 
John’s earlier vacillation between mind and body is noteworthy. At that moment, the 
clarity that he attributes to this experience extends to – or, perhaps, extends through 
– his body. It is not just in his head. Rather, his “whole body feels completely clear 
and fresh and full of life.” Leder (1990) is useful here again. A parallel to the 
embodied feeling which John refers to is usefully described in his phenomenology of 
absorption. The length of the excerpt will hopefully be excused on the basis of its 
relevance to the current context: 
[A]esthetic absorption is a mode of one-body relation. I open feelingly such that 
the world can penetrate my senses, my muscles, my consciousness. The temporality 
of the landscape transforms my temporality. The slow crescendo and decrescendo 
of the wind, the stately glide of clouds awaken a resonance within my body-mind 
such that my hurried stride begins to slow, my thoughts to glide effortlessly, no 
longer rushing toward a goal. The spaciousness of the outdoors becomes my space. 
I somehow begin having bigger ideas than the cramped concerns that preoccupied 
me. From my broader perspective, I can see the smallness of my previous worries. 
New thoughts from within me that I have never had in my windowless office. They 
feel in-spired, “breathed in” as if from the wind and the trees. Where before there 
were words and more words, now there are only bird calls and the whispering of 
leaves. The boundaries between inner and outer thus become porous. As I close 
my eyes I feel the sun and hear the bird songs both within-me-without-me. They 
are not sense data internal to consciousness, but neither are they “out there” 
somewhere. They are part of a rich body-world chiasm that eludes dualistic 
characterizations. My relaxation is the smell of pine needles and the warmth of the 
breeze; self and Other can only be artificially disentangled...This is an experience of 
bidirectional incorporation; the world comes alive empathically within my body, 
even as I experience myself as part of the body of the world  (Leder, 1990, pp. 165-
6; original emphasis). 
 
It might be said that John wavers between clarity of mind and body because his 
experience, too, eludes dualistic characterisation. Everything is framed in “a 
completely different way now.” It is worth noting the relevance of “the distraction 
hypothesis” here. To a certain extent, it clearly resonates with John’s description of 
his experience. He takes time out, finds a space in which he can refocus his 
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 organisation of attention, and experiences an increased emotional profile. But he 
does not merely forget about his worries. Working out does not merely enable John 
to put his worries into abeyance until such time that he is burdened with them again. 
Going to the gym, rather, facilitates a reorientation to the outside world, enabling 
him to reconfigure it on new terms. He does not just use the gym to escape or to 
shirk his responsibilities outside of it. On the contrary, his experience is 
characterised by an openness and receptivity to this change in environment and it is 
one that is rewarded with a reconciliation of affective relations. Instead of being 
distracted from the world, for John, the world is now disclosed to him in a new way. 
The worries of which he speaks are, in a sense, out in front, rather than pressing in, 
on him. They do not disappear. Rather, their centripetal character seems to give way 
to a modified temporality. Like Leder, John’s experience facilitates a broadening of 
horizons, his worries now “breathed” with new life and significance. It is in 
moments such as these that John experiences the release from tension and an 
openness up onto the world. He experiences what Leder (1990, p. 166) referred to as 
the ‘ecstatic quality’ of his ‘one-body,’ that ‘expansive being...leaping beyond 
constriction.’ 
In the context of the foregoing, and to the question of whether being relieved of 
tension is the same as being released from it, it might be said that the latter exhibits a 
dialectical structure which the former lacks. In fact, the pleasure that is attributed to 
the latter might usefully be thought of as being analogous to those types of emotional 
responses typically associated with the arts, and music in particular (see Bharucha, 
Curtis & Paroo, 2006; Holbrook, 1995, 2007). Going to the gym and working out 
also exhibits emotional responses. Its stressor effects facilitate a departure from 
points of stability in which the body is likely deemed to be an impediment. At the 
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 gym, there is a disturbance to the body at stasis, an opening up of the possibilities for 
individuals to experience the expressive qualities of their bodies through improvised 
embodied performances. In this, there is an opening up of the possibility for an 
improvisation (antithesis) of prior structure, its tensions and constraints (thesis), and, 
as such, going to the gym and working can offer the potential for a reconciliation of 
prior affective relations (synthesis). With this improvisation, there is an experience 
of the ordered, controlled, sedentary, and recessive body being breached, there is an 
interaction with and altering of prior structure, and a pleasure that is one of rhythmic 
and creative resolution.  
4.4 Summing Up: Fitness, From Consumption to Virtuous 
Production 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a phenomenological response to 
a number of hermeneutical problems that have been associated with fitness under the 
conditions of late modern consumer society. Its impetus was rooted in the 
acknowledgement that (important and all though they have been to building a body 
of research which illuminates fitness from a sociological perspective) the tendency 
for fitness research to be overly (and overtly) critical has strayed too far from the 
natural attitude and was beginning to run out of steam. In order to facilitate a 
reorganisation of attention and construct a positive appropriation of fitness, this 
chapter presented it as a negotiated endeavour of practical activity (as opposed to 
merely an ambivalent one of representation).  In order to examine the structure of 
this process of negotiation, this chapter discussed fitness in the context of (i) 
meaning, (ii) motivation, and (iii) pleasure (the three thematic areas outlined under 
objectives in Chapter Three).  
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 In the first section, it was shown that, for participants, health provided an 
important standard of reference for fitness. It was argued that dislocating them 
tended to overlook the importance of health in meliorating problems of embodiment 
(of the interaction between the body-subject and body-object) and failed to account 
sufficiently for how experiences of fitness tend towards coherence through health as 
a broader narrative frame. In order to counter the over-emphasis on instrumental 
accounts of fitness and account more fully for how participants become 
meaningfully oriented towards fitness practices, the second section of this chapter 
utilised Nozick’s “Experience Machine” thought experiment in order to underscore 
the importance of both “doing fitness” and the possibilities of “being someone 
through fitness.” It was observed that, by “doing fitness,” participants become 
administrators of inductive resources, which they learned to manage in a rational 
way. It was shown that this rationalisation process acted as a central element in the 
participants’ network of tools for negotiating the demands of fitness practices (both 
reinforcing the trajectory of their participation and explaining how they find 
themselves in situations in which they feel obliged to exercise). To this, it was added 
that “being a certain way/being someone through fitness” plays an important 
contributing factor in providing participants with a privileged context in which they 
are solicited by the situation to get in line with it. It was argued that this “being a 
certain way/being someone through fitness” provides a horizon of significance which 
orients them towards the fitness environment in a meaningful way. The final section 
of this chapter examined the types of pleasures that accrue to participants while 
engaging in fitness practices. On the basis of participants’ own descriptions, it was 
observed that, in addition to the types of instrumental goods typically associated with 
fitness, there was a type of pleasure that could only be accrued “in action.” It was 
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 argued that, in order to understand the full extent of its significance, one had to 
understand how participants depart from prior structures and open up to the 
expressive qualities of their bodies through a structure of tension-release. 
More generally, the findings presented in this chapter provide evidence of a 
tendency towards authentic, practical activity over the consumption of mere 
pleasurable, illusory, or unattainable representations. They resonate particularly well 
with MacIntyre’s (2007, pp. 188-189; see also McNamee, 1994; Morgan, 1994) 
claim that there are two types of goods which can be attached to, and gained from, 
engaging in practices – “external goods” and “internal goods.” On this basis, it might 
be said that the value of fitness need not be thought solely as some separate external 
ingredient added to the experience of working out. Rather, to use MacIntyre’s 
phrasing, being oriented towards this practice in an internally significant way is an 
affirmation of the importance to personhood of the exercise of virtues. 
Since there has been a tendency in previous research to paint in broad strokes – 
which reflects a general tendency in the critical literature towards structural 
explanations more generally (for a critique, see Latour, 2004a, 2005) – it might be 
said that many existing accounts of fitness participation have not been privy to these 
internal goods. The doing or practical aspects are largely discounted because, at best, 
this action is oriented towards some external end or, at worst, this action is merely 
seen as an expression of projects and representations determined over and above 
individuals in objective structures. In this, such perspectives appear to move scarcely 
beyond the level of what MacIntyre referred to as external goods. To borrow a 
phrasing from Chapter Two and from Bourdieu (see Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), 
they are only able to account for how players are taken in by the game of fitness, not 
for how and why they continue to invest in the game over time. They are insensitive 
180 
 to the local organisation of the fitness experience and to the way fitness participation 
can change over time and acquire new meanings for participants (see Crossley, 
2006a; Sassatelli, 1999b). They are insensitive to the way these activities can be 
simply performed for the somaesthetic pleasures (of engaging in them) and for their 
internal significance (Shusterman, 1999, 2008). As McNamee (1994, p. 297) 
explained, ‘for the many activities where there are a multiple of aims and sub-aims, 
it is inadvisable to proceed to locate single ends and colorless means...[as] this is to 
rob them of the web of interconnectedness which is characteristic of...their 
significant value.’ Existing perspectives on fitness have tended to focus on “what is 
valued” at the expense of the process of “valuing.” They have tended to focus on 
what sort of value can be accrued from being fit (the valued “I am”) as opposed to 
the pleasure that can be accrued from the practical and somatic experience of 
participating in fitness activities (the valuing “I can”). 
In order to understand the substantive contribution of this chapter, we would do 
well to acknowledge two important factors. Firstly, what is valued in an instrumental 
sense is but one aspect of the fitness experience, not the sum of it. And on this basis, 
that there are two types of values (or “goods,” to use MacIntyre’s phrasing) to be 
accrued therein. There is value to be accrued from the activity and in the activity. Or, 
alternatively, fitness participation is both pleasure-producing and pleasure-inducing. 
To say that value is only to be accrued from fitness activities is to consign it to mere 
consumption activity. This not only overlooks the repertoire of resources which 
orient participants towards fitness practices and their internal significance, but 
renders fitness activities meaningless except as a means of acquiring values external 
to them. Consigning fitness to mere consumption activity overlooks the dual force of 
“doing fitness” and “being someone through fitness.” It overlooks its negotiated 
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 character, and how it opens up the possibilities of a virtuous production through 
fitness. It overlooks the fact that, if “doing fitness” enables one to become acquainted 
with the goods internal to it as a practice, then perhaps “being someone through 




CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A COMPLEMENTAL MODEL OF 
HEALTH AND FITNESS 
 
 
‘I propose...that we should name a series of this kind a ‘complemental series,’ and I 
forewarn you that we shall have occasion to construct others of the same kind.’ 
Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 
 
 
One might recall that, in Chapter Three, a thoroughly pragmatic approach to the 
problem of fitness was emphasised and, despite the self-referential difficulties posed 
to generalisation by the broader disembedding landscape of reflexive modernity, 
there was still scope for assessing this thesis’ significant contributions. Emphasising 
fitness as a matter of concern implies a turning away from traditional ontological and 
epistemological assumptions and a shift in emphasis from the representation of 
phenomena (for the purposes of generalisation) towards their re-presentation. It 
means that the contribution of this thesis must be assessed in terms of its usefulness 
as a means of facilitating a reweaving of beliefs about (health and) fitness and its 
potential for engendering new purposes (i.e. new ways of talking about the fit body). 
Taking this into consideration, this concluding chapter will examine the significant 
contributions of this thesis in the context of its usefulness in urging new ways of 
speaking about fitness. This will be done under the following headings: (i) fitness, 
from semantics to pragmatics, (ii) fitness and the futurity of modernity, (iii) 
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 reconsidering the relation between health and fitness, (iv) towards a complemental 
model of health and fitness, and (v) talking about the fit body. In concluding this 
thesis, some notable limitations and possible avenues for future research are 
underscored. The chapter concludes by revisiting Sisyphus and by reflecting on the 
meaning of fitness in respect of this thesis’ re-description. 
5.1 Fitness, from Semantics to Pragmatics 
The contributions of this thesis cannot be fully explored without first 
acknowledging the methodological departure that was taken from previous analysis 
of fitness under the conditions of modernity. The contributions of this thesis are 
largely parasitical upon the phenomenological-pragmatic lens through which fitness 
has been recast and it has been both phenomenologically and pragmatically framed 
from the very beginning. It has been phenomenological in the sense that the primary 
object of analysis has been a description of fitness. And it has been pragmatic in the 
sense that this description has been framed on quite specific terms. Bracketing the 
natural, commonsense attitude with respect to fitness – and framing the preliminary 
description in terms of the question of fitness’ cultural embeddedness – was certainly 
a pragmatic strategy. However, it was in the departure from overly (and overtly) 
critical accounts of fitness (in order to follow through on the positive proposition that 
it is a negotiated endeavour) that the true phenomenological and pragmatic character 
of this thesis was evinced.  
In emphasising participants’ lived descriptions in the second part of the thesis, 
and how meaning relates to use and practice, a particular strategic move was made. 
This afforded a certain ontological weight to the local organisation of the fitness 
experience and the experiences of individual fitness participants, which had been 
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 largely unacknowledged (Collins, 2002; Crossley, 2004a, 2006c, 2008; Sassatelli, 
1999a, 1999b are notable exceptions). To borrow from Latour (2004a) and Csordas 
(1993, 1994) respectively, it was argued that overly deterministic and critical 
structural analyses of fitness have run out of steam and that there has been an over-
emphasis on how people attend to their bodies as vehicles with semantic properties 
at the expense of how they attend with them as vehicles of practical activity. In 
fulfilling its methodological departure, this thesis has made a significant contribution 
by reformulating the problem of fitness (on new terms) as one of negotiation and 
practice, and not merely representation and ambivalence. One thing that was clear 
from this thesis is that the meaning of fitness and its place in modern society cannot 
be reduced to the exchange of mere representational or sign material. The re-
description sought here implied seeing fitness as a pragmatic matter to be negotiated 
through individual bodies rather than as merely a sign to be inscribed upon them. 
This seeing-as, as Wittgenstein (1963, p. 93) would have explained, has provided the 
conditions for a change in aspect and, in relation to the phenomenon under 
investigation, ‘see[ing] that it has not changed...yet...see[ing] it differently.’ The 
value of this change in aspect is discussed in the upcoming sections and considered 
in light of future research. 
5.2 Fitness and the Futurity of Modernity 
Perhaps the broadest contribution is to be found in the challenge it poses to one 
of the generalised characteristics of modernity – futurity and ambivalence. In 
Chapter Two, it was established that our present stage in the history of modernity – 
and consequently the body, the self, and its fitness – is characterised by an 
unyielding future-oriented temporality. The liquid character of our present stage has 
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 wreaked havoc on traditional normative assumptions about the body’s health status, 
leaving an ambivalent body that must be fit for mere consumption purposes.  
In the context of the findings of this study, it should be clear that such a 
monolithic conception of the trajectory of the self is insufficient. For one, it might be 
said that such a view overlooks (or, at the very least treats as secondary) the fact that 
modern individuals both attend to their bodies and through their bodies in a reflexive 
manner. The implication of this dual force is that the body is not merely an end to be 
consumed for indefinitely. Rather, its amenability to practice and practical activity is 
the very condition for the possibility of consumption in the first place. It should also 
be noted that a monolithic conception of the trajectory of the self is insensitive to the 
way in which participants ordered their experiences of fitness and working out. This 
ordering was multilayered. It involved the establishment of horizons of significance 
in which fitness was situated (or the recognition of those already present). It was 
something to be worked at, though at times unlike work. It required of participants a 
network of tools, that they become effective administrators of these as inductive 
resources, and that they manage them in a rational way. It was something that had to 
be persisted at, something that could not be done second-hand, and would only 
become sedimented over time. The monolithic conception of modernity as 
relentlessly future-oriented is insensitive to this type of ordering. It treats fitness 
practices transparently, as just another consumer activity oriented towards some 
external end. It overlooks the primacy of practical activity and how meaning relates 
to this practice itself. It is also not equipped to acknowledge internally significant 
aspects of engaging in fitness practices and how ambivalence can be sublimated in 
the production of a virtuous self. 
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 In this study, it became clear that engaging in fitness practices is not merely 
structured in a manner that promotes the passive endurance and acceptance of events 
or their succession towards external ends. Indeed, such capricious activity was 
anathema to the type of meaningful orientation to one’s activity environment that 
characterises “doing fitness” and that “being someone through fitness” demands. 
Contrary to those perspectives outlined in Chapter Two that consign fitness to one 
temporal plane of experience, it is clear that there are conditions under which fitness 
can take on a more dynamic temporality. That is, with “doing fitness” and “being 
someone through fitness,” there is not merely an arbitrary beginning, middle, and 
ending. Rather, there is initiation, immersion, and consummation. There is a 
structure to the experience in which each stage is tied to a quite specific temporal 
orientation. There is a making of experience that is infused with meaning. This made 
experience requires not only a cognitive commitment to going to the gym and 
working out. Rather, it requires a practical commitment to the embodied and skilful 
aspects of working out, and an openness and receptivity to one’s activity 
environment such that, in the doing, something is done to individuals in return. It 
requires, as Dewey (2009) explained, that activity be continued into the doing and 
undergoing of consequences such that the mere flux can be loaded with significance. 
Modernity’s wholesale futurity blinds us to this type of “experience” and to the type 
of normativity that, over time, brings cumulative growth of the sort that contributes 
to “being someone through fitness.” 
5.3 Reconsidering the Relation of Health and fitness 
One might recall from Chapter Two the argument that, given its awkward 
relation to the epidemics of our time and its general obsolescence in the context of 
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 our modern logic of consumption, Health (upper case, vertical, epistemological) 
could be considered to have become dislocated from fitness (lower case, horizontal, 
ontological). In terms of the foregoing (Chapter Four especially), the question to be 
asked in conclusion is whether or not there are grounds for eschewing as hasty and 
untimely this dislocation (which, in the context of arguments put forward in Chapter 
Two in relation to existing literatures, seems imminent), and whether or not there are 
any grounds for reconsidering the relation of Health and fitness. 
One thing that is clear from the findings presented in this thesis is that the 
relation between Health and fitness is a complex one. This is particularly evidenced 
by the fact that, while some of the participants held steadfastly to notion that one has 
to be healthy prior to being fit, others claimed that it is fitness that contributes to 
Health. What’s more, both camps seemed equally correct in having asserted these 
conflicting positions. But how can fitness contribute to Health if one has to be 
sufficiently healthy to engage in fitness activities in the first instance? How can we 
account for this interplay without invoking an unhelpful (and tautologous) loop?  
One tendency that has prevailed in previous literature has been to say that 
participants are simply mistaken in having made these assertions (theirs is a phony 
metaphysics as it were). They might believe that they are accepting well-confirmed, 
evidence-based scientific research whereas, in reality, the pursuit of fitness (idealised 
images of the healthy body notwithstanding) merely reflects an imposed meaning 
that serves to reproduce and legitimate the violently productive inner-workings of 
the capitalist machine (see e.g. Frew and McGillivray, 2005; Holmes et al., 2006; 
Pronger, 2002). This sort of zero-sum game, I would like to argue, is rather 
impoverished. And I would refuse to translate participants’ descriptions into the 
vocabulary of symbolic power. 
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 Going forward, the maintenance of a relation between fitness and Health is 
desirable. In fact, on the basis of the ontological weight participants attributed to the 
relation between Health and fitness, it seems almost absurd to argue for their 
dislocation as it does for the resignation of Health to the conceptual wastebasket. It 
was clear, for example, that, for participants, fitness was oriented towards Health as 
an important standard of reference and tended towards coherence (by way of Health) 
as a broader, temporally-configured frame. Most striking among the findings 
presented was the fact that participants seemed unable to account for instances in 
which the projective unity of their body-subject was compromised without recourse 
to some sort of detached, mechanistic, or machinic metaphor for their body-object 
(which might as well be called “Health”). As such, it is not only the case that the 
dislocation of Health and fitness negates a broader meaning holism that exists (and 
would have to be dispensed with). Rather, both of these would result in a failure to 
acknowledge Health’s function (that is, its institutions, discourses, and practices) as a 
means of dealing with hermeneutical problems associated with the often experienced 
indeterminacy, frailty, and peculiar duality that characterises human embodiment.  
In terms of the relation between Health and fitness, one might go so far as to 
say that, for participants involved in this study, Health functioned as a sort of 
ostensive lens that enabled them to cope with the logic of flows and futurity in a 
manner that promotes what Ricoeur (1984, p. 66) referred to as a ‘concordant 
discordance.’ Health’s vertical character cuts through the temporally ambivalent 
character of fitness in such a way that the succession of episodic sequences can be 
thought of, not merely as ‘one thing after another,’ but rather, as ‘one thing because 
of another’ (ibid, p. 52). Its epistemological orthodox helps to synthesise the 
heterogeneous, make the intelligible spring from the accidental, and convert chaos 
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 into causality. Far from resolving the paradoxes of becoming, the narrative function 
of Health helps to make it more palpable (or more cathartic). It opens the body-self 
up to movement under the guidance of expectations and, hence, potentialities that 
would otherwise go unnoticed. It allows for the consummation of movement, 
summoning precedents and likenesses, and meaning in what would have otherwise 
disconcerted us. The key opposition is whether one wants to think of this relation as 
merely symbolic, and thus conforming to the dictates of power, or as pragmatic, and 
therefore rendered formal so as to produce effects. On the pragmatic view I am 
advocating, Health can be said to provide an anchoring for fitness by functioning as 
a ‘narrative mode of comprehension’ (ibid, p. 159). 
5.4 Towards a Complemental Model of Health and fitness 
The relation between Health and fitness is a complex one because it is either 
conceived as a simple causal relation (as the boosters or consensus position 
supporters are wont to believe) or as merely illusory and nonexistent (as critics of 
fitness argue). But as we have seen from Chapter Four and the previous section in 
particular, it need not be a zero-sum proposition. Some participants did relay the 
consensus position with respect to fitness’ relation to Health. Others clearly 
undermined it. However, the enigmatic character of the relation between fitness and 
Health is evidenced most clearly by the fact that both of these perspectives seem 
correct. That is, participants seemed to be correct in saying, on the one hand, that 
fitness contributes to Health yet, on the other hand, saying that one has to be 
sufficiently healthy to engage in fitness activities in the first instance. Neither the 
consensus position nor its critical treatment in much sociological literature seems to 
adequately account for this interplay. Nor does it sufficiently account for the 
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 interplay of presence and absence that is at stake between “bodies-as-objects” and 
“bodies-as-subjects.” 
In order to account for the interplay between Health and fitness, it will be 
instructive to say that, rather being causally related (and, thus, ontologically alien), 
Health and fitness exist in a complemental relation (and, therefore, are ontologically 
relational). Following the work of Freud (1991, 2000), Leder (1990), and Throop 
(2003, 2005, 2010), this relation can be illustrated in the following manner in terms 
of what might be referred to as “The Complemental Curve” (see “Figure 5.1 The 
Complemental Model of Health and fitness” on the next page). In line with the 
illustration of the relation of Health and fitness presented in Chapter Two (“Figure 
2.4 Planes of Health and fitness”), where Health (upper case) corresponds to a 
bounded vertical (or epistemological) plane of experience, fitness (lower case) 
represents its boundless horizontal (or ontological) corollary. As regards their 
relation, it is to be observed of the phenomena involved that an increase in the one 
factor is necessarily correlative of a decrease in the other. On the basis of this, the 
complemental model provides a heuristic whereupon a gradated series of 
phenomena, experiences, or cases can be plotted between these two seemingly 









 Figure 5.1 The Complemental Model of Health and fitness61 
 
                                                
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                               
                                             
                                                           
 







Rather than exhibiting a causal structure then, which precludes understanding of 
that peculiarly phenomenological tension which exists between the body as both an 
object and subject, the complemental model exhibits a figure-ground structure 
whereupon Health and fitness interact at various levels. By joining H22 to f1, H21 to 
f2, H20 to f3, H19 to f4, etc., in an inverse manner, the model depicts a complemental 
curve whereupon varying degrees of prominence can be attributed to both Health and 
 
61 This Complemental Model of Health and fitness is presented as the principle contribution in my own 
article: Neville, R.D. (2012b) Considering a complemental model of health and fitness, Sociology of Health 
& Illness. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9566.2012.01494.x 
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 fitness at the same time. Rather than exhibiting a causal structure, which would 
imply that Health and fitness are equivalent in terms of their relations to the body 
(which they are not), the complemental model provides a means of accounting for 
both the body’s objective and subjective dimensions. To borrow from Throop (2009, 
p. 536), it allows for the mapping of a whole host of ‘intermediary varieties of 
experience’ in between. By plotting points of intersection along the curve – red dots 
highlighted on the curve at (H16, f2), (H9, f4), (H4, f10), and (H1, f18) which might 
usefully be referred to as fixational junctures – the model suggests that an increase in 
fitness along the horizontal axis does not imply an increase in Health on the vertical 
one (as would be the case on the hierarchical consensus position). Rather, engaging 
the lived “body-subject” through fitness renders at varying levels of backgrounded 
awareness Health and the objective or mechanistic experience of the body it 
presupposes (cf. Gadamer, 1996; Leder, 1990 van Hooft, 1996). For example, if one 
was to take into consideration age profile and the potential for the body-as-desiring-
machine, it would be likely that, of the participants engaged in the latter chapters of 
this thesis, Steve (74, male) would be best placed at H16, f2, John (54, male) at H9, 
f4, Liam (45, male) at H4, f10, and Kevin (34, male) at H1, f18. Alternatively, and at 
the level of the individual, the model might also be interpreted to show how Gail (45, 
female) has improved her fitness by moderating her activity in relation to being 
diagnosed with anaemia; how Deirdre (45, female) obviates previously regular 
ailments and has become increasingly resistant to things like annual flu; how John 
(54, male) has occupied various positions along the curve in line with participation 
setbacks and bouts of arthritis; and how Bob (22, male) continues to push the 
boundaries with respect to his fitness along the horizontal axis in line with his 
continued elite level coaching and sports participation. 
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 The implications and interpretive possibilities of this model will not be 
exhausted in what remains of this thesis. This is a task to be left to my own future 
research in this area and to the model’s uptake after being exposed to its relevant 
research communities (see note 59 previously on page 186). In spite of this, three 
points are worth noting. Firstly, rather than treating Health and fitness on 
hierarchical terms as has traditionally been the case, the complemental model 
acknowledges our fundamental embodiment, as well as the fact that there exists a 
whole host of intermediary varieties of experience in which we can (or are forced to) 
reflect back upon, and become mindful of, our bodies. Secondly, in contributing to a 
re-description of the relation of Health to fitness, it takes into account the fact that 
the body is both object and subject, a site of representation and practice, both over-
exposed and under-exposed, attuned to multiple temporal orientations, and a 
functional gestalt that is characterised by series’ of absent-present relations (Csordas, 
1990, 1993, 1994; Crossley, 1996, 2006a, 2006b; Illich, 1976; Leder, 1990, 1992a; 
Marcel, 1977; Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 2002; Shilling, 2003; Svenaeus, 2001, 2009; 
Throop, 2010; Williams & Bendelow, 1998). The complemental model takes into 
account what Eagleton (1993, p. 7) meant when he said that ‘[i]t is not quite true that 
I have a body, and not quite true that I am one either.’ Finally, it is worth noting that 
it is perhaps only through an immersion in fitness practices (at the level of those 
almost aesthetic encounters discussed in Chapter Four) that the vertical character of 
Health can become entirely effaced. Only then can a space be opened up for the free 





 5.5 Talking About the Fit Body: New Horizons of Experience 
The primary implication of this Complemental Model of Health and fitness is 
the need for a re-evaluation of what we understand by the fit body. We have not yet 
come to terms with the task of talking about the fit body and it is clear from the 
findings of this research that we have been largely content to talk about fitness in a 
derivative way and as a predicate applied to Health in a relative manner. To this 
shortcoming, I believe that The Complemental Model of Health and fitness can 
contribute to a more dynamic structural understanding of the body as both an object 
of representation and a subject of practice. Reflecting on the distinctions proposed in 
Chapter Two (“Table 2.1 Configuring the Role of Fitness in the Modern 
Experience”), there is much scope to explore the interplay of the body’s dual 
structure on the basis of epistemological and ontological considerations, the body’s 
inner and outer dimensions, its baseline requirements and its potential, and, hence, 
what a body is and what it can do. I believe that the complemental model will be of 
particular use in exploring the relation and interplay of object- and subject-centred 
risk, especially since this distinction has not been explicitly posited in the existing 
literature (save for my own work in Neville, 2012a, 2012b). It also provides a useful 
language of comparison for discussing the body’s dual structure. Since we have 
largely been content to talk about fitness in terms of imposing effects upon the (prior) 
healthy body, of particular importance to the uptake of this complemental orientation 
will be the task of coming to terms with the fit body’s playful and somaesthetic 
potential to affect and be affected. 62 In the context of a shift in emphasis in the body 
                                                            
62 For example, I think that this is the main problem with Smith Maguire’s (2008a) work on fitness. While 
consumption certainly plays an important role in the configuration of the modern fitness industries, I 
think that it would have been more instructive for her to frame fitness in terms of this potential to affect 
and to be affected (rather than a mere potential to consume and be consumed by others). The consumption 
emphasis, however, clearly suited the critical bent of her research approach. 
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 studies literature towards the affectivity of embodiment (see e.g. Blackman & 
Featherstone, 2010; Blackman & Venn, 2010; Buchanan, 1997; Clough, 2010; 
Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 1987; Featherstone, 2010; Fox, 2002; Fox & Ward, 
2008a, 2008b; Latour, 2004b; Papoulias & Callard, 2010), this task has not been 
adequately explored. Since the fitness field has largely positioned itself as a 
prescriptive, meliorative, and therapeutic one, the task of coming to terms with the 
free play of the fit body and its creative-aesthetic potential is of great pragmatic 
value. 
This association with play brings us neatly back to the point made in Chapter 
Two (section “2.2.2 Fitness, Official Discourses, and the Hegemony of Vision”) that 
investments in fitness can be likened to investing in a game. To this, in Chapter 
Four, it was established that existing perspectives have largely failed to account for 
how individuals continue to invest, over time, in the game of fitness. Given the 
intensification of subject-centred risks (notably, cancer, stoke, heart disease, Type 2 
diabetes, hypertension, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and obesity) and 
widespread inactivity in key problem demographics, this question of investment is 
more timely than ever. It is also a question that the ongoing policy position on 
promoting individual (consumption) behaviour remains ill-equipped to answer. A 
plausible work of retrieval can be established here once we encourage and come to 
terms with new ways of talking about the fit body. It is a task, I believe, that can be 
achieved through a refinement of what is meant by “doing fitness” and “being 
someone through fitness.” 
A number of important findings from Chapter Four will be helpful in laying 
some new groundwork. Firstly, it was established that, in order for individuals to be 
meaningfully attuned to activity-environments – that is, in order for individuals to 
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 “do fitness” – a certain capacity had to be actualised. It was argued that individuals 
had to have at their disposal a pool of inductive resources that they could draw on so 
that intention could be bridged into action. It became clear in Chapter Four that this 
process required being a certain way or a certain sort of person – what I designated 
as “being someone through fitness.” At the outset of Chapter Four, and in the 
previous section in particular, this mode of being was designated as Health. 
However, in addition to this, it also meant being “sporty,” “committed,” 
“competitive,” “energetic,” “in alignment,” “authentic,” being a “gym bunny,” and 
even “not being.” It meant being recognised as these things and, hence, subject to 
norms of identification, association, and behaviour. Notably, “being someone 
through fitness” not only indicated a constitutive “I am,” but indicated a sort of 
practical turn towards the world akin to what Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. 159) meant by 
the ‘‘I can’.’63 As Merleau-Ponty explained, this “I can” designates an experience of 
a sense of harmony between what we aim at and what is given. It designates a 
tending towards equilibrium of the sort outlined in Chapter Four when I said that 
participants implement strategies and provide normatively appropriate responses in 
the face of problems encountered when working out. It designates a tendency of the 
sort I meant when I said that participants were able to draw upon a network of tools 
that reinforces the trajectory of their participation and puts them in situations in 
which they feel obliged to exercise. This “I can” designates an experience of skilful 
coping in which bodily tension gives way to what Dreyfus (1996, 2002; Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 1999) referred to as an optimum body-environment relationship. As 
                                                            
63 This distinction between a constitutive “I am” and a performative “I can” was also well developed in 
Nietzsche (1996). Nietzsche (ibid, p. 29) explained that, while ‘popular morality distinguishes strength 
from expressions of strength, as if behind the strong individual there were an indifferent substratum 
which was at liberty to express or not express strength,’ ‘no such substratum exists.’ Nietzsche (ibid.) 
explains, ‘there is no ‘being’ [or “I am] behind doing [“I can]. Rather, ‘the doing [the “I can”] itself is 
everything’ (ibid). 
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 individuals become efficient administrators of their own resources through skilful 
coping, they experience a sense of this optimum body-environment relation and are, 
thus, solicited by the situation to get into alignment with it. It is this repeated 
solicitation to get into alignment with an activity-environment that I wish to invoke 
when referring to “being someone through fitness.” And this is a performatively 
sedimented body-environment relation that adds character, meaning, and style to the 
practice of “doing fitness.” 
In order to build on this reorganisation of attention, there is a need to seriously 
consider a cultural shift in emphasis from mere activity to experience (to use 
Dewey’s distinction). An analogous shift is evident in Rojek’s (2010a, 2010b) recent 
contributions to leisure theory where he states that meaningful leisure is not merely 
free time, but an ongoing application of emotional intelligence and emotional labour 
of the sort that contributes to competent citizenship.64 However, whereas Rojek sees 
the task of renewing leisure studies as a process of naturalising metaphors 
traditionally associated with work, I believe that a similar task here can be achieved 
by establishing a renewed interest in experience. This shift from activity to 
experience implies thinking about the problem of fitness and the “I can” not merely 
as something that can be improved by increasing levels of activity alone, but as a 
made experience (i.e. something that requires involvement, learning, skill 
development, and an appreciation of value). More importantly perhaps, it requires a 
focus on those who experience an ‘inhibited intentionality’ or an ‘I cannot’ in 
relation to such practices (to use Young’s, 1980, p. 146 extension of Merleau-Ponty).  
To put it in terms utilised in Chapter Four, it requires a shift in emphasis from mere 
consumption to virtuous production. Moreover, it requires recognition of the fact that 
                                                            
64 For a critical discussion of the relationship between leisure and emotional intelligence, see World Leisure 
Journal Volume 52 Issue 4 2010 (see also Parrinello, 2011; Smith Maguire, 2008b; Spracklen, 2011; 
Waring, 2008). 
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 not all activity is created equal (a trap that Freund and Martin’s 2004 account of 
relational fitness appears to fall into).65 As Dewey famously remarked, it is only 
when activity is continued into the doing and undergoing of consequences, and when 
a change made in action is reflected back into a change made in the individual, that 
there is growth of the sort that makes experience in the vital sense of the term. Only 
out of courtesy should we refer to mere activity as experience. 
In addition to this focus, there is a broader need for a refocusing of attention 
away from the narrow goal of improving fitness through individual activity to the 
broader goal of improving the relations of fit individuals experience between their 
bodies and their social-material activity-environments. If we can agree that the major 
factors impacting upon the body are made up of genetic makeup, the environment, 
and individual behaviour, then the uptake of this relational orientation means 
extending the policy position to encompass (at the very least) one of the latter two. 
At the policy level, it means viewing fitness not merely as a problem of individual 
activity, but rather, as an infrastructural problem. It means taking seriously at the 
policy level the notion that individual fitness is best assured through the proper 
design of our urban, working, and educational environments (and not necessarily by 
sequestering it off from the daily life-world into external systems for physical 
activity). 66 67 To reiterate a point made on a number of occasions in Chapter Four, it 
means taking seriously at policy level the fact that what is valued in late modernity 
                                                            
65 In their article, Freund and Martin (2004) explain that what contributes to fitness is activity. I think it 
would have been more instructive for them to say that, while activity stimulates adaptive responses, not 
all of these responses are desirable (not to mention intended). A recent article entitled “Women: Running 
into trouble” reinforces my views on this point (see Kiefer, 2011). 
66 See Freund and Martin (2004) for a discussion of this. On this matter in relation to education, see 
Dewey (2009). 
67 While external systems of leisure and consumption certainly have their place, I would reiterate my own 
point from Chapter Four that these practices can also take on internal significances. It is by focusing on 
their physical activity potential alone that renders them meaningless except as means of acquiring external 
values. This is one of the primary lessons to be taken from Chapter Four of this thesis. Notably, it is also 
point developed in McNamee’s (1994) scarcely applied model of leisure and relational valuing. 
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 (intellect, information, the virtual) severs life from the organs of embodied activity 
and that what is needed is a thoroughgoing re-evaluation of the social organisation of 
movement.68 This relational orientation to talking about the fit body is one that will 
clearly have to extend far beyond the confines of the commercial fitness industries 
and individual activity. For example, this means acknowledging at the policy level 
the fact that, if “Food is Medicine” and “Exercise is Medicine,” then, so too, 
“Planning is Medicine.” The framing of the problem of fitness on individual terms, 
and in relation to consumption, is not working. It fails to account sufficiently for the 
fact that, as I have mentioned previously, all activity is not created equally and that, 
without a supportive background and environmental conditions of meaning, mere 
activity never constitutes experience. It fails to account sufficiently for the fact that 
almost no one would agree with the current policy position were it called by its real 
name – “Consumption is Medicine.” 
The problem of fitness requires an ecological orientation (to borrow from and 
extend Freund and Martin’s 2004 work). That is, the problem of fitness can only be 
solved by coming to terms with individual fitness as a made experience in the 
context of an ecology of objects, artefacts, ideas, practices, techniques, technologies, 
discourses, institutions, infrastructures, events, and associations that contribute to its 
progressive articulation – that enable and disable it – and make it possible for 





68 This is a point that Dewey made in his Democracy and Education, published almost a century ago (1916). 
He stated: ‘It would be impossible to state adequately the evil results which have flowed from this 
dualism of mind and body, much less exaggerate them’ (Dewey, 2009, p. 154). Today, more than ever, 
these evils are readily apparent, duly acknowledged, and there for all to see.  
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 5.6 Limitations of the Study 
Highlighting the limitations of any study is a task akin to those acts of contrition 
outlined in Chapter Two. It is, for all intensive purposes, a confessional practice in 
which one pleads one’s case and promises to do x, y, and z next time around. It 
merely serves to exonerate the researcher, unburden him/her of wrongs committed, 
and liberate in varying degrees corresponding to his/her willingness to play 
epistemological apologist. In spite of this, it will be instructive to outline a number 
of plausible limitations of this research. It will not be a ritualistic statement of 
limitations (to use Thompson et al’s 1997, p. 173 phrase). Rather, the following 
paragraphs highlight a number of reflexive considerations that extend beyond the 
strictly formal dimensions of this thesis’ structure in order to examine some future 
possibilities for the narrative field of Health and fitness. These limitations are 
coupled with and reconciled by a number of possible lines of inquiry that are suitable 
for future work in this area. It is noteworthy to mention that all of these lines of 
inquiry either have a natural affinity with, or follow on from, the Complemental 
Model of Health and fitness or encourage new ways of talking about the fit body. 
One specific limitation worth considering is the extent to which this thesis is 
guilty of overlooking larger and more established bodies of research with respect to 
fitness. Medical research, in particular the growing emphasis on sports medicine as a 
legitimate area of scientific inquiry, is worth underscoring here. Similarly so, is the 
level of depth and sophistication with which the psychological community have 
contributed to our current understanding of exercise and affective beneficence. One 
might ask why this research has largely been overlooked, especially since sociology 
and phenomenology are new on the scene when it comes to matters of reflexive 
embodiment. One of the main reasons for this is an over-emphasis on the merits of 
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 such research would have been at odds with the phenomenological task at hand. 
Phenomenology is concerned with the disclosure of entities and not merely their 
application as theoretical constructs. To clarify, where medico-scientific research in 
this area presupposes consensus, and proceeds to inquire into its various 
applications, the nature of phenomenological inquiry takes as its primary task the 
clarification of the conditions under which consensus is produced. This difference 
was reflected in Chapter Two’s account of fitness as an official discourse. In 
addition, the difference is also reflected in an internal critique of medico-scientific 
approaches in the following excerpt from McNamee’s (2005) Philosophy and the 
Sciences of Exercise, Health and Sport: 
That we need science to understand matters of disease, exercise, fitness, health, 
illness and so on is undisputed. [However] whether any empirical or scientific 
enterprise could properly proceed without philosophical reflection is not 
universally agreed...What is [also] less obvious...is the array of questions that are 
assumed in the very nature of the methods, reasonings or theories that underlie the 
activities of scientists. For researchers...the[se] kinds of reflections seem a mere 
annoyance [despite the fact that] the cultivation of broader concerns to inform 
their knowledge and understanding of scientific research is critical to their 
becoming reflexive practitioners as opposed to mere scientific technicians...To 
show how [a] problem may or may not have been conducted otherwise, and to 
show how observation is theory-laden, is crucial and all too often ignored. Even 
where it is not overlooked it not taken seriously (McNamee, 2005, pp. 1-2). 
 
The point McNamee is making here is that the problems of disease, exercise, fitness, 
Health, and illness are scarcely thought of as more than merely empirical, and that 
this orientation is largely unreflexive with respect to a narrative field as a whole. 
Where problems are addressed, they are largely deemed to be intraparadigmatic and 
reconcilable in a teleological manner. That is, problems are reconcilable over time, 
in the context of new information, varied sample sizes and types, and with greater 
methodological refinement. In the context of this thesis, medico-scientific research 
has been largely overlooked because of its general disregard for the types of social, 
cultural, and historical conditions of meaning which underpin fitness. It has been 
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 overlooked because it treats fitness as a natural category, whereas the 
phenomenological account sought here has treated fitness as the effect of 
naturalising processes. This is a point that has been laboured at from the very 
beginning of this thesis. Fitness is a slippery concept, and this is a fact that is cloaked 
by the very sciences that are said to be most vested in its understanding. 
In terms of future research, it would be instructive to engage collaborative 
research programmes which take insights from the now wide variety of disciplines 
investigating matters pertaining to the body. A caveat to this, however, is that, since 
research in the area of Health and fitness is now undertaken in functionally separated 
parts of the academy, the feasibility of a project would have to be questioned. For 
example, it is likely that, since socio-phenomenological work now critically 
examines the specific hierarchies, operations, and internal dynamics of scientific 
research communities, a conflict of interest would result. It is likely, for example, 
that such work would be seen as a threat to, and an undermining of, epistemological 
commitments that have been long since established in the medico-scientific 
community (see Latour & Woolgar, 1986). Building on my own observations 
outlined in the previous section, a proffered solution would be to encourage a 
broader spectrum of debate with respect to the relations of fit individuals experience 
between themselves and their material-social activity environment. Since this focus 
would explicitly traverse the personal, inter-personal, community, social, economic, 
and political realms, it is likely that it would also attract collaborative work on the 
basis of a confluence of interest (and would be less likely to descend into polemic 
over conflicting epistemological positions). 
A related observation on the theoretical shortcomings of this thesis concerns the 
concept of “wellbeing.” Since the problem of Health and fitness has been presented 
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 as one of commensurability – that is, since the body presupposed by health is not the 
same as the body presupposed by fitness – this thesis might rightly be accused of 
overlooking the potential for the concept of “wellbeing” to provide a natural 
language of comparison. In terms of the current risk context, even recent work in the 
sociology of health and illness has emphasised the need for a refocusing of attention 
towards wellbeing and towards the World Health Organization’s original 
formulation of health as a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing 
(WHO, 1946; see e.g. Bunton, Nettleton & Burrows, 1995; O’Brien, 1995; Petersen 
& Lupton, 1996; Tones & Green, 2005). So why, it might be asked, has this concept 
been overlooked here? The primary reason for this is related to criticisms discussed 
in previous paragraphs. For one, such an oversight is merely terminological and it is 
unlikely that adding wellbeing into the problematic equation of Health and fitness 
proposes anything more than an arbitrary solution. Indeed, given the generally 
unreflexive nature of much research in this area, one could even go as far as to say 
that the Health-as-wellbeing perspective merely dodges hard epistemological 
questions with respect to Health by redefining the terms in which the problem has 
been raised. What is worse, perhaps, is the thought that this position merely allows 
for a continuation of the ideology of Healthism by espousing the imperative of 
Health without having to deal with any of its conceptual baggage. While such 
perspectives are justified in seeking a broader context (within which to discuss 
individuals and their relations of fit to their activity-environments), the force of 
theories of health-as-wellbeing has been blunted by logically deficient and 
unpersuasive redefinitions (for a review, see Bloodworth & McNamee, 2007).   
A possible avenue for future research – and one that has been strengthened by 
this thesis’ conclusions – would be to explore the possibilities for wellbeing in terms 
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 of the Complemental model of Health and fitness. For example, an elaborated model, 
like the one outlined on the next page (“Figure 5.2 The Complemental Model of 
Health, fitness, and wellbeing”), might be instructive for future research (or merely 
teaching) purposes. Reflecting on “Figure 5.2 The Complemental Model of Health, 
fitness and wellbeing,” it could fruitfully be argued that “wellbeing” is an interesting 
additional element to the Health-fitness relation only insofar as it is defined in terms 
of an individuals’ relation to risk. That is, where Health corresponds to object-
centred risk (ob-c) and fitness to subject-centred risk (sb-c) – and where Health, 
fitness, and wellbeing (lower case) are depicted as the two opposite sides and the 
hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle respectively – the complemental model might 
well cater for “wellbeing” as a ratio of object-centred to subject-centred risk (ob-
c:sb-c). On the basis of such a model, an increase in general “wellbeing” would not 
correspond to an increase in either Health or fitness alone, but to a relation which is 


































On the whole, I would tend to stick with my original position outlined in 
Chapter Two (“2.2.2.2 Diagnosing Bodies”) that much research in the area of Health, 
fitness, and wellbeing merely allows for an account of modern bodies on both 



















 to have explicitly detected the problematic mismatch between these conflicting 
repertoires. Future research, along the lines developed in Neville (2012a, 2012b), 
would certainly help in reconciling the problem of conflicting ontologies. For now, 
however, it will suffice to say that the majority of appeals to wellbeing merely posit 
a new name for some very old ways of thinking. 
Finally, that much of the socio-phenomenological literature pertaining to fitness 
has analysed it through the lens of social class or gender (or both) is also a potential 
limitation of this research. In one sense this emphasis has been particularly desirable 
since, in treating social class and gender as explanatory variables, fitness 
participation is treated as an effect of goals, projects, and desires produced over and 
above individuals in objective structures. However, an over-emphasis of these as 
explanatory variables in this thesis would have rehearsed the overly deterministic 
picture that has already clouded much research into fitness participation. Moreover, 
it would have negated the importance of the negotiated character of fitness and the 
ontological weight attributed to the made experience of fitness participants in the 
second half of this thesis. In terms of social class, much existing research associates 
fitness with a distinctly middle-, service-, managerial-, or executive-class body 
consciousness. However, given the relentless individualising of our modern 
experiences of selfhood, it is unlikely that any variation of the classed identity has 
the explanatory powers it once had.69 Moreover, since much of this previous 
research involves the theoretical assumption that class identities are inscribed on the 
body (and can be read off those cultural scripts which are deemed reflective of that 
particular class taste) the proverbial tail is often left wagging the dog (a point 
                                                            
69 In fact, there is much work being undertaken in sociology on this very matter and on the extent to 
which social class (like so many other standards of reference) has lost it explanatory powers. Beck’s (Beck 
& Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Beck & Willms, 2004; see also Bauman, 2000, 2001, 2007) notion of the 
zombie category is the most advanced articulation of this view. 
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 laboured at length in Chapter Three section “3.1.1 From Critique to Matters of 
Concern”). 
The case is less clear with respect to gender. It might be said that this thesis is 
guilty of overlooking the gendered dimensions of fitness participation and how 
patterns of negotiation might be seen to differ between sexes. Though it is hardly the 
place to go into such matters in detail, it might be useful for the purposes of 
defending this thesis’ approach to highlight two meanings of the term “gender.” On 
the one hand “gender” implies sex, sexual identity or, perhaps more precisely, the 
cultural organisation and elaboration of sexed roles. On this account of “gender,” this 
study is certainly guilty of not explicitly offering accounts of the female experience 
of fitness. That is, this thesis has not sought to represent the female voice. However, 
there is a broader definition of “gender” which takes into account its more general 
sense in terms of engendering (i.e. to make, give rise to, create, etc.). The notion of a 
negotiated character of fitness outlined in the previous sections and in Chapter Four 
is entirely commensurate with (and in fact takes as its formative influence) feminist 
accounts that emphasise the gendered nature of identity in this broader sense of the 
term (see e.g. Bell, 1999; Butler, 1990, 1993, 1994; de Lauretis, 1984; Scott, 1991). 
The notion that fitness is a process (doing fitness) through which identities are 
constructed (being someone through fitness), rather than an inherent feature tied to 
individual bodies, resonates particularly well with recent developments in the study 
of gendered identities.  
The task for future research, it seems, would be to reconsider previous research 
that takes social class and gender as explanatory variables. Since it is itself a 
gendering process, future research might do well to investigate how fitness, its 
practices, discourses, and institutions are contributing to the changing nature of the 
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 classed and gendered dimensions of identity. Rather than treating social class and 
gender as causative of the engagement in fitness practices and as reflective of 
previously established norms, future research would likely benefit from analyses into 
whether the creative, playful, and somaesthetic potential of fitness can contribute to 
the establishment of new norms of identification, association, and behaviour. 
5.7 Concluding Thoughts: Fitness, Sisyphus, and the Absurd Hero 
It is fitting perhaps that we should encounter Sisyphus in the concluding 
passages of this thesis. For one, previous researches (however insufficient I have 
found their interpretations to be) have led us here. It is fitting that we should 
encounter Sisyphus in conclusion because he is, as Camus (2003) explained, “the 
absurd hero.” Previous researches have taught us nothing with regards to fitness if 
not the fact that exercising is an absurd pastime. This is a lesson that legendary 
Olympic track and field coach Bill Bowerman learned during his tenure at Oregon 
and through his pioneering work on jogging in America during the late 1960s. 
Bowerman explained: ‘Running is basically an absurd pastime on which to be 
exhausting ourselves.’ But unlike previous researches, Bowerman knew Sisyphus 
only too well and continued: ‘But, if you can find meaning in the kind of running 
you have to do to stay on this team [then] chances are you’ll be able find meaning in 
another absurd pastime – life.’70 It is fitting that we should encounter Sisyphus in 
conclusion because this thesis has also been a story of finding meaning in the 
previously established “absurd.” It has been a story of practical commitment, of 
made experience, of negotiating multiple temporal planes of experience, and of a 
kind of pleasure and significance that comes only from openness and receptivity to 
                                                            
70 These quotations are taken from Bowerman’s portrayal in the feature film Without Limits, 1998. [Feature 
Film] Directed by Robert Towne. USA: Warner Bros. 
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 one’s activity-environment. Moreover, it is fitting that we have ended up here 
because, for Camus, Sisyphus’ noble heroism is also defined by a complemental 
relation. The absurd, Camus writes, is essentially a divorce. It lies in neither of the 
compared elements, but is born of their confrontation. To say that Sisyphus is the 
“absurd” hero, is to say that he is, as much through his passions as through his 
torture. Camus concludes: 
All Sisyphus’ silent joy is contained therein. His fate belongs to him. His rock is his 
thing...I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds one’s burden 
again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises 
rocks. He too concludes that all is well. This universe henceforth without a master 
seems to him neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake 
of that night-filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward the 
heights is enough to fill a man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy (Camus, 
1983, p. 123). 
 
Despite the ephemerality of mastery over nature and a world that is indifferent to 
his/her purposes, the Sisyphean is neither naïve nor wholly ambivalent about this 
condition. Rather, the story reframed in this positive manner, is one of value to be 
negotiated in the shadow of this torment. It is a value that puts paid to this condition 
and expresses a silent joy that is to be found therein. I hope to have shown in this 
thesis that the story of fitness can, too, be reframed as a story of negotiation. I hope 
to have shown that this story of negotiation is akin to the story of Sisyphus – one of a 
higher fidelity, and confronting shadowy torment with silent joy. This thesis will 
have warranted a mere half of its energies if it has shown that the value of fitness can 
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The Research: What’s it all about? 
First off I would like to thank you for your expressed interest in this research. 
This research is being undertaken at the Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT), 
within the School of Hospitality Management and Tourism, Cathal Brugha St., 
Dublin 1. The research reflects an ongoing interest and commitment in this 
Institution to the development and facilitation of learning about leisure studies in 
Ireland. The background for this research is one with which you will be familiar. 
At a broad level, we live in a society in which there is increasing encouragement 
for us to be responsible for our own health. Our standards of health have changed 
and, by and large, we live in a society in which our quality of life can be managed by 
if we assume a proactive approach. Because of the wealth of information about the 
positive benefits of engaging in physical activity, exercising for health and fitness 
has taken a position at the heart of this. In fact, your membership at your local health 
and fitness club is a testament to this claim. In spite of this encouragement to engage 
in healthy free-time leisure activities, we also live busier lives. Not only do we 
assume our normal, working and family roles, but there are a greater variety of social 
and non-active leisure opportunities within which we can choose to be involved, or 
not. So the question arises: where does physical activity and exercise fit in? How do 
I balance the requirements for family, work, and socialising with the increasing 
demands for healthy activity? These questions are at the core of this project.  
The basic idea of this research is to try to understand how people negotiate 
fitness participation; that is, how they learn about, organise, and manage their fitness 
participation within their daily life, and around their everyday activities. This is 
where you come in! What is required of you as a participant in this project, and 
someone who acknowledges the value of exercising for fitness, is a number of 
important things. First of all, the purpose of this document is to ascertain your 
informed consent to be involved in this research (or not), and to find out some of 
your personal details. Secondly, this research requires you to participate in an audio-
taped recorded interview where we can talk about your fitness activity. 
 
Regards, Ross Neville 
247 
 Expression of Interest and Informed Consent 
The purpose of this form is to ascertain your informed consent to contribute to 
this study (as required by the Dublin Institute of Technology Research Ethics 
Committee). If you would like to participate in this research, please complete the 
following. 
Participation in this research involves being interviewed by a researcher, Ross 
Neville, from the Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT). The interview will last 
approximately one hour, notes will be taken during the interview process, and the 
interview will be audio-taped for later transcription. Participants can withdraw their 
involvement at any time during the research process. 
The information that you contribute to this research will only ever be used for 
this research project which seeks to investigate how fitness activities are negotiated 
in the context of everyday life and its responsibilities. At all times, interview-related 
information will be kept confidential as it is not the purpose of the study to focus on 
any given individual, but on the experience of “going to the gym” and “working 
out.” To that end, you will only ever be referred to under a pseudonym and your 
name will not be connected with any of the study’s results or any material published 
using the results of this study thereafter.  
I hope that this information helps to clarify the broad aims of the research, the 
methods involved, and your place in the research process. If you have any questions 
at any time during the research process, please contact Ross Neville on 087 2945640. 
If you would like to participate in this study, please indicate and sign below. 
Informed Consent 
(Please circle the response below that is appropriate for you) 
I have been fully briefed on the aims of this research, the method involved, and what 
is required of me as a participant and I would LIKE to be involved in this research 
project. 
I have been fully briefed and would prefer NOT to be involved in the research. 
 
Signature of participant: __________________________  Date: _______________ 
Signature of researcher: __________________________  Date: _______________ 
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 Personal Information 










Marital status: (Please circle the response below that is appropriate for you) 
Never married   Married  Separated Divorced Widowed Other 
If “Other,” please specify  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Education: (Please circle the response below that is appropriate for you) 













Interview Themes and Questions 
Fitness History 
How long have you been a member of a gym? 
Has it been the same gym throughout this period? 
If Yes: What are the reasons for staying?  
If No: What prompted you to change? 
Have you been a frequent user/attendee over this period? 
On average, how many times per week? 
What days of the week? 
What are the sorts of activities you do at the gym? 
Has this changed over the course of your membership? 
Framing Fitness 
Would you describe yourself as a fit person? 
How would you describe yourself (or somebody else) as “being fit”?  
What distinguishes a person as “being fit” rather than “not being fit”? 
What sort of person would that be like?  
Negotiating Fitness Activities 
What is a typical day like when you go (or have planned to go) to the gym? 
Could you describe it to me? 
Do you go in the morning/afternoon/evening? ...before or after work? 
...during the week or at the weekend? ...with anyone or on your own? 
Is there any reason for going at this time? ...why this might change? 
Do you prefer going to the gym on different days/at different times? 
Do you do anything to prepare for your workout? 
How do you generally feel about going to the gym before/after work?  
What does it feel like before/after a workout? Is this different on different 
days? Does it always feel like that? Is this feeling different on different 
days/at different times? Could you describe it to me? 
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